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The practice of arbitration in seventeenth-century England has not been the subject of close 
study. Whilst it is recognised that arbitration was a frequent and favoured means to resolve 
disputes during this period, previous historians of law and social relations have focused their 
interests elsewhere. For this reason, little has been done to account for the passing of the 
Arbitration Act of 1698, the first statute on arbitration to be enacted in England. The statute 
authorised the common law courts to imprison individuals for contempt of court if they did 
not comply with an arbitration, thereby instituting a procedure that is dissonant with the 
conciliatory or ‘neighbourly’ view of arbitration espoused by historians. The aim, then, of 
this dissertation is two-fold. First, it seeks to examine the structure and practice of arbitration 
in seventeenth-century England to provide an introduction to the topic that is long overdue. 
This will offer the opportunity to question some of the prevailing assumptions about the 
process, and it will be argued that arbitration was often far more coercive and law-related 
than previous scholars have indicated. Second, the dissertation seeks to explain why the 
Arbitration Act of 1698 was made. By analysing the development of the enforcement 
procedure on which the statute was based and the circumstances surrounding its drafting and 
enactment, it will be argued that the making of the Arbitration Act was in fact a two-stage 
process, the stages of which were largely unconnected to one another. Whereas the 
enforcement procedure the statute authorised first arose to ensure the specific performance of 
an award, the decision made as a result of an arbitration, the statute itself was passed to 
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This dissertation examines the practice of arbitration in seventeenth-century England. It was 
conceived to address the incongruity that whilst historians have recognised the importance of 
arbitration to early modern individuals, little has been written about the process itself. 
Arbitration was (and is) a method of dispute resolution whereby individuals authorised one or 
more third parties known as ‘arbitrators’ to decide their differences. As many scholars have 
noted, it was also a principal way to resolve disputes in the seventeenth century, one that was 
employed far more frequently than litigation.1 Yet what the process entailed, how it was 
perceived by contemporaries, and whether it changed over the period in question are matters 
which have remained predominantly unexplored and unanswered. This lack of scrutiny can 
be largely attributed to the fact that the interests of scholars have lain elsewhere. For legal 
historians, scholars whom one might expect to have examined arbitration given its modern, 
legalised form, these interests have centred on the law and its doctrinal development.2 For 
social historians who have investigated the ways in which early modern individuals resolved 
disputes and maintained social order, these interests have instead revolved around the use of 
litigation3 and the incidence of crime.4 Put simply, the study of arbitration has fallen outside 
the confines of preceding historiographical trends. 
 
1
 Most notable is legal historian John Baker’s comment that ‘[t]he courts of law never, at any period 
in history, displaced arbitration as a normal method of dispute resolution in England’. J.H. Baker, 
‘From lovedays to commercial arbitration’ in his Collected papers on English legal history (3 vols., 
Cambridge, 2013), vol. I, p. 432.  
2
 For examples that will be used in this dissertation, see Simpson, CLC; Ibbetson, HILO; Baker, ELH; 
J.S. Rogers, The early history of the law of bills and notes (Cambridge, 1995); J. Swain, The law of 
contract, 1670-1870 (Cambridge, 2015). 
3
 For example, C.W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and vipers of the commonwealth: the ‘lower branch’ of the 
legal profession in early modern England (Cambridge, 1986); Lawyers, litigation and English society 
since 1450 (1998); C. Muldrew, ‘Credit and the courts: debt litigation in a seventeenth-century urban 
community’, EHR 46:1 (1993), pp. 23-38; W.A. Champion, ‘Recourse to law and the meaning of the 
great litigation decline, 1650-1750’ in Communities and courts in Britain 1150-1900 (1977), pp. 179-
98. 
4
 For example, J.S. Cockburn, ed., Crime in England 1550-1800 (1977); J.A. Sharpe, Crime in 
seventeenth-century England. A county study (Cambridge, 1983); Crime in early modern England 
1550-1750 (1984); J.M. Beattie, Crime and the courts, 1660-1800 (Oxford, 1986); C. Herrup, The 
common peace: participation and the criminal law in seventeenth-century England (Cambridge, 
1987). 
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 This is not to say that arbitration has been entirely overlooked in previous studies. 
Indeed, it is widely held amongst social historians that arbitration was a conciliatory and 
‘neighbourly’ way to resolve disputes in seventeenth-century England. They have maintained 
that because its procedure was informal and was often carried out by friends, neighbours, or 
kin, arbitration was more likely than litigation to bring a peaceful and lasting settlement to a 
dispute.5 This view of arbitration has been applied in turn to argue that early modern England 
was a consensual society: the preference shown by contemporaries for the process has been 
used to contend that English society encouraged a ‘culture of reconciliation’;6 and the fact 
that lawsuits were often concluded by arbitration has been emphasised to claim that the wide 
scale litigiousness of the period did not have a corrosive effect on social relations.7 Yet by 
stressing its conciliatory nature, scholars have repeatedly construed arbitration as an endpoint 
in the disputing process. Less attention has been given to the instances in which arbitration 
failed to resolve a dispute and to the mechanisms that were in place to enforce compliance 
with it.8  
 Admittedly, instances of ‘failed’ arbitration likely composed only a small portion of 
the total number of arbitrations conducted in the seventeenth century, but to disregard them 
entirely makes it difficult to explain the enactment of the Arbitration Act of 1698, the first 
statute on arbitration to be passed in England.9 The Act was fundamentally concerned with 
enforcement: it authorised the courts to imprison parties for contempt if they did not comply 
with an arbitration. Interestingly, this was done by means of a legal fiction.10 Parties who 
drew up a written contract known as a ‘submission’ to arbitrate their dispute were permitted 
to enter the document into a court’s rule book so that the terms of the submission could be 
 
5
 M. Ingram, ‘Communities and courts: law and disorder in early-seventeenth-century Wiltshire’ in 
Crime in England 1550-1800, ed. J.S. Cockburn (1977), pp. 110, 125-26; K. Wrightson, English 
society 1580-1680, 61-62. 
6
 C. Muldrew, ‘The culture of reconciliation: community and the settlement of economic disputes in 
early modern England’, HJ 39:4 (1996), pp. 915-42. 
7
 J.A. Sharpe, ‘“Such disagreement betwyx neighbours”: litigation and human relations in early 
modern England’ in Disputes and settlements: law and human relations in the west, ed. J. Bossy 
(Cambridge, 1983), pp. 167-87; ‘The people and the law’ in Popular culture in seventeenth-century 
England, ed. B. Reay (1985), pp. 244-70. 
8
 This is in contrast to work conducted on ‘failed’ arbitrations from the medieval period. For example, 
see J. Biancalana, ‘The legal framework of arbitration in fifteenth-century England’, AJLH 47:4 
(2005), pp. 347-82, at pp. 363-75; M. Stevens, ‘Failed arbitrations before the court of Common Pleas: 
cases relating to London and Londoners, 1400-68’, JLH 31:1 (2010), pp. 21-44. 
9
 ‘An act for determining differences by arbitration’, 9 & 10 Wm. III, c. 15. 
10
 L. Harmon, ‘Falling off the vine: legal fictions and the doctrine of substantive judgment’, Yale Law 
Journal 100 (1990), pp. 1-71; E. Moglen, ‘Legal fictions and common law legal theory: some 
historical reflections’, Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 10 (1990), pp. 33-62; J.H. Baker, The law’s 
two bodies: some evidential problems in English legal history (Oxford, 2001), pp. 33-57. 
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taken as having been ordered by the court itself. If these terms were later breached, most 
notably by having one of the parties not perform the arbitrator’s decision or ‘award’, the party 
would be held in contempt of the fictional rule and be subjected to the court’s penalising 
process. Whilst legal historians and scholars have shown that the Act’s enforcement 
procedure built on existing judicial practice11 and have offered legal explanations for its 
enactment,12 save for a few exceptions they have ignored the historical context in which the 
Act was made.13 Consequently, little has been done to consolidate the Act with the 
conciliatory view of arbitration put forward by social historians so that the question of why 
the Act was needed remains unresolved. 
 The aim, then, of this dissertation is two-fold. First, it seeks to provide what can be 
seen as a historical introduction to seventeenth-century arbitration by investigating what the 
process entailed and how it was practised. Second, it seeks to examine more fully the reasons 
for the enactment of the Arbitration Act in order to clarify why the enforcement procedure it 
authorised was needed. Chapters 1 and 2 will address the first of these aims albeit in different 
ways. Chapter 1 will consider the principal elements of arbitration—namely, the people it 
involved, the submission used to contract it, and the award which resulted from it—and will 
specify the legal rules that applied to each of them. As these rules prescribed how an 
arbitration should be composed and conducted, they provide a useful framework on which to 
base the rest of this study. With this framework in place, Chapter 2 will proceed to examine 
how arbitration was actually practised by individuals in the seventeenth century and the 
reasons they might have had for choosing it. Relying on contemporary accounts of arbitration 
found in diaries and letters, the chapter will retrace the steps disputing parties would have 
taken to set up and carry out an arbitration, from their initial agreement to arbitrate the 
dispute to their later performance of the arbitrator’s award. Chapters 3 and 4 will then shift 
the focus to the second aim of the dissertation, to consider why the Arbitration Act was made, 
 
11
 Horwitz and Oldham, ‘Arbitration’, pp. 141-43. 
12
 For example, P. Sayre, ‘Development of commercial arbitration law’, Yale Law Journal 37:5 
(1928), pp. 595-617, at p. 604; S. Simpson, ‘Specific enforcement of arbitration contracts’, University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 83:2 (1934), pp. 160-76, at pp. 160-61; E. Wolaver, ‘The historical 
background of commercial arbitration’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 83:2 (1934), pp. 132-
46, at p. 139; E. Moglen, ‘Commercial arbitration in the eighteenth century: searching for the 
transformation of American law’, Yale Law Journal 93:1 (1983), pp. 135-52, at p. 137; D. Yarn, ‘The 
death of ADR: a cautionary tale of isomorphism through institutionalization’, Pennsylvania State Law 
Review 108:4 (2004), pp. 929-1015, at pp. 985-86. 
13
 Notable exceptions include Horwitz and Oldham, ‘Arbitration’, 138-44; C. Burset, ‘Merchant 
courts, arbitration, and the politics of commercial litigation in the eighteenth-century British Empire’, 
LHR 34:3 (2016), pp. 615-47, at pp. 615-17. 
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with each chapter examining a different aspect of the Act’s making. Chapter 3 will explore 
how the enforcement procedure authorised by the Act first developed and will lend support to 
the scholarly claim that the statute built on existing judicial practice. But the chapter will go 
beyond mere confirmation: it will investigate how arbitration was enforced by the courts 
before the Act’s passing to contextualise the change it later implemented, and it will bring 
into question explanations raised in previous scholarship for this change. Finally, Chapter 4 
will centre on the making of the Arbitration Act itself, examining the circumstances 
surrounding its drafting and approval. It will reveal the ostensibly surprising finding that the 
Act had been composed by the philosopher John Locke in his role as a member of William 
III’s Board of Trade and will argue that the statute had been advanced more to address 
commercial and political exigencies of the 1690s than to alter or improve how arbitration was 
enforced at the time. Together Chapters 3 and 4 will show that the question of why the 
Arbitration Act was needed is in fact more complex than previously recognised, and it is 
hoped that by taking the time to investigate the matter at length, this dissertation will be 
better positioned to comment on what the Act’s passing says about the conciliatory view of 
arbitration espoused by scholars.  
1. Sources 
 
As it is the intention of the dissertation to approach the subject of seventeenth-century 
arbitration from multiple angles, taking into consideration factors that are legal, social, 
political and even commercial in nature, it is worth examining the principal categories of 
primary source material on which this study will rely. These categories are: treatises on 
arbitration; legal reports and records; diaries and letters; and sources relating to the 
Arbitration Act. The following discussion will briefly introduce each category of sources, 
explaining how they will be used in this study and, where applicable, addressing some of the 
issues encountered in analysing them. 
 
1.1 Treatises on arbitration 
 
The first category of primary source material that will be used in this dissertation are treatises 
on arbitration that were published during the period. Admittedly, stating that these works 
were ‘on’ arbitration is somewhat misleading as only one of the treatises was devoted entirely 
to the subject; the rest considered the process alongside other matters. It is also worth noting 
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that these works were essentially legal in character: they were written by lawyers and, despite 
some claims otherwise, they were intended primarily for a legal audience. As such, their use 
in this study will be largely confined to examining the ‘law’ side of this dissertation, in 
particular the legal rules that prescribed the practice of arbitration at the time. 
 Of the treatises on arbitration from the period, there are three which merit particular 
attention as they examine the process in a far greater level of detail. The first is the legal 
writer William West’s Symboleography, a work that was first published in 1590 and then 
amended and reprinted in two parts, the first in 1592 and the second in 1594.14 It was in this 
second part that West first included an entire chapter on arbitration, entitled ‘Of 
Compromises and Arbitrements’ and composed of fifty sections,15 in which he examined 
issues pertaining to the people involved in arbitration, the submission (‘compromise’), and 
the award (‘arbitrement’), and provided examples of the legal instruments employed in the 
process.16 Whilst West’s work predates the seventeenth century and cites legal cases and 
other authorities that are even older, there are nevertheless two specific reasons for including 
the work in this study. First, as the treatise represented the earliest, systematic analysis of 
arbitration, it would become by the seventeenth century an authority in its own right, cited by 
legal writers and practitioners alike.17 It was therefore historically significant to the period, if 
less useful for commenting on the practice of arbitration as it existed at the time. Second, 
Symboleography also served, both in form and substance, as inspiration for later treatises on 
the process, in some instances writers even copying West’s text verbatim into their own 
writings. It seems sensible, then, to examine the text ‘at source’ rather than having to rely on 
second-hand versions of its analysis. 
 The second treatise to consider arbitration in more detail is one that was actually from 
the seventeenth century, although initially its treatment of the subject was spread over two 
publications. In 1647, John March, the Commonwealth legal writer, reporter, and reformer, 
published a work with its full title being Actions for Slaunder, or, a Methodicall Collection 
 
14
 For information on the publication of West’s works, see E. Poole, ‘West’s Symboleography: an 
Elizabethan formulary’ in Law and social change in British history, eds. J.A. Guy and H.G. Beale 
(1984), pp. 96-106.  
15
 The chapter is actually composed of forty-nine sections, the forty-sixth having been omitted from 
the text. This appears to have been rectified by the third edition of the treatise published in 1601. 
16
 West, Symboleography, fols. 3-16v. Keeping with the convention used by other scholars, my 
citations regarding this text will use the section numbers provided by West rather than the folio 
number. 
17
 Arbitrium redivivum, pp. 6-9, 15, 18; W. Sheppard, A grand abridgment of the common and statute 
law of England (1675), p. 175. 
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under certain Grounds and Heads…To which is added, Awards or Arbitrements.18 Whilst 
one may rightly question what the offence of slander and the practice of arbitration had to do 
with one another, as March himself explained, both issues tended to result in unnecessary 
litigation, much of which he claimed could be avoided if there were simply a better 
recognition of the legal grounds and rules relating to them.19 March’s endeavours were 
apparently well-received, for only a year later he published a second work on these issues that 
served to supplement, rather than revise, his original treatise.20 For this reason, March’s 
analysis of arbitration can be found in both parts of what collectively became known as 
Actions for Slander: in the first, consideration is given to what March identifies as the five 
parts of arbitration, a classification that was itself derived from an earlier decision of Sir 
James Dyer, the chief justice of the Common Pleas for the period of 1559-1582;21 in the 
second, whilst some additional reflection is given to the subject, particularly in relation to 
awards, most of the text is used to provide examples of written submissions and awards, 
some of which are taken directly from West’s earlier work. 
 The third treatise to note is one that may properly be called a treatise ‘on’ arbitration 
as it was the first work to consider arbitration as a subject matter in its own right. Published 
anonymously in 1694 as Arbitrium Redivivum, or the Law of Arbitration, it is also notable for 
the fact that it was printed only four years before the passing of the Arbitration Act.22 In 
terms of composition, much of the work compiles together earlier treatments of the subject, 
including the treatises of West and March but also Sir John Dodderidge’s The English 
Lawyer (1631),23 discussed below, and the legal reporter William Style’s The Practical 
Register (1657), which had abridged several legal cases concerning awards from the 1640s.24 
Usefully, the author tends to be more reflective in his analysis of the various components of 
arbitration, noting not just the legal rules and principles relating to a particular topic but also 
what the ‘usual course’ was at the time.25 The treatise therefore provides a window into the 
legal practice of arbitration at the end of the seventeenth century, and by comparing the work 
 
18
 March, Actions for slander I, with pp. 149-241 concerning arbitration.  
19
 Ibid., title page. 
20
 March, Actions for slander II, with pp. 32-97 concerning arbitration. 
21
 Dyer’s judgement, in which he set out the five things ‘incident’ to an award, was reported in 
Browne v Meverell (1561/2), Benl. 107. March also appears to have copied the pleadings of the case 
into the second part of his work. March, Actions for slander II, pp. 39-52. 
22
 Arbitrium redivivum. The title page notes that the author had also written Regula placitandi (1691), 
a pleading manual. 
23
 Refer to n. 26 below. 
24
 W. Style, Regestrum practicale: or, the practical register (1657). 
25
 For example, see Arbitrium Redivivum, pp. 39, 68, 77. 
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to earlier treatises on the process, it is possible to get a sense of how arbitration might have 
changed over the period. 
 Whilst Symboleography, Actions for Slander, and Arbitrium Redivivum were the most 
detailed works on arbitration to be published during or immediately before the seventeenth 
century, they were not the only works to examine the process. Other treatises which discussed 
its practice and which will be used in this study include the judge Sir John Dodderidge’s The 
English Lawyer (1631), which uses the subject of arbitration as an example of how the type 
of legal logic Dodderidge proposed in his treatise could be applied;26 the lawyer William 
Noy’s Principal Grounds and Maxims (1641), which includes a brief overview of the practice 
in recognition that parties involved in the other issues discussed in the work might seek for 
them to be ‘quietly ended by friends’;27 and the legal reformer William Sheppard’s two legal 
encyclopaedias, The Faithful Councellor (1651) and The Epitome of Laws (1656), both of 
which consider aspects of arbitration, such as the common ‘faults’ of awards, in the context 
of a wider analysis of the legal system at the time.28 Consideration will also be given to legal 
dictionaries from the period, such as John Cowell’s The Interpreter (1607) or Thomas 
Blount’s Nomo-Lexicon (1670), as almost invariably they contained definitions and 
etymologies of words relating to arbitration, suggesting that, at least in a legal context, there 
was a clear idea of what constituted the process.29 
 
1.2 Legal reports and records 
 
The second category of source material to be used in this dissertation, classified here as legal 
reports and records, can essentially be subdivided into two groups. The first group are the 
nominate reports, a series of printed reports of legal arguments and discussions had 
principally before the justices of the common law courts which took on the name of the 
 
26
 J. Dodderidge, The English lawyer. Describing a method for the managing of the lawes of this land 
(1631), 166-90. As noted in the preface to the treatise, an earlier work attributed to Dodderidge, The 
lawyers light (1629), was printed from an imperfect copy of the manuscript used for the treatise. For 
more information on these works, see R. Terrill, ‘Humanism and rhetoric in legal education: the 
contribution of Sir John Dodderidge (1555-1628), JLH 2:1 (1981), pp. 30-44. 
27
 W. Noy, A treatise of the principall grounds and maximes of the lawes of this kingdome (1641), pp. 
125-130.  
28
 W. Sheppard, The faithful councellor: or the marrow of the law (1651), pp. 259-64, 649-50; An 
epitome of all the common and statute lawes of this nation (1656), pp. 105-15. 
29
 J. Cowell, The interpreter: or booke containing the signification of words (Cambridge, 1607); T. 
Blount, Nomo-lexicon: a law-dictionary (1670). 
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reporter who was attributed, however disingenuously, with having recorded them.30 For 
doctrinal legal historians of the seventeenth century, the nominate reports are their bread and 
butter; a reliance on their use is taken as so self-evident that, on the whole, little reflection is 
given to their nature as a primary source. As this dissertation is not about the law but rather 
considers the law’s impact on the contemporary practice of arbitration, the intended audience 
of this study is more wide-ranging than just legal historians, so it is worth taking some time to 
consider both the reports and the general practice of law reporting in more detail.  
As John Baker and others have shown, the tradition of law reporting has a long and 
varied history in England, but its purpose has largely remained the same.31 Given that the 
official record of a court tended to document only the formulaic pleadings of the parties to a 
lawsuit and the end-result of their case, for the sake of legal learning and to ground legal 
practitioners’ arguments, the practice developed of recording in manuscript form what was 
discussed by the lawyers and judges in banc. With the advent of printing, many of these 
manuscript reports were put into print, and by the seventeenth century both the manuscript 
versions and their printed copies had become an important resource for substantive and 
procedural law. The nominate reports are, therefore, an invaluable tool for learning about the 
legal treatment of arbitration at the time, and by undertaking an exhaustive and, admittedly, 
exhausting search of the reports connected to the period, more than 500 distinct cases have 
been uncovered that involve arbitration in some way.32 These reported cases will be used 
primarily in two ways. First, they will serve as an additional source for learning about the 
legal rules prescribing the practice of arbitration. Indeed, as the treatises on arbitration 
discussed above were often based on these cases, in analysing a given rule on arbitration, 
priority will be given to the reported case or cases to which the rule related, they being the 
more direct or ‘root’ source. Second, the reports will be used to examine how the courts 
enforced arbitration, a particular area of interest given that the Arbitration Act was concerned 
with enforcement. As, broadly speaking, the format of a case recorded in the nominate 
reports begins by identifying the legal action on which the case was brought, it is possible to 
determine what actions were used to enforce arbitration and to get a sense for which of these 
 
30
 Baker, ELH, pp. 192-95. 
31
 Ibid., pp. 188-97; C. Stebbings, ed., Law Reporting in Britain (1995). 
32
 The principal categories of cases involving arbitration are as follows: those where a suit was stated 
to have been resolved by arbitration; where an award was pleaded to bar further proceedings in a suit; 
where an aggrieved party sued an opponent for not performing the award; where a legal matter 
relating to the validity of an award was heard on appeal; where an aggrieved party motioned for a writ 
of attachment to be issued against his opponent for not performing the award. This final category will 
be examined in more detail in Chapter 3.  
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actions were preferred at the time. Moreover, as the reports document in banc discussions, 
they can be used to gauge the receptiveness of the judges to particular arguments or practices. 
This will prove crucial to the dissertation’s analysis of references, a specific type of 
arbitration whereby a pending lawsuit was referred by order of a court to an arbitrator or 
‘referee’ to decide, as it would appear that during the 1650s and 1660s the court of King’s 
Bench departed from the courts of Common Pleas and Exchequer, the other two common law 
courts, by refusing to enforce references in a new way. 
Yet as even legal historians would admit, using the nominate reports as a source 
material is not without issue. For one thing, most of the reporters had never intended for their 
reports to be distributed amongst a wider audience, so they made no attempt at 
comprehensive coverage: they included only those cases that they believed were of interest, 
and they focused on the courts that were deemed to be most important to the development of 
the law.33 One consequence of this practice was that, at least for the seventeenth century, 
there are few nominate reports of cases heard before the courts of Common Pleas and 
Exchequer, the court of King’s Bench having been considered to be the more innovative at 
the time.34 The fact, then, that the court of King’s Bench diverged from the other courts in its 
enforcement of references in the 1650s and 1660s is only known because it was explicitly 
stated in discussions before its justices;35 unfortunately, no reported cases exist for the courts 
of Common Pleas and Exchequer to confirm this position. Another issue with the reports is 
that some are of objectively poor quality or, due to problems with printing, are factually 
incorrect.36 Legal historians are accordingly urged to consult the manuscript versions of the 
reports where available, advice which this dissertation has not followed.37 The only excuse 
that can be given for this lapse is timing: as the law and its effects on arbitration represent 
only one component of this study, priority had to be given to analysing other areas instead. 
Whilst this decision may be regretted at certain points in the following analysis, particularly 
in relation to the reluctance shown by the court of King’s Bench noted above, these 
misgivings are to an extent eased in knowing that this dissertation is and only claims to be an 
introduction to the subject—further research can always been undertaken. 
 
33
 Baker, ELH, p. 194. 
34
 Ibid.  
35
 Kene v Fleming (1666), 2 Keb. 22; Derbishire v Canon (1669), 2 Keb. 579; Tremenhere v Tresilim 
(1670), 2 Keb. 664. 
36
 Baker, ELH, pp. 192, 194. 
37
 Ibid.; J. Oldham, ‘Detecting non-fiction: sleuthing among manuscript case reports for what was 
really said’ in Law reporting in Britain, ed. C. Stebbings (1995), pp. 133-68. 
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The second sub-group of legal source material that will be used in this study are the 
order books for the Western Circuit of the assizes, covering the period 1629-1688.38 The 
Western Circuit was one of the six circuits of counties through which the common law 
justices and some serjeants-at-law would travel twice a year to administer the trials of suits 
initiated in their own courts, an event that was collectively known as the assizes.39 By 
convention, when the justices, who travelled in pairs, would visit a particular county, they 
would divide between themselves the business to be attended, one administering criminal 
trials (the ‘crown side’) and the other civil trials (the ‘nisi prius side’).40 Whilst the crown 
side of the assizes has received disproportionately more attention in previous studies, 
particularly those by historians of crime,41 this dissertation will focus instead on the nisi prius 
side of business to which the order books relate. Essentially, the order books recorded the 
directions or commands made by the administering assize judge during the course of a trial. 
These directions dealt with a wide range of issues, many of which were procedural, but the 
ones that are of interest to this study are those concerning references, the type of arbitration 
initiated when a pending lawsuit was referred to arbitration on the order of a court. In the 
common law courts, this order was typically made at trial, when the parties or their legal 
counsel were present to agree to the reference, so for this reason the order books provide an 
unparalleled view into how this form of arbitration began. But not only do the order books 
record how a reference was initiated; they also reveal what occurred when the assize judge’s 
order was not followed. They are, therefore, a useful source for examining methods of 
enforcement and, as we shall see, for contextualising the enforcement procedure that would 
be implemented by the Arbitration Act. 
As a final point to note, it must be mentioned that parts of the Western Circuit’s order 
books have been printed in previous works. On behalf of the Somerset record society, T.G. 
Barnes transcribed the assize orders that were made in Somerset, one of the six counties on 
the Western Circuit, for the period 1629-1640,42 an undertaking that J.S. Cockburn continued 
 
38
 TNA, ASSI 24/20-23. These order books are the only surviving records of their kind from the 
assize circuits, the others having apparently been lost or destroyed. For more information on the 
surviving records of the assizes, see J.S. Cockburn, ‘Introduction’ in Western circuit assize orders 
1629-1648 (1976). 
39
 For a historical overview of the assizes and the six assize circuits, see Cockburn, Assizes, pp. 23-48. 
40
 For the crown side of business, see Cockburn, Assizes, pp. 86-133. For the nisi prius side, see 
Cockburn, Assizes, pp. 134-50; Baker, ELH, pp. 23-25. 
41
 For example, Herrup, The common peace; L. Knafla, ‘“John at love killed her”: the assizes and the 
criminal law in early modern England’, University of Toronto Law Journal 35:3 (1985), pp. 305-20. 
42
 T.G. Barnes, ed., Somerset assize orders 1629-1640 (Frome, 1959). 
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for 1640-1659.43 Then, separately, Cockburn also compiled a calendar of the assize orders 
from the entire circuit for the period 1629-1648, which, whilst not presenting the exact text as 
written in the order books, does get across the principal issues, actors, and directions 
specified in each order.44 Whilst these are useful resources, particularly to get a sense of the 
types of matters dealt with on the nisi prius side of the assizes in addition to administering 
trials, this dissertation will instead rely on the original manuscript sources for its analysis. 
Partly this is to ensure that the original form and language of the orders are preserved, but, 
more importantly, it is because the orders made in the second half of the seventeenth century, 
a period which, on the whole, has not been covered by Barnes and Cockburn, will be crucial 
to this study. It is in these later assize orders that a change in how the orders made to refer a 
suit to arbitration was first implemented, a change that will prove significant to explaining in 
turn how the enforcement procedure of the Arbitration Act developed.  
 
1.3 Diaries and letters 
 
The third category of source material that will be examined in the dissertation are 
contemporary diaries and letters, two related types of sources that will be used to investigate 
what the practice of arbitration was like beyond the legal rules that prescribed it. The decision 
to analyse these sources has been heavily influenced by the works of Craig Muldrew and 
Christine Churches, both of whom recognised that legal records and reports can only tell us 
so much about disputes and the efforts taken to resolve them.45 Their own analyses of these 
types of sources have also revealed how contemporary diaries and letters can be used to 
explore not just the events that occurred outside the courtroom but also the motivations and 
responses contemporaries had in relation to them, a finding that has served to inspire this 
dissertation’s study of why contemporaries chose to arbitrate their disputes. However, in 
selecting which diaries and letters to include in this analysis, it must be noted that only those 
that have since been put into print have been examined. Whilst this decision was again made 
to prioritise research into other areas, it was also taken in recognition that a given diary or 
letter-book from the period is not guaranteed to include accounts of arbitration. Indeed, of the 
 
43
 J.S. Cockburn, ed., Somerset assize orders 1640-1659 (Frome, 1971). 
44
 J.S. Cockburn, ed., Western Circuit assize orders 1629-1648 (1976). 
45
 Muldrew, ‘Culture of reconciliation’; C. Churches, ‘False friends, spiteful enemies: a community at 
law in early modern England’, HJ 71:174 (1998), pp. 52-74. For a similar perspective, see S. Roberts, 
‘The study of dispute: anthropological perspectives’ in Dispute and settlements: law and human 
relations in the West, ed. J. Bossy (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 19-23. 
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more than forty printed diaries and letter-books that were consulted for this study, far fewer, 
only about twenty, recounted occasions in which the writers participated in arbitration in 
some way. Rather than take the time to seek out manuscript sources that are in no way certain 
to touch on the topic of arbitration, it was thought best to focus attention and efforts on more 
productive outcomes. 
 Yet even restricting the analysis to printed diaries and letters has not been without 
challenge. For one thing, despite every intention to consider as diverse an array of sources as 
possible, the extent to which this study can be seen as ‘typical’ of the practice of arbitration at 
the time is limited to those works that contain accounts of arbitration. And far from 
representing a wide cross-section of seventeenth-century society, the writers who described 
arbitration in their diaries and letters were a more homogenous bunch: whilst geographically 
diverse, they were entirely men; they were of the ‘middling sort’ or higher;46 and their 
professions were largely, though not entirely, limited to matters concerning trade, law and 
policy, and religion. Nor were their accounts of arbitration set out in the same level of detail. 
Whereas some accounts of the process consisted of several paragraphs or even pages of 
discussion, others were nothing more than the comment that the writer had ‘made an end’ of 
a dispute.47 Whilst both types of description will find use in this study, the more detailed 
accounts tend to have greater analytical value as more can be drawn from them, so they will 
be relied on more frequently as a result. By favouring these accounts, however, the analysis 
will at times become skewed toward these writer’s remarks, bringing into doubt whether it 
can depict a representative view of what arbitration was like at the time. 
 A second challenge presented in analysing these sources is language. Whilst there 
may have been a more fixed vocabulary for arbitration in legal publications, the writers of the 
diaries and letters consulted for this study often employed a far looser terminology to refer to 
the process, such as to bring an ‘end’ to a dispute or to make ‘peace’ or ‘friends’ of the 
disputing parties. The problem with such language is that it was not used exclusively for 
arbitration: writers also employed the same terms and phrases in relation to other out-of-court 
methods of dispute resolution. How, then, is it possible to know when the writers were 
referring to arbitration and when they were not? Unfortunately, there is no fool-proof way to 
get around this issue. Indeed, there are many contemporary accounts where it may never be 
possible to say with complete certainty that the process described was arbitration. The best, 
 
46
 J. Barry and C.W. Brooks, eds., The middling sort of people. Culture, society and politics in 
England, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke, 1994). 
47
 A. Macfarlane, ed., The diary of Ralph Josselin, 1616-1683 (1976), p. 116.  
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then, that this dissertation can do is to set out the approach it has taken to identify and classify 
accounts as arbitration, recognising that there might be other ways to address this issue as 
well.48  
Essentially, the approach of this dissertation is composed of two limbs. The first limb 
is the more straightforward and relies on the fact that whilst the writers of diaries and letters 
might have used a looser language in referring to arbitration, they did still employ words like 
‘arbitrator’ and ‘award’. As these words were specific to arbitration—they were not used in 
relation to other dispute resolution methods—it is presumed that when an account contains 
these keywords, the process it described was arbitration. The second limb of the dissertation’s 
approach concerns instead instances in which these keywords were not used. In such cases, 
an account is only taken to describe arbitration if the following three conditions are evident: 
(i) that a third party be involved in the dispute resolution process; (ii) that the third party be 
responsible for deciding the matters in dispute; and (iii) that the disputing parties retain 
control over how the process be conducted. None of these conditions should come as much of 
a surprise. They take what are the hallmarks of arbitration even today—that people empower 
an arbitrator to resolve their differences but decide between themselves how and when the 
arbitration should take place—and put them into a workable form.49 It should be noted, 
however, that this dissertation has been strict in applying this limb. If it is not entirely clear 
from an account that all three conditions have been or would be met at a later date, the 
process described in the account is not identified as arbitration. Whilst the effect of this 
approach might be to exclude from study some actual accounts of arbitration for lack of 
clarity, it has been felt nonetheless that the benefits of sticking to a defined approach 
outweigh this possibility. 
 
1.4 Sources relating to the Arbitration Act 
 
The fourth and final category of source material that will be used in this dissertation are 
sources that relate to the drafting of the Arbitration Act. As this category is less cohesive in 
 
48
 For example, both James Sharpe and Craig Muldrew have distinguished between ‘informal’ and 
‘formal’ arbitration as a way of characterisation. Sharpe, ‘Such disagreement betwyx neighbours’, pp. 
182-87; Muldrew, ‘Culture of reconciliation’, pp. 931-32, 935-36. 
49
 Although the questions of how and when an arbitration should take place have been largely 
replaced in modern practice by a choice between institutional arbitration bodies and rules. A. 
Tweeddale and K. Tweeddale, Arbitration of commercial disputes: international and English law and 
practice (Oxford, 2010), pp. 61-96. 
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nature than the others, the only real link between the sources being the Act itself, each source 
or type of source will be considered in turn. First amongst them is the Board of Trade’s 
earliest minute book or ‘journal’, covering the period from the Board’s first meeting on 25 
June 1696 until 20 February 1696/7.50 The Board of Trade was the committee established by 
William III on 15 May 1696 to administer the trade-related and colonial affairs of the 
kingdom.51 Accordingly, its journal begins by reproducing the royal commission that 
empowered its members for this purpose,52 and then proceeds to record the official business 
that was dealt with at every meeting, a heading for each topic discussed written in the 
journal’s margins. It is in this journal, then, that the directions given to John Locke, one of 
the Board’s members, on 19 August to draw up a proposal relating to arbitration are 
recorded,53 as well as Locke’s later announcement on 9 November that he had drafted a bill.54 
The journal is, therefore, pivotal to learning about the origins of the Arbitration Act, and for 
this reason the entries pertaining to its drafting have been transcribed in Appendix II. These 
entries and others will be used not only to trace the Act’s substantive development, but also 
to contextualise these efforts amidst certain issues the Board was facing in the early months 
of its inception, something that this dissertation will argue is key to understanding why the 
Act was made. 
 The second type of source or, in this case, sources that will be used in the following 
analysis are John Locke’s personal papers and correspondence, Locke, as we have seen, 
having been responsible for the original draft of the bill, henceforth called the ‘arbitration 
bill’. Locke’s papers relating to his work for the Board of Trade are found in the manuscript 
collection of his writings and other texts at the Bodleian Library, and those that will be 
examined for this dissertation include two drafts of the arbitration bill, discussed below, as 
well as a report on the Board’s progress that was sent to the House of Commons in 
1699/1700 which Locke appears to have edited by hand.55 The letters Locke received from 
the merchants Benjamin Furly and Paul D’Aranda, presumably in response to queries he had 
made regarding the drafting of the arbitration bill, will also be considered, the former 
 
50
 TNA, CO 391/9. 
51
 For information on the establishment of the Board of Trade, see R. Lees, ‘Parliament and the 
proposal for a council of trade, 1695-6’, EHR 54:213 (1939), pp. 38-66; I.K. Steele, Politics of 
colonial policy: the Board of Trade in colonial administration 1696-1720 (Oxford, 1968), pp. 3-18. 
52
 TNA, CO 391/9, pp. 1-6. 
53
 TNA, CO 391/9, p. 62. 
54
 Ibid., p. 222. 
55
 Bodl., Locke MS c. 30, fols. 119-24. 
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included in the fifth volume of E.S. de Beer’s The Correspondence of John Locke,56 and the 
latter found in the above manuscript collection, a transcription of which will appear in Mark 
Goldie’s forthcoming publication on Locke’s later correspondence.57 All of these sources will 
be used to understand how John Locke came to draft the arbitration bill and to support the 
argument this dissertation will make that the proposal Locke had been directed by the Board 
to formulate had not concerned arbitration per se, but rather references. 
 The third and final type of source that will be considered for this analysis are the 
actual drafts of the Arbitration Act. Excluding its final form, there are four known drafts of 
this statute: two are found in Locke’s personal papers;58 another is recorded in a 
supplementary book or ‘journal’ of the Board of Trade;59 and the final is included in the 
manuscripts of the House of Lords.60 As each of these drafts will be examined in this study, 
they have been transcribed in Appendices III-V, respectively, with a copy of the Arbitration 
Act set out in Appendix VI for comparison. There are two points of note regarding these 
drafts. First, whilst the making of each draft can be largely attributed to the arbitration bill’s 
time before a particular institution, such as the Board of Trade or, as we shall see, the Privy 
Council, the identity of their actual drafters, the individuals who either wrote the drafts or 
were responsible for their drafting, is in most cases unclear. This is even true for Locke’s 
original draft of the bill: whilst the two drafts found in Locke’s papers are set out under the 
heading ‘Trade: Arbitration Bill 96’, suggesting that they were composed at the time when 
Locke was reported to have drafted his bill, no indication is given as to which of the drafts 
was the original. Consequently, this dissertation will take time to analyse the two texts and to 
arrive at a conclusion on the matter, as only one of the drafts actually proposed the 
enforcement procedure which the Act would later implement. Second, whilst there may have 
been four drafts of the Act, the bill itself was revised on at least five separate occasions after 
the initial draft was made. Accordingly, consideration will also be given to the revisions that 
did not result in the full re-drafting of the arbitration bill, the revisions being, in certain cases, 
even more important to understanding why the Act was made than the drafts themselves. 
 
56
 E.S. de Beer, ed., The correspondence of John Locke, (8 vols., Oxford, 1976-1989), vol. V, pp. 689-
92. 
57
 Bodl., Locke MS c. 30, fols. 45-46. Professor Goldie has been very kind to include my transcription 
of this letter in his forthcoming work. 
58
 Ibid., fol. 105. 
59
 TNA, CO 389/14, pp. 90-92. 
60
 HLRO, HL/PO/JO/10/1/498/1219. 
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2. Approaches of study 
 
As a final topic by way of conclusion, there are two issues regarding this dissertation’s 
approach that merit particular attention. First, as the above discussion on sources suggests, 
the scope of the ‘law’ side of this study will be limited to analysing the common law courts 
and the assizes. Obviously this will serve to qualify what the dissertation can say about the 
law and its effects on seventeenth-century arbitration. For one thing, the dissertation will 
overlook what occurred at the local level, a particular concern for social historians, the 
assizes having been seen as the imposition of royal, central justice on the provinces and not 
necessarily representative of local practices.61 For another, the dissertation will largely ignore 
how other types of courts, such as the ecclesiastical courts or the courts of equity, dealt with 
arbitration, areas of research which have in the past produced some interesting findings.62 Yet 
in light of the stated aims of this study, to examine the practice of arbitration during the 
period and to explain why the Arbitration Act was made, focusing on the common law courts 
and their associated institutions makes sense: not only did these courts formulate the legal 
rules prescribing how arbitration was formed and conducted, but, as we shall see, it was also 
in these courts that the enforcement procedure of the Act first developed. The courts are, 
therefore, most relevant to what this dissertation seeks to achieve, so it has been thought best 
to concentrate on them alone, particularly as there are other components to this study.  
 The second issue relating to the approach of this dissertation is that since the research 
conducted for its study began, the late Derek Roebuck published a book entitled Arbitration 
and Mediation in Seventeenth-Century England.63 This work is part of a larger anthology that 
had been undertaken by Roebuck, then a retired academic and chartered arbitrator, to account 
for the practice of arbitration in English history, from Anglo-Saxon times until, most recently, 
the ‘long’ eighteenth century.64 Whilst this has meant that certain matters specific to the 
seventeenth century, most notably the Arbitration Act, were of only secondary concern to 
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 For ecclesiastical courts, see Sharpe, ‘Such disagreement betwyx neighbours’; for courts of equity, 
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Roebuck in writing his book,65 there remains  nonetheless a fair amount of overlap between 
Roebuck’s work and this dissertation, both in subject matter and in the printed sources used 
for analysis. Unfortunately, much of this overlap is unavoidable, particularly in relation to the 
legal rules on arbitration as set out in the treatises published during the period. Where it has 
been possible to diverge, however, this dissertation has taken deliberate steps to do so, 
acknowledging in its text where further information can be gleaned from Roebuck’s own 
analysis. What ultimately sets this dissertation apart, however, is its attempt to engage with 
previous scholarship: it seeks to examine the practice of arbitration to confirm whether it was 
the conciliatory process scholars have depicted it to be, and it seeks to account for the making 
of the Arbitration Act to consider what its passing says about this scholarly view. Without 
such engagement and, indeed, lacking any substantive argument, Roebuck’s work can at most 
be seen to provide an additional window into what it must have been like to practice 
arbitration at the time.
 
65
 With their permission, Roebuck has substantially copied Horwitz and Oldham’s analysis of the 
Arbitration Act in his work. Roebuck, Arbitration in seventeenth-century England, pp. 432-37. 
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1. Elements of Arbitration 
 
 
To embark on this study of arbitration in seventeenth-century England, it is necessary to 
know what the process entailed. At most, previous historians have sketched out its basic 
functions and have recognised the relative flexibility of its procedure. In explaining the out-
of-court methods of dispute resolution that were available at the time, Craig Muldrew noted 
that arbitration ‘involved having the disputants agree to give the arbitrator power to umpire 
the matter in question’.1 Comparing the effects of arbitration to those of litigation, Martin 
Ingram claimed that ‘the relative informality of the procedure made it possible to be flexible, 
to take all relevant factors into consideration and to persuade the parties at issue to 
compromise their rights in the interests of harmony’.2 Presumably because the interests of 
these scholars and others did not concern arbitration alone, it has not been thought needed to 
investigate the process in a more penetrative manner. Given the types of sources historians 
have used to examine the disputes of contemporaries and the methods employed to resolve 
them, it may also be that the practice of arbitration appeared nebulous: contemporaries clearly 
knew that they were taking part in this process, but they did not provide the clues to reveal 
arbitration in any comprehensive form. 
 Whilst the traditional divide between the fields of social history and legal history, one 
that Christopher Brooks was amongst the few exceptions to have bridged,3 has largely 
prevented historians of the former from using the sources and tools of those of the latter, in 
order to examine what arbitration entailed in the seventeenth century, such a crossing is in 
fact necessary. For although the sources used by social historians might not be suited to 
identify what arbitration was at the time, legal sources from the period assuredly are. Not 
only is it in the nature of the law to prescribe the accepted boundaries of practices and, 
indeed, behaviours, but more specifically to arbitration, the seventeenth century marked the 
period in which legal treatises ‘on’ arbitration first began to be written and published. At least 
from a legal standpoint, then, there was a clear understanding of how arbitration was 
 
1
 C. Muldrew, ‘The culture of reconciliation: community and the settlement of economic disputes in 
early modern England’, HJ 39:4 (1996), pp. 915-42, at p. 931. 
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 M.J. Ingram, ‘Communities and courts: law and disorder in early-seventeenth century Wiltshire’ in 
Crime in England 1550-1800, ed. J.S. Cockburn (1977), pp. 110-34, at p. 125. 
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 Most notably, C.W. Brooks, Law, politics and society in early modern England (Cambridge, 2008). 
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composed and conducted. Whilst it may be questioned how applicable or representative this 
legal view was of the practice of arbitration at the time, in the absence of any other way to 
explain the process, detailing what arbitration was according to the law can at least provide a 
useful framework on which to base the rest of this study.4 Accordingly, the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the key elements of arbitration as prescribed by the law: the people who 
were involved in the process; the submission that was used to contract it;5 and the award 
which resulted from it. 
1. People 
 
The first element of arbitration were the people involved in the process: the parties who 
agreed to arbitrate their dispute; the arbitrators they chose to resolve the matter; and the 
umpire who would essentially take over for the arbitrators in the event that they could not 
make an award. This section will be used to examine these categories of people in turn, 
focusing not just on who could take on the roles but also on the legal rules and principles that 
prescribed their duties and powers. As we shall see, there were not many rules in relation to 
these roles, the courts taking a largely hands-off approach, but the rules that did apply were 
crucial to the practice of arbitration as a whole. Their coverage in this section will therefore 
help inform the rest of this chapter’s discussion, providing an important foundation for 




The first category of people involved in arbitration were the parties, individuals who, for 
whatever reason, found themselves in a dispute and agreed to resolve the matter by 
arbitration. Unlike the words ‘arbitrator’ or ‘umpire’, the term ‘party’ was in no way specific 
to the contemporary practice of arbitration; it is instead a convenient label that will be used 
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century. For example, see W. Sheppard, The faithful councellor: or the marrow of the law in England 
(1651), pp. 93-106. 
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by this dissertation in light of the fact that no consistent word or phrase was employed at the 
time. In Symboleography (1594), William West would refer to the parties as ‘persons 
striving’, to emphasise that they were in strife or disagreement, or as ‘compromittors’, to 
underscore the link between the parties and their submission, the word ‘compromise’ being 
an earlier name for the contract.6 Neither of these designations appear, however, to have 
survived into the seventeenth century, as later treatises on arbitration would employ more 
generic terms, including ‘party’, or use the actual names of the individuals concerned.7 This 
lack of specificity might itself be indicative of the fact that there were few qualifications for 
being a party during the period. Even in the eyes of the law, there were no extra requirements 
that the parties would have to meet to make use of arbitration, something that might have 
been suggested had there been instead a fixed term for these individuals. 
 Indeed, there was only one caveat to this inclusive view. Should the parties wish to 
enforce their arbitration—that is, should they wish to sue their opponent at some later date for 
failing or refusing to comply with the process—they and their opponent would have to be 
capable of entering into a contract. This is because it was the submission that made an 
arbitration legally enforceable: the courts were willing to provide enforcement on the basis 
that the parties had agreed between themselves to comply with the process, it having long 
been an established rule that the courts would hold individuals to their promises and 
obligations.8 Yet the courts were also measured in applying this rule. It was recognised that 
certain individuals were not able to comprehend the potential effects of entering into a 
contract, either for themselves or for others, and so should not be authorised to do so. 
Moreover, there were certain types of people whom the courts, for various reasons, did not 
acknowledge as existing, and so any contract made by these people would be held void and 
unenforceable. Accordingly, the discussions on parties found in the treatises on arbitration 
would almost invariably consist of specifying the different classes of individuals who were 
incapable of entering into a contract, presumably as a sort of guide or check-list to help their 
readers assess whether the arbitrations they agreed to could be enforced by the courts.9 In a 
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format first adopted by Symboleography, the treatises would distinguish between individuals 
who were prohibited by ‘nature’ and by ‘law’ from entering into a contract. Those who were 
prohibited by nature included ‘infants’, ‘lunatics’, and ‘idiots’, individuals who had some 
mental ‘defect’ preventing them from properly understanding the consequences arising from 
a contract. Those who were prohibited by law were instead a more diverse group, and 
included (i) individuals holding some form of joint power who had not received the authority 
to act from the rest of their group; (ii) married women or ‘feme coverts’ whose legal 
personality was subsumed by their husbands’ upon marriage; (iii) individuals who had been 
deprived of their legal rights by outlawry or attainder; and (iv) members of the clergy who 
were not formally recognised by the common law, being instead subjected to the civil law 
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. Outside these classes, all other individuals, both male 
and female, would be capable of entering into a contract and could therefore seek 
enforcement from the courts.  
 Despite these clear classifications, it does not appear that the advice of the treatises 
was always heeded in practice. In Rudston and Yate’s case (1641), the court of King’s Bench 
refused to enforce an arbitration because the plaintiff to the suit had been an ‘infant’ or minor 
at the time when he had entered into the submission.10 Moreover, in Saccum v Norton 
(1671/2), the same court ruled that it could not enforce an arbitration on the grounds that, 
whilst one of the parties, a woman, had been unmarried at the time when she had entered into 
the submission, she was married before her arbitrator made an award and could no longer be 
held to her agreement.11 Whilst the existence of such cases might bring into question how 
frequently the treatises on arbitration were actually consulted at the time, it might equally 
reflect the noted litigiousness of the period where contemporaries initiated lawsuits often with 
a view to other ends, in these cases, perhaps, to use the threat of commencing legal 
proceedings as a way to get an opponent to meet his or her commitments out of court.12 
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The second category of people to examine were the arbitrators, individuals chosen by the 
parties to decide the matters in dispute between them. Arbitrators were chosen or ‘elected’ by 
being named in the parties’ submission, and it was also from this contract that their authority 
derived. As the parties would agree in their submission to perform the award of their 
arbitrators, they would be legally bound to adhere to this decision: any party who did not 
could be sued by his opponent for enforcement. For this reason, arbitrators were accepted by 
legal writers and practitioners alike as judges, the principal difference between arbitrators 
and, say, the justices of the common law courts being that the justices were empowered by 
virtue of their office whereas arbitrators ‘are made judges by the assent and election of the 
parties’.13 As was recognised at the time, in many ways this made the power of an arbitrator 
to decide the parties’ dispute far greater than that of an ordinary judge. As John March 
explained in the first part of Actions for Slander (1647), provided that ‘theire judgment be 
according to the submission’, arbitrators ‘may judge according to there [sic] will and 
pleasure’ and not be ‘tied to any formalities, or punctuallities in Law…as other Judges 
established by publike authority are’.14 What is more, an arbitrator’s decision could not be 
overturned, even when it was patently unjust. In the case of Morris v Reynolds (1703), the 
arbitrators made an award in favour of the plaintiff without hearing the testimony of either 
the defendant or any of his witnesses, and for this ‘mismanagement’ the defendant refused to 
perform it. When the plaintiff sued the defendant in the court of King’s Bench for 
enforcement and these issues were raised, the court refused to side with the defendant, Sir 
John Holt, the chief justice, stating that ‘the arbitrators being judges of the party’s own 
chusing, he shall not come and say, they have not done him justice, and put the court to 
examine it’.15 
 In light of the extent and effect of an arbitrator’s power, it was advised in the treatises 
on arbitration that the parties choose arbitrators who were both ‘skilfull’ and ‘indifferent’. By 
‘skilfull’ it was meant that the arbitrators have the knowledge and expertise to decide the 
dispute between the parties so that ‘their ignorance may not make them erre, and the parties 
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suffer as much by their folly’.16 By ‘indifferent’ it was instead intended that the arbitrators be 
detached and impartial in making their decision so that the award would be ‘sincere and 
incorrupt, according to right and equity, without malice, flattery, and every other vicious 
affectation or perturbation, which may in any sort lead [them] awry from the right Path of 
Justice and Equity’.17 Yet it must be stressed that these qualities were merely recommended; 
the parties were under no legal obligation to seek out these qualities in choosing their 
arbitrators. As John Dodderidge explained in The English Lawyer (1631), the law was more 
concerned with the award that the arbitrators would then proceed to make, a point which will 
be examined in more detail later in this chapter, and for this reason ‘there hath not beene 
made many nor scarce any question, who may be an Arbitrator, and who not: 
Neither…should it be greatly necessary’.18 
 Essentially, there was only one legal requirement concerning the arbitrators and their 
power: they had to comply with what the parties had agreed to in their submission. As the 
courts were only prepared to provide enforcement to hold the parties to what they had agreed 
between themselves, if the arbitrators strayed from the contents of that agreement, any award 
that they would then make would be unenforceable. The reports of cases reveal that there 
were four ways in which arbitrators could contravene the submission. First, they could 
delegate either all or part of the decision-making in the dispute to someone else, which would 
be in defiance of the submission because the parties had only named the arbitrators as the 
persons whose award they would perform.19 In Emery v Emery (1600), it was revealed that 
the arbitrators had ordered the defendant to release his pending actions against the plaintiff in 
a manner as to be advised by a third party, which the court of Common Pleas disallowed on 
the grounds that the award could not ‘refer [the release] to the act of another’ and so the 
defendant was ‘not bound to perform it’.20 Second, if, as was conventional, the parties had 
specified a date by which the arbitrators should make their award, the arbitrators would 
contravene the submission by reserving in themselves the power to decide some aspect of the 
dispute after that date had passed.21 In Winch and Grave v Sanders (1620), the parties had 
sought for their arbitrator to resolve a disputed debt between them by 8 March, and whilst the 
arbitrator devised by that date a schedule for repaying the debt over the subsequent months, 
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he included a provision that would have allowed him to set the value of the final payment 
when it became due.22 The court of King’s Bench held this provision sufficient to overturn 
the award entirely, stating that ‘the arbitrator cannot reserve such power in himself’ to decide 
the matter given that ‘the judicial power of arbitrators is determined within the time limited to 
them’ by the parties.23 Third, along similar lines, if the parties set out a certain number of 
issues for their arbitrators to decide, the arbitrators would disobey the submission by 
including in their award matters other than those specified, effectively exceeding their 
power.24 In Bedell and Moor’s Case (1588), heard before all the common law justices in the 
Exchequer Chamber on writ of error from the court of King’s Bench, the facts presented were 
that the parties had specified that their arbitrators resolve every quarrel existing between them 
up until 24 November, but in their award the arbitrators ordered that the defendant in the 
original King’s Bench case make a release of all actions against the plaintiff arising in the 
year and a half following that date. As this exceeded what the parties had included in their 
submission, the justices ruled that the defendant was not obliged to perform the award as the 
arbitrators ‘have no authority to arbitrate that which is not submitted unto them’.25 Fourth, if 
the arbitrators required some thing or act of a third party as part of their award, this would 
violate the submission for concerning a ‘stranger’, a person who, unlike the parties, had not 
agreed to perform the award. Or to put it another way, the arbitrators’ power was restricted to 
the parties who formed the submission alone.26 In the King’s Bench case of Ecclestade v 
Maliard  (1582), the plaintiff sued the defendant for failing to pay the plaintiff’s son five 
pounds as was required by their arbitrator in his award. Yet the court ruled that the ‘action did 
not lie’ and the defendant ‘was not bound to pay or tender the money’ on the grounds that 
‘the arbitrator had no authority to award any thing concerning a stranger’.27 To summarise 
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then, arbitrators could not delegate, reserve, or exceed the authority granted to them by means 
of the parties’ submission or require anything of a person who was a ‘stranger’ to the 





The third and final category to consider was the umpire, the person chosen to resolve the 
parties’ dispute in the event that the arbitrators could not do so. As this description suggests, 
an umpire was not always involved in an arbitration; indeed, the parties would only arrange 
for the appointment of an umpire where there was a real possibility that the arbitrators would 
be unable to make an award. This might have been because the parties’ dispute was especially 
complex, the parties recognising that someone with even more expertise than the arbitrators 
might be needed to settle it.29 Alternatively, in cases where there was an even number of 
arbitrators elected and it was likely that they would be split in making a decision, the parties 
might appoint an umpire to have the final say on the matter.30 Yet the general impression 
given by the sources consulted for this chapter is that the use of an umpire was not an overly 
common occurrence in the seventeenth century. The treatises on arbitration tend to say very 
little about the umpire other than the fact that in making his decision, what was known as an 
‘umpirage’ to distinguish it from the award, the umpire had the same authority as the 
arbitrators and was equally bound by the terms of the parties’ submission.31 As the law 
reformer William Sheppard concisely put it in his Epitome of the Laws (1656), the umpire 
was ‘the same in effect with an arbitrator’.32 
 Yet if the use of an umpire was not particularly widespread in the practice of 
arbitration at the time, the role received an inordinate amount of attention in the reports of 
cases, particularly those reports concerning the second half of the seventeenth century, 
because an umpire and the making of his umpirage presented a sort of legal quandary that the 
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courts were ultimately forced to resolve, one that took them several decades to sort out. This 
issue was typically referred to as one involving ‘concurrent authority’, and it is best explained 
by means of a hypothetical scenario. Let us assume that on 1 January, two parties agree to 
resolve their dispute by arbitration, arranging for the appointment of an umpire in the event 
that their chosen arbitrators fail to make their award by the end of the month. The arbitrators 
set out to resolve the dispute, but because the matters involved are complex or because the 
arbitrators cannot agree between themselves on how to address them, they inform the parties 
on 15 January that they will not likely succeed in making an award within the allotted time. 
The parties, who desire above all else a quick end to their dispute, consequently turn to their 
umpire for resolution, and five days later, on 20 January, the umpire makes his umpirage on 
the matters. Unbeknownst to the parties, however, the arbitrators realise in the meantime that 
they can resolve the dispute and so proceed to make their award on 25 January which they 
then present to the parties. Having received two separate decisions, what are the parties to 
do? Do they perform the umpirage as it was the earlier decision, or do they instead perform 
the award given that it had been made within the time period that the parties had specified? 
Or to put it another way, who of the arbitrators and the umpire do the parties obey given that 
their authority overlaps or ‘concurs’? 
 To prevent this very situation from arising, the initial position of the courts, one that 
was set out by the court of King’s Bench in Barnard v King (1651), was to hold that an 
umpire would only be able to make an umpirage on the parties’ dispute once the time period 
specified for the arbitrators to make their award had elapsed.33 To apply this position to the 
scenario above, this would mean that the umpire would have only been able to make his 
umpirage from 1 February onwards. But what if the arbitrators decided unequivocally, rather 
than provisionally as above, that they could not make an award, perhaps weeks or even 
months before the time period specified by the parties had ended? Would the parties be 
forced to wait all this time for their umpire to be authorised to resolve the dispute? And, as 
was sometimes the case in practice, what if the parties had left it to the arbitrators to appoint 
an umpire when they realised that they would not be able to resolve the dispute? Even though 
the appointment of an umpire would provide clear evidence that the arbitrators could not 
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make an award, would the umpire still be prevented from making an umpirage until the time 
period initially specified by the parties had elapsed?  
In light of the potential issues that could arise in applying the rule set out in Barnard v 
King, the courts ultimately reversed their initial position, adopting in its place a two-pronged 
approach. In cases where the parties were the ones to appoint the umpire, it was held by the 
court of King’s Bench in Case v Dare (1681) that the ‘confusion on concurrence of authority 
as to time’ need not be an issue if priority was always given to the arbitrators’ award, it 
having been the decision that the parties had initially agreed to perform.34 If the arbitrators 
did not make an award, or if for some reason the award was invalidated by the courts, then 
the parties would be expected to perform the umpirage when it was made. In cases where the 
parties allowed instead for their arbitrators to appoint an umpire, the same court held in 
Travers v Twistleton (1665-66) that there would be no concurrence of authority as ‘by 
chusing an umpire [the arbitrators] have renounced their power’.35 This stance was further 
elaborated in Denovan v Mascall (1670) to require that the arbitrators expressly state that 
they were ‘deserting’ their authority by appointing an umpire so as to avoid later claims that 
the appointment had only been provisional.36 Moreover, in Trippet v Eyre (1684), the court of 
Common Pleas ruled that it was not enough for the arbitrators to appoint an umpire; the 
umpire had to accept the appointment as well.37 Only then would the authority to resolve the 
parties’ dispute shift from the arbitrators to the umpire. As this overview makes clear, the law 
as it related to seventeenth-century arbitration was in no way fixed, the courts at least 
appearing to change their position in response to real problems and issues arising from 
practice, a theme, as we shall see, which will reappear a later points in this chapter. 
2. Submission 
 
The second element of arbitration was the submission, the contract in which the parties 
agreed to perform their arbitrator’s award, the word ‘submission’ referring to the fact that the 
parties had submitted themselves to this decision.38 An earlier name for this contract was the 
‘compromise’, a term which derived from compromissio, the civil law designation for this 
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type of agreement, one that stressed the mutual promise between the parties to perform.39 
Whilst the term ‘compromise’ continued to be used in the treatises on arbitration and in 
certain legal dictionaries that were published during the period,40 its use in practice appears to 
have fallen out of favour by the mid-seventeenth century, perhaps because of its association 
with the civil law, a politically-fraught issue at the time,41 or, more likely, because the word 
‘submission’ better encapsulated the obligation it put on the parties to perform the award. For 
once the parties entered into the submission, they became legally bound to adhere to its 
terms. If one of the parties later failed or refused to perform, the other would be entitled to 
sue him for enforcement, although, as we shall see, this did not guarantee that he would be 
successful in his claim. In light, then, of the significance of this contract both to the practice 
and enforcement of arbitration, this section will be used to examine the submission in more 
detail, focusing in particular on its form, its substance, and the ability of the parties to 




The first issue to consider are the forms that a submission could take, a topic that is not only 
useful for envisaging what this contract looked like at the time, but also for understanding 
what an aggrieved party could hope to achieve should his opponent not perform the award, 
the form of a submission largely dictating the possible options for enforcement. Essentially, 
there were two ways to form a submission in the seventeenth century: either the parties could 
enter into an oral contract called a ‘parol’ submission, the word ‘parol’ meaning by word,42 or 
they could instead write down the terms of their agreement in a deed. To form a parol 
submission required nothing more than the parties promising to each other to perform the 
award, it having been established in the mid-sixteenth century that the mutual exchange of 
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promises was sufficient to create a binding contract.43 Yet not even the words ‘I promise to 
perform the award’ or something similar were necessary to create this form of submission. As 
the court of King’s Bench held in Neve v Lyne (1596), it was enough that the parties 
expressed to one another a clear intention to comply with the process.44 This lack of formality 
was undoubtedly useful as it meant that a submission could be formed even over the course 
of a conversation, with little effort or fanfare. But in the event that one of the parties did not 
perform the award, this same informality could also be disadvantageous as it would then be 
difficult to prove that a contract had been made. Not only would there be no written evidence 
to show that the submission existed, but if the non-performing party denied that he had 
agreed to it, the matter could quickly devolve into a case of ‘he said, she said’. As with all 
oral contracts, these issues could be mitigated by having witnesses, perhaps even the 
arbitrators themselves, attest to the fact that a submission had been made, but depending on 
the circumstances, even their testimony might not have been enough to convince the courts 
that a submission existed. For this reason, most of the treatises on arbitration either 
counselled against the use of parol submissions or did not include this form of submission as 
an option. In Arbitrium Redivivum (1694), whilst the author explained that ‘submissions are 
in two manners, either by writing or by word’, he then insisted that ‘every compromise or 
submission be made by writing’.45 By contrast, the lawyer William Noy denied even the 
possibility that a submission could be made orally in his Principal Grounds and Maxims 
(1641) by stating that it was the first of ‘three things [that] are to be regarded’ in a submission 
that it be made in writing.46 Such advice appears to have been persuasive, for by the time that 
the eighteenth-century treatise writer Matthew Bacon wrote his work on arbitration, The 
Compleat Arbitrator (1731), he could remark that ‘submissions by parol are almost out of 
use, and never practised but when the controversy is of some small or insignificant matter’.47 
 It was far more common, then, for a submission to be formed by deed, the technical 
term for a written document that was affixed in wax with the parties’ seals and then delivered 
into their possession, this final condition reflecting the fact that deeds were typically written 
by professional draftsmen, such as clerks or scriveners, and not by the parties themselves.48 
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Unlike the modern day, the signature of a party was not a requirement for a deed,49 a 
distinction perhaps reflecting the level of literacy during the period,50 although if the parties 
were capable of signing their names, they would invariably do so in addition to sealing the 
document. The purpose of these formalities was one of evidence: if a document satisfied all 
three conditions of writing, sealing, and delivery, the courts would then take it to be 
conclusive evidence that the terms contained within it were true.51 This would mean that, 
once the parties entered into a submission by deed, they could not deny that they had agreed 
to perform their arbitrator’s award, a clear advantage over parol submissions. If one of the 
parties failed or refused to perform, the aggrieved party would have a far greater chance of 
success in suing his opponent for enforcement, the opponent, as we shall see later, having to 
come up with other ways to prevent the courts from holding him to his agreement. Yet a deed 
was not itself a specific type of contractual instrument; it merely denoted that the formalities 
needed for a document to be granted greater evidential weight at law had been met. What is 
left to be discussed, then, are the two types of instruments that were used in the seventeenth 
century to form submissions by deed, focusing not just on how these instruments were made, 
but also on what their legal effect would be in the event that a party did not perform the 
award. 
The first type of instrument used to form a submission by deed was known as the 
‘indenture’, its name deriving from the fact that the written document itself was cut in half 
along a jagged or ‘toothed’ (in modum dentium) line.52 On both halves of the indenture would 
be written the terms of the parties’ submission and, to ensure that the formality of sealing was 
satisfied, the parties would then affix their seals to both halves, signing them if possible, 
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Figure 1: Diagram of a submission by indenture 
 
Once the indenture was finalised, the parties would each retain one of the halves, satisfying 
the formality of delivery as well as arming each party with what he would need to bring a 
lawsuit against his opponent in the event that the opponent did not perform the award. In such 
a case, the aggrieved party would tender his half of the indenture to the court, thereby 
preventing his opponent from asserting that he had not agreed to perform. What is more, the 
physical shape of the indenture could equally be used to thwart any potential claims by the 
opponent that the document had been forged, for the ‘teeth’ of both halves of the indenture 
could be realigned to confirm authenticity.53 Whilst the indenture was therefore a useful 
means to form a submission, one that appears to have been employed throughout the 
seventeenth century,54 it must be noted that it was far less popular than the second instrument 
used to form submissions at the time, the conditional bond. This was not, however, caused by 
any fault or defect with the indenture itself; rather, as we shall see, it was a consequence of 
the specific advantages of the conditional bond, in particular its incentivising nature. 
 The conditional bond, the second instrument used to form submissions, has been a 
notoriously difficult subject for contemporaries and modern scholars alike to explain in any 
straightforward way, belying the reality that the conditional bond was the principal 
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instrument used to contract agreements for more than 400 years, from the fourteenth century 
until the mid-eighteenth century.55 Part of this issue stems from the fact that a conditional 
bond, as its name suggests, was not a contract in the typical sense; instead, it was a debt 
obligation—an ‘I owe you’—that would be waived if the terms of an agreement were 
satisfied or performed. This sort of dual structure, whereby a debt obligation overlay a 
separate, contractual agreement, was linked to the way in which this type of instrument was 
constructed. Essentially, when two parties wished to enter into an agreement by conditional 
bond, they would each draft a written document composed of two sides. On the front side 
would be the bond or ‘obligation’, specifying that one party owed to the other a specific sum 
of money, what was known as the ‘penalty’. The bond would invariably be written in Latin 
and set out in the present tense so that the debt would be construed as outstanding.56 It would 
also be sealed and, where possible, signed by the indebted party to prevent him from later 
denying that the debt was owed.57 On the reverse side of the document would instead be the 
‘condition’, and it would be here that the indebted party would set out what he had agreed 
with the other party, ending with the provision that if he satisfied the terms of the agreement, 
the bond would be void and of no effect. Typically the condition would be written in English, 
presumably to make it easier to know what exactly would discharge the debt from being 
owed, but unlike the front side of the document, the reverse would not be sealed.58 Once both 
sides of the document were drafted, the parties would exchange their conditional bonds so 
that each would have in their possession a deed specifying that they were owed the penalty, 
the sum of money set out in the bond. If one of the parties then failed to adhere to the 
agreement, such as, in the case of submissions, by not performing the award, the other party 
would be entitled to bring a debt action to recover the penalty, the non-performing party 
having forfeited the one scenario that would have excused him from having to pay. A simple 
diagram of the two sides of a conditional bond can be found below for illustration, with the 
condition reflecting what would be included if the instrument were used to form a 
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submission. Note that a separate, near identical document would be prepared by Party 2, with 
only the roles of the two parties being reversed.59 
 
 
Figure 2: Diagram of a submission by conditional bond 
 
There are two points to emphasise from the above description that help explain why the 
conditional bond had been the most common instrument used to contract agreements, 
submissions or otherwise. The first concerns the penalty, the sum of money stated as being 
owed in the bond. When parties entered into an agreement using conditional bonds, they 
would set the penalty at an exorbitant amount of money, which, by convention, was typically 
twice the value of the agreement itself.60 This meant that if one of the parties did not adhere 
to the terms of the agreement as set out in the condition of his bond, he would become liable 
to pay this large sum, his actions having forfeited the one situation that would have 
discharged him from paying the penalty. The second point to note is the fact that, once the 
conditional bonds were drafted, the parties would exchange them with one another so that 
each had in their possession a written document sealed by their opponent stating that he owed 
them the penalty. Both parties were therefore equipped with the evidence needed to show a 
court that they were entitled to this large sum of money. Indeed, given that only the front side 
of the conditional bond was sealed, each party could in theory bring a debt action at any point 
to recover the penalty, it falling on the opponent to have to prove, first, that there was a 
condition to the bond and, second, that he had fulfilled it, this being the only way to avoid 
being compelled by the courts to pay the sum. Thus, the penalty of a conditional bond served 
to add ‘teeth’ to the parties’ agreement: even if the parties were dissatisfied with what they 
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had agreed to do, they would think twice before breaking it as to do so would mean that they 
would almost certainly be forced to pay the penalty. 
 It is not difficult to see, then, why parties favoured the use of conditional bonds to 
form their submissions. With the penalty set at twice the value of the matters in dispute, the 
parties would be incentivised to perform their arbitrators’ award, if not to resolve the dispute, 
then at least to avoid paying the penalty. John March was perhaps the most clear of the 
treatise writers at getting this point across. As he explained in the second part of Actions for 
Slander (1648), whilst the use of conditional bonds to form submissions ‘seemeth dangerous’ 
as the parties could by their own actions ‘hazard the whole penalty of the bond’, this very 
threat ‘will the rather ingage the performance of the award, and thereby determine 
controversies’ which was the ‘sole aime, scope, and end of arbitrements’. For this reason, he 
concluded, the use of conditional bonds ‘certainly is the best and most approved meanes’ to 




Having examined the various forms that the submission could take, what needs to be 
considered next is its substance—that is, what provisions the contract would typically 
contain. Some of these provisions have already been considered earlier in this chapter. For 
example, from the discussion of the people involved in arbitration, we know that the 
submission would name the arbitrators chosen by the parties and, where needed, either 
nominate an umpire or provide for the umpire’s appointment. Moreover, as the previous sub-
section has made clear, the submission would also include the agreement of the parties to 
perform the award, this being the constitutive element of the contract. Yet as it appears from 
the many examples and precedents of submissions that were printed during the period, most 
of the contract tended to be used to set out stipulations regarding the award. To a large extent, 
the parties would specify in their submission how exactly the award should be made. These 
stipulations generally concerned four issues: (i) content, the matters in dispute which the 
award should be made to address; (ii) form, whether the award should be made orally or in 
writing; (iii) timing, the date by which the award should be made; and (iv) notice, how the 
arbitrators should inform the parties that the award had been made. All four of these issues 
can be seen in the following precedent, which was included in the first volume of the drafting 
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manual The Young Clerks Guide (1649) attributed, almost certainly speciously, to Sir Richard 
Hutton.62 The first issue takes up most of the text, whereas the other three issues can be found 
in the final lines of the contract, with the abbreviation ‘&c’ used to indicate where the reader, 
presumably a clerk or scrivener, would add in information specific to the arbitration at hand. 
Note also that this particular precedent takes the form of the condition of a bond, so its 
phrasing differs slightly from what one would instead find in a submission formed by means 
of an indenture: 
 
The Condition [of this obligation is such] That if the within bounden R.C. […] 
[does] […] well and truly stand to, abide, obey, observe, performe, fulfill and 
keep the award, arbytrament, order, rule, determination and judgement of &c. 
Arbytrators indifferently chosen, elected and named, as well on the part and 
behalf of the said R.C […] as on the behalfe of the within named R.S. […] to 
arbytrate, award, rule, decree and Judge of, for, upon, touching or concerning all 
actions, suits, doubts, and variances concerning &c. out of the manner of L. in the 
Parish of W. in the County of &c. now in question and controversie, between the 
said parties; And also, for touching, and concerning all and all manner of other 
suits, quarrels, debts, debates, duties, bonds, specialties, controversies, 
transgressions, offences, strifes, contentions, reckonings, accompts, and demands 
whatsoever, which between the said R.C. […] on the one part, and the said 
[R.S.…] on the other part, at any time from the beginning of the world, untill the 
day of the date of these presents, have been had, moved, stirred, or are in any 
wise depending, so always as the same award, arbitrament, or determination and 
judgement of the parties, in and upon the same premisses, be made and given up 
in writing indented, under their hands and Seals, ready to be delivered to the said 
parties, at or in &c. on or before &c. That then this [obligation to be void and of 
none effect, or else to stand and remain in full force and virtue].63 
 
Whilst it was not a requirement for the parties to include these stipulations in their 
submission, for several reasons the practice appears  to have been nonetheless conventional. 
The first was undoubtedly one of practicality: by addressing these issues in the submission, it 
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would have been clear both to the parties and to the arbitrators what exactly the parties had 
agreed to perform. Presumably this would have helped structure how the arbitration would 
then proceed and, in cases where the terms of the submission were written in a deed, the 
inclusion of these stipulations would have served as a useful point of reference should any 
disagreement or uncertainty later arise. Indeed, this was often framed as another advantage of 
forming a submission by deed. As the author of Arbitrium Redivivum explained, writing out 
these stipulations enabled ‘the arbitrators [to] know their power, and the parties how far they 
are subject to their sentence’.64 
 A second reason why the parties appear to have set stipulations about the award was 
in response to the position of the courts should they not. As the courts consistently held 
throughout the period, if the parties failed to specify how they expected the award to be made 
in their submission, it would be left to the discretion of the arbitrators to decide.65 It bears 
emphasising that in terms of enforcement, this stance marked a clear departure from the 
courts merely holding the parties to what they had agreed, foreshadowing the sort of judicial 
law-making that we shall see in relation to the rules on the validity of awards.66 Yet it is 
possible to guess at the logic behind this particular position. If the courts sought instead to 
verify that the award made by the arbitrators accorded with what the parties would have 
agreed to had they included the stipulation in their submission, not only might the parties 
disagree as to what they would have stipulated, but it is conceivable that any party who 
disliked the decision would claim that the award had not been made in accordance with what 
he had expected so as to avoid having to perform it. Relying on the arbitrators appears, 
therefore, to have been the more straightforward and impartial option. Whilst it makes sense 
why the courts would have taken this stance, it is equally understandable that this position 
could prove problematic in practice. For example, in Newgate v Degelder (1666) where this 
issue was addressed, the parties had stated in their submission that the arbitrators were to 
make the award ‘when their occasions will permit’, a provision over which the justices of the 
court of King’s Bench were in disagreement as to whether it should mean at a time 
convenient for the arbitrators after one or both of the parties had requested the award to be 
made, or whether it should instead be construed as empowering the arbitrators to make the 
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award at any point in the duration of their lives.67 Whilst the case was ultimately ruled in 
favour of the plaintiff by default, the defendant having failed to observe the correct pleading 
formalities in making his defence,68 it is clear that neither of the proposed interpretations 
would have been especially expedient, particularly if the parties had desired a quick end to 
their dispute. Indeed, from what the defendant did claim, when he requested for the 
arbitrators to make their award, two years had already passed since the parties had first 
entered into their submission, and yet the arbitrators had still not undertaken the task.69 
Whilst it cannot be ruled out that the arbitrators needed more than two years to come to a 
decision, the facts of the case being unclear, it seems more likely that this was an excessive 
delay, something that the parties could have avoided altogether had they simply stipulated in 
their submission a date by which the award should be made. 
 The third and final reason why the parties might have sought to stipulate how the 
award should be made relates to the issue of liability. By setting clear parameters for the 
award, the parties were effectively limiting what they could then be legally obliged to 
perform. Given that most submissions appear to have been formed using conditional bonds, 
this would also have had the added effect of narrowing the circumstances in which the parties 
might forfeit the penalty, something which they would have undoubtedly been eager to avoid. 
That this was a motive behind what the parties chose to include in their submission can be 
seen from the frequent appearance, typically near the end of a submission as in the precedent 
set out above, of the phrase ‘so that the award be made of and upon the premises’ or 
something to that effect.70 Whilst this phrase might appear to be a mere formality, one easily 
missed alongside the more long-winded provisions of the contract, its inclusion in the 
submission served a specific legal purpose. When coupled with the stipulations the parties set 
concerning the award, it signalled that the parties were agreeing to perform their arbitrators’ 
award only if it complied exactly with what they specified.71 This would have been relatively 
simple for the arbitrators to achieve in terms of the form, timing, and notice of the award,72 
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but as the above precedent attests, the difficulty often concerned the award’s content, as the 
arbitrators would in theory have to address every matter listed in their award, although the 
courts did qualify this rule to apply only to the matters of which the arbitrators had received 
express notice.73 Nonetheless, the phrase was a useful tool for the parties to attempt to limit 
what they would be liable to perform, and it should therefore cause no surprise that one of the 
most common defences that a non-performing party would raise when sued by his opponent 




The final issue to consider regarding the submission is revocation, the ability of the parties to 
withdraw from or ‘revoke’ this contract. Could the parties revoke their submission without 
facing any legal consequences for their actions? More importantly, could a single party do so, 
thereby terminating an attempt at arbitration unilaterally? The short answer was yes: since at 
least the late fourteenth century, the legal position on revocation had been that it was possible 
to revoke the submission and, to use an earlier phrase, ‘discharge the arbitrators’ at any point 
before the award was made.75 Only when the arbitrators had pronounced their decision could 
the parties face potential legal repercussions, for any attempt to withdraw from the contract 
would amount to non-performance and so would be in breach of the parties’ mutual 
agreement to perform the award. The fact that the submission was revocable was most 
famously stated by Sir Edward Coke, then the chief justice of the Common Pleas, in his 
report of Vynior’s Case (1609), although, as noted here, he was not responsible for 
establishing the position; he merely confirmed it.76 Note that the word ‘countermand’ was 
(and is) synonymous with ‘revoke’: 
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Although…the defendant was bound…to stand to, abide, observe, &c. the rule, 
&c. arbitrament, &c. yet he may countermand it; for a man cannot by his act 
make such authority, power, or warrant not countermandable, which is by the law 
and of its own nature countermandable.77 
 
What Coke went on to explain in the report and, indeed, what appears to have been the more 
significant part of his decision for practitioners at the time, was that for a revocation to be 
valid, it had to be communicated to the arbitrators in the same form as the submission.78 
Thus, if the parties had entered into a parol submission, they could express their intention to 
revoke it orally; but if the parties had instead formed their submission by deed, they could 
only withdraw from it by drafting another deed. Or as Coke put it, ‘if the submission be by 
writing, the countermand must be writing, if by word I may countermand by word’.79 Failing 
to provide the proper form of notice would result in the arbitrators retaining their power to 
make an award, and if they proceeded to formulate a decision, the parties would still be 
obliged to perform it, their intentions to the contrary notwithstanding.80 
 Whilst this was the ‘official’ position on revocation, the straightforward nature of this 
stance was complicated when the parties formed their submission using conditional bonds. 
This was not because this particular form of submission was fundamentally different from the 
others; rather, it was tied to how a conditional bond functioned. Because the bond side of the 
instrument, in which one party was stated to owe the other party the penalty, could only be 
discharged by fulfilling the instrument’s condition, which was for the party to perform the 
award, by withdrawing from the submission the party made it impossible for this to occur, the 
arbitrators no longer having the power to make an award, and so the party would be liable to 
pay the penalty. This is what happened in Vynior’s Case: although, as we have seen, it was 
recognised that the defendant in the case could revoke his submission and did on the facts do 
so validly, because the parties had formed their submission using conditional bonds, the 
defendant was held to have forfeited the penalty. As Coke explained, given that the defendant 
‘has by his own act made the condition of the bond…impossible to be performed…by 
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consequence his bond is become single’ and so he was obliged to pay.81 The court of King’s 
Bench explained in Noble v Harris (1677) that the only way for a party could avoid this 
unfortunate result was if his opponent consented to the revocation, presumably as the parties 
could then take steps to cancel the bonds that had formed their submission, each party, as 
explained earlier in this section, having in his possession the other party’s bond to attest that 
he was owed the penalty.82 Yet even this was not entirely fail-safe, as the facts of the King’s 
Bench case of Westlie v King (1624) show: whilst the parties had together consented to 
revoke their submission, the plaintiff appears, quite deviously, to have retained the 
defendant’s bond and, once revocation had occurred, to have used it to sue the defendant in a 
debt action to recover the penalty. Unfortunately for the defendant, because he failed to 
adhere to the correct pleading procedure in revealing what the plaintiff had done, the case 
was ruled in the plaintiff’s favour by default and the defendant was obliged to pay him.83 The 
case clearly illustrates why John March cautioned in Actions for Slander that forming a 
submission using conditional bonds ‘seemeth dangerous’, but, as we shall see, this was not 
the only occasion in which conditional bonds were used to give effect to a different result 
than the stated legal rule. 
3. Award 
 
The final element of arbitration was the award, the decision made by the arbitrators to resolve 
the parties’ dispute. Or as William West put it in Symboleography, it was ‘nothing else but 
the verie dome, order, and decree pronounced by arbitrators vpon the controuersie, for the 
ending whereof they were chosen by the striuing parties’.84 Similarly to the submission, the 
award was also identified by another name, that of ‘arbitrement’, one that was used far more 
interchangeably in practice. Indeed, it could even be said that the word ‘arbitrement’ was 
considered to be the more precise, technical term for the arbitrators’ decision, perhaps 
because it better encapsulated the dispute resolution process as a whole. As John Dodderidge 
explained in The English Lawyer, whereas the term ‘award’ derived from the French verb 
‘agarder’ meaning to decide or judge, there was more than one way to account for the 
etymology of ‘arbitrement’: either it was ‘because the Iudges elected therein, may determine 
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the controversie, not according to the Law, but ex boni viri Arbitrio’, or else ‘because the 
parties to the controversie have submitted themselves to the Iudgement of the Arbitrators, not 
by compulsory meanes, and the coertion of the Law, but ex libero Arbitrio suo, of his own 
accord’.85  
The emphasis placed on the award as a form of judgment was not a figure of speech, 
however. As perhaps the most important point regarding the award, one that has been 
overlooked by previous scholars,86 it must be stressed that the courts recognised the award as 
tantamount to a judgment. For example, in the King’s Bench case of Martham v Jemx (1604), 
it was held per curiam that ‘an award is in the nature of a judgment and sentence’,87 and in 
Holford v Platt (1617), John Dodderidge, here in his capacity as one of the justices of the 
same court, explained that an award was one of the four types of judgment accepted at the 
time, the others being by confession, default, or trial.88 The legal view that an award was a 
form of judgment in turn affected how the courts dealt with this decision, leading in particular 
to the elaboration of an entire ‘law’ on awards, one that defined whether an award would be 
valid or void. The following discussion will be used to examine this ‘law’ in more detail as 




Rather than examine the form and substance of an award similarly to the above discussion of 
the submission, it is more worthwhile to focus on the formalities of this decision. This is 
because, as we have seen, the content, form, timing, and notice of an award were largely 
dictated by what the parties had specified in their submission. If the arbitrators failed to 
adhere to these stipulations in making their award, the courts would hold that the decision 
was void and that the parties were not obliged to perform it, the reasoning being that a void 
award was treated as if no award had been made, as attested by the established legal maxim 
that a ‘void arbitrement est nul arbitrement’.89 Conceivably, the requirement that the 
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arbitrators had to adhere to the parties’ specifications in making their award could have 
proven burdensome in practice. For example, as the facts of the King’s Bench case of 
Bussfield v Bussfield (1620) reveal, the arbitrators had resided in York and had made their 
award there, yet because the parties had specified in their submission that they should receive 
notice of the decision in London, the court ruled that the parties would have to be so informed 
or else the award would be void.90 
 There were, however, two sorts of caveat to the principle that an award had to comply 
with the parties’ stipulations: the first involved the question of whether an award could be a 
deed if the parties had specified that it be made to satisfy the conditions of this construction; 
and the second concerned the effect of the arbitrators complying with the parties’ stipulations 
when the matters to decide were not themselves ‘arbitrable’, or capable of being determined 
by arbitration. As these caveats had no bearing on one another, the rest of this subsection will 
therefore be used to examine each of them in turn. 
  
(i)   Could an award be a deed? 
 
The first caveat to the principle that an award had to comply with what had been specified in 
the parties’ submission concerned whether an award could be a deed. It must be remembered 
that a deed was not itself a particular instrument but rather the technical term for a document 
which satisfied the formalities necessary for it to bear greater evidential weight at law.91 But 
because it was ultimately for the courts to decide whether a given document would be 
construed as a deed or not, there was the possibility that even if the parties had stipulated that 
the award meet the requirements for a deed, the courts might not accept it as one. As 
presented, this issue might seem to be of largely theoretical concern, but there was a clear, 
practical reason why parties would have wanted their awards to be deeds. Since the 
fourteenth century, the courts had been prepared to enforce debts arising not just from 
contracts but from judgments,92 and given that an award was considered to be a form of 
judgment, if the arbitrators chosen by the parties ordered for one party to pay the other a sum 
of money as part of their decision, the party who was supposed to receive the sum could bring 
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a debt action to recover it should his opponent fail or refuse to pay.93 Yet for any debt action, 
the likelihood that a party would be successful in enforcing the debt depended on whether the 
obligation giving rise to it was enshrined in a deed.94 If it were, it would have been relatively 
straightforward for the party to recover the sum, the deed providing conclusive evidence that 
the debt was owed. However, if the debt obligation were not so enshrined, the party bringing 
the action, the plaintiff, would almost certainly fail in his attempt, for his opponent, the 
defendant, could deny the debt by waging his law. This involved the defendant swearing that 
he was not obliged to pay the plaintiff, a claim that would then be corroborated by eleven 
witnesses or ‘compurgators’ under oath, and, if accomplished, it would amount to a complete 
defence against the plaintiff’s action, causing the case to be dismissed.95 Yet as John Baker 
has explained, given that there were no legal requirements as to who could be a compurgator, 
by the seventeenth century wager of law had essentially become a ‘charade’, it having been 
customary for the defendant to pay a fixed fee to the court’s door-keeper to hire off the streets 
individuals who were willing to swear on the defendant’s behalf.96 The net effect of this 
practice was that it was rarely possible for a plaintiff to enforce a debt not arising from a 
deed, which would help explain why, in the context of awards, the parties would have wanted 
their arbitrators’ decision to be accepted as a deed. 
 For the first half of the seventeenth century, however, the courts refused to construe 
awards as deeds. In Markham v Jurex (1604), the court of King’s Bench expressly 
distinguished awards from deeds by stating that ‘there was much difference between wills 
and deeds, and between arbitrements’,97 and in Dodd v Herbert (1655), John Glynne, the 
chief justice of the Upper Bench, asserted that ‘an arbitrement under seal is no deed’ but 
merely ‘a writing under hand and seal’.98 It should be noted that this was not a new position 
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for the courts to take; instead, they were simply confirming what had been the ‘official’ 
stance for centuries, a theme, as we shall see, that will re-emerge elsewhere in this discussion 
on awards.99 But what was a seventeenth-century development was the complete reversal of 
this position, a change that appears to have been implemented in the King’s Bench case of 
Hosdell v Harris, heard over several terms in 1668-1669.100 Interestingly, the case was not at 
all concerned with the possibility that a defendant might wage his law if his opponent, the 
plaintiff, sought to sue him for a debt arising from an award. Instead, the issue of the case 
centred, if somewhat belatedly, on the application of the Limitation Act of 1623, the first 
statute of limitations to be passed in England.101 As with all succeeding statutes of 
limitations, the purpose of the Limitation Act was to restrict when a party could bring an 
action to only a fixed period after the cause of his action had occurred. One of the limitation 
periods specified in the Act was that a party would be prohibited or ‘barred’ from bringing an 
action to enforce a debt not arising from a deed more than six years after the debt became 
due, and it was this provision that was relevant to the facts of Hosdell v Harris.102 From what 
can be determined from the reports of the case, more than six years previously Hosdell and 
Harris had decided to arbitrate their dispute, specifying in their submission that their 
arbitrator make an award in writing, under seal, and, presumably as it is not explicitly stated 
in the reports, to be delivered to the parties—ostensibly satisfying the formalities for a deed. 
The arbitrator proceeded to make his award in accordance with these stipulations and ordered 
that Harris pay Hosdell a sum of money, something which Harris refused to do. For reasons 
that are unclear, Hosdell then delayed suing Harris to recover this sum for more than six 
years, so what the court of King’s Bench had to decide was whether Hosdell was barred from 
bringing his debt action under the Limitation Act. It was, then, crucial to the court’s decision 
whether the award made by the arbitrator could be construed as a deed: if the court 
maintained its previous position by holding that an award could not be a deed, the Act would 
have applied to the case and Hosdell would have been barred from his action; if the court 
altered its stance and allowed for an award to be a deed, the Act would not have applied and 
Hosdell could have proceeded to recover the sum owed to him by Harris. After much 
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deliberation, the court adopted the latter option, its reasoning being that the Act had not been 
intended to apply to cases involving debts from awards, so in this roundabout way it came to 
be that an award was capable of being a deed.103 As the court ruled, ‘the award being by deed 
is a specialty…and so out of the statute’.104 From then on, if parties specified in their 
submission that their arbitrators’ award be made as a deed, it was possible for the arbitrators 
to comply with this stipulation. 
 
(ii)   Arbitrability 
 
The second caveat to the principle that an award had to be made in accordance with the 
parties’ submission concerned the issue of ‘arbitrability’, whether a matter could be the 
subject of arbitration or not. If the parties specified that their arbitrators were to make a 
decision on a matter that was not ‘arbitrable’, should the arbitrators comply and address this 
matter in their award, the decision would be held void by the courts. Unlike the previous 
issue, then, it was not that the arbitrators were unable to satisfy the intentions of the parties as 
stipulated in their submission; the problem was that if the arbitrators did so, their resulting 
award would be legally invalid. Admittedly, this was not especially burdensome in practice 
as there were only two matters which the courts deemed not to be arbitrable: the first was real 
property, meaning land and any structure affixed to it;105 and the second was any matter that 
was ‘certain’, which, from the examples that were typically given to illustrate this restriction, 
appears to have meant a matter that was already determined or settled, such as a bond 
attesting that a party owed a sum of money, it being ‘certain’ that the obligation to pay the 
sum existed.106 As with the courts’ initial position in refusing to accept awards as deeds, these 
restrictions on arbitrability pre-dated the seventeenth century and so were often expressed in 
both the reports of cases and the treatises on arbitration as established rules, with little or no 
explanation for why they existed.107 But from a brief study of two older categories of legal 
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literature, the Year Books108 and the law abridgments commonly referred to as Statham, 
Fitzherbert, and Brooke,109 it would appear that both restrictions were tied to the principle 
that an award was a form of judgment and should, therefore, bring an end to a dispute. For 
the restriction on real property, the reasoning would seem to be that arbitrators could not by 
their award alone effect the transfer of real property from one party to another, this being 
possible only by operation of the law, so any award claiming to do so would not actually 
bring an end to the parties’ dispute.110 For the restriction on ‘certain’ matters, the reasoning 
appears to be based largely on common sense: as the matter was already determined or 
settled, there would be nothing for the arbitrators to bring an end to or resolve.111 To continue 
with the example of a debt arising from a bond, which, as we have seen, was a type of deed, 
at least from a legal standpoint it would have been indisputable that the debt was owed, so all 
that the arbitrators would have been able to do was confirm this position, they themselves 
lacking the power to compel the indebted party to pay. Accordingly, there would be no 
judgment for the arbitrators to make. This line of reasoning also helps explain the exception 
to this restriction: if the parties specified that their arbitrators should make an award on 
several matters, some of which were ‘certain’ whilst others were ‘uncertain’, any award made 
in accordance with this stipulation would be valid as there would then be matters for the 
arbitrators to determine.112 
 Probably part of the reason why legal writers in the seventeenth century did not take 
the time to examine these restrictions on arbitrability in much detail was that they could be 
circumvented by the parties forming their submission using conditional bonds. As the 
conditional bond was structured so that a party would be liable to pay its penalty if he did not 
fulfil the bond’s condition, which was to perform the award, even if the award was void for 
concerning a matter that was not arbitrable, the party would have to perform it or else risk 
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paying the penalty. This effective reversal of the courts’ established position was recognised 
by the author of Arbitrium Redivivum: after listing what matters were and were not arbitrable 
in his treatise, he qualified the discussion by saying ‘yet in such cases though themselves be 
not arbitrable, yet if a man will bind himself to stand to an award, such bond is good: and for 
the non-performance of the award the bond will be forfeited’.113 Given the frequency with 
which contemporary writers claimed conditional bonds were used to form submissions, it 
would appear that the problem posed by the restrictions on arbitrability, whilst worth 
mentioning in a study of arbitration in the seventeenth century, was not actually all that 
taxing, a useful reminder that rules and doctrine were not the be-all and end-all of legal 
practice. 
 
3.2 The law of awards 
 
The final issue to examine, both in this section and the chapter as a whole, is what 
contemporaries referred to as the ‘law’ or ‘doctrine’ of awards, the legal rules prescribing 
whether an award was valid or void. From the standpoint of enforcement, this was 
unquestionably the most important issue concerning arbitration as it determined whether the 
courts would hold the parties to their agreement to perform the award or not. If the award 
were valid, the parties would be legally obliged to perform it; but if the award were instead 
void, the parties would not be so obliged, the courts, as we have seen, treating a void award 
as if no award had been made. Technically, the parties’ legal position would revert back to 
how it had been in the intermediate stage between the parties forming their submission and 
the arbitrators making their award,114 but usually by the point when a party sought 
enforcement from the courts, the time period specified for the arbitrators to make an award 
would have expired, discharging the parties’ obligation to perform as a result. In practice, 
then, the effect of a court ruling that an award was void would be to terminate the parties’ 
attempt at arbitration, with neither party suffering any legal repercussions for it.  
 Given this outcome, it should not be surprising that when a party was sued for not 
performing an award, the most common defence put forward was to claim that the award was 
void. Indeed, in cases where the parties had formed their submission by deed, this was 
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essentially the only defence that could be made. If the submission had been formed using an 
indenture, the parties’ agreement to perform would have been enshrined in a deed, so the 
non-performing party could not deny that he had agreed to perform the award. One of the 
only ways to avoid being held to this agreement, then, was for the party to argue that the 
award was void, in the hopes that the court would accept this defence and dismiss the case for 
the reasons above.115 If the submission had been instead formed using conditional bonds, by 
not performing the award the party would have contravened the condition of his bond and 
would therefore be liable to pay the penalty. He could only hope to escape payment by 
contending that the award was void, for given that a void award was equated to there being 
no award made, the effect of this position on the bond’s construction would be that the party 
had not breached its condition, there being no award for him to perform, and so he was not 
yet liable to pay. Thus, when a party, the plaintiff, brought a claim to sue his opponent for not 
performing the award, it was conventional for the opponent, the defendant, to plead that their 
arbitrators did not make an award (nullum fecerunt arbitrium), a plea he would maintain until 
joinder of issue so that the question for the court to decide was whether there was an award or 
not—the plaintiff claiming that there was one, and the defendant claiming there was not.116 
As this was a legal issue rather than a factual one, the defendant’s plea standing only if the 
court ruled that the award was void, the matter would be brought before the justices in banc 
either by special verdict117 or on demurrer118 so that the defendant could argue that the award 
was void. It was from these arguments, then, that the law of awards was both expressed and 
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reinforced, and given that it was the in banc discussions that were reported in the nominate 
reports, it is possible to know what these rules were and, importantly, how they were 
justified. 
 Turning now to the rules themselves, it must be stressed that they were in no way 
haphazard; rather, they derived from the two general principles on awards that have been 
discussed in this section: first, that the award must comply with what was specified in the 
submission; and second, that the award was tantamount to a judgment. The rules proceeding 
from the first principle, the reader will be thankful to know, have all been examined 
elsewhere in the chapter and so only need to be synthesised here. In terms of formalities, the 
award had to satisfy the stipulations of the parties regarding content, form, timing, and notice 
or else it would be void. In terms of the arbitrators exercising their powers, they could not 
delegate, reserve, or exceed their authority or make a decision involving a third party or 
‘stranger’ as to do so would exceed what the parties had specified in their submission and 
would, therefore, be void. The rules deriving from this first principle were, then, merely 
expressions of the fact that the courts would only hold the parties to what they had agreed 
between themselves. If an award contravened any of these rules, it would be void for the 
simple reason that it was not what the parties had agreed to perform.  
 The rules ensuing from the second principle, by contrast, can more properly be seen 
as ‘judge-made’ rules as they were not tied to what the parties had agreed to in their 
submission but instead to what the courts expected of a judgment. As a form of judgment, an 
award was supposed to end or ‘finally determine’ the dispute between the parties,119 a result 
which could be achieved by adhering to three specific rules. First, the award had to be 
‘reciprocal’, meaning that it had to provide some sort of redress or satisfaction to both parties, 
the implication being that if only one party received satisfaction, the dispute would not be 
ended vis-à-vis the other party.120 Sir Henry Hobart, the chief justice of the Common Pleas, 
made this position clear in his own report of Nichols v Grunnion (1614), a case in which the 
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court of Common Pleas had been prepared to judge the award void for lack of reciprocity, it 
requiring the defendant to vacate her home and pay the plaintiff a sum of money whilst 
providing her nothing in return.121 As Hobart explained, ‘because every controversie is 
between two parties at the least…the controversie cannot be ended, except it be ended in 
respect of them both’.122 Second, the award had to be certain, meaning that the parties had to 
know what exactly was required of them to bring effect to the decision, any contingency or 
uncertainty causing the dispute to remain unresolved.123 This rule was distinctly expressed in 
Thinne v Rigby (1612), a case heard in the Exchequer Chamber on writ of error from the 
court of King’s Bench.124 As the arbitrators had not specified in their award what type of 
security the defendant was to give the plaintiff for payment of a sum of money at a later date, 
it was agreed ‘by all the judges and barons’ that the award was void for being uncertain, for 
‘every arbitrament ought to be certain, that the party may know what he is to perform’.125 
Third, the award had to be both possible and lawful to carry out, for if the parties were either 
physically or legally incapable of performing what their arbitrators had stipulated, they could 
not bring effect to the decision and end the dispute as a result.126 Disappointingly, no reported 
cases have been found of an award concerning an impossible or unlawful act, perhaps 
because it would have been obvious even to the arbitrators not to make a decision involving 
these issues, but due to a pleading error in the King’s Bench case of Gennings v Markham 
(1606/7), the effect was nonetheless the same. In recounting the contents of the arbitrators’ 
award in his declaration to the court, the plaintiff stated that it was a provision for the 
defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of money on 21 May and, on receiving the sum, for the 
plaintiff to release his claim to a disputed copyhold on 1 May. This was clearly a mistake in 
the writing of the plaintiff’s declaration, the word ‘twenty’ (vicesimum) being omitted from 
‘twenty-first day of May’ (vicesimum primum diem Maii), it having been stated that the 
plaintiff was to make his release on the ‘aforesaid’ (predictum) day.127 Yet as this was how 
the award was presented to the court, the justices held that the decision was ‘insensible’ as it 
was not possible for the defendant’s payment and the plaintiff’s release to occur on the same 
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day, 1 May and 21 May being distinct dates, and so were prepared to judge the award void. 
The case was, however, adjourned, and no report was made of the court’s judgment.128 
 Following from the two principles concerning awards, then, there were several rules 
prescribing whether an award was valid or void.129 Whilst the rules have been presented here 
separately, in practice they could operate in tandem, a court judging that an award was void 
for contravening several of the rules examined above.130 Perhaps because of this, it was 
common for a defendant to raise as many rules as were relevant to the facts of his case in 
arguing that the award was void, in the hopes that at least one of them would be held by the 
court to have been breached. For example, in the Common Pleas case of Freeman v Baspoule 
(1609/10), the defendant argued that the award was void because it was not reciprocal; it did 
not comply with the submission; and it was uncertain. None of these points appear to have 
convinced the court, for it gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff.131 Even more drastically, 
in the King’s Bench case of Peeling v Ken (1648), the defendant raised no less than six 
separate arguments to contest that the award was void, including that the decision was not 
reciprocal; that it involved a stranger; that some of its provisions were impossible; and that it 
did not comply with the parties’ submission. Presented with this veritable deluge, the court 
stated that it would take time to advise.132 In light of such practices, it is not difficult to see 
why the law reformer William Sheppard lamented that ‘the Law is so at this Day, that the 
wisest Man in the Country cannot make an Award that a hole cannot be pick’d in it to make it 
void’.133 Yet it is worth remembering that these rules had not developed to hinder or delay 
arbitration; indeed, as is clear from the principles from which they derived, they were meant 
to support the process and what the parties had agreed to between themselves. Like so many 
other issues, even the most well-intentioned of rules were capable of having a different result 
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By examining the elements of arbitration, this chapter has shown that there was clearly a 
legal practice to arbitration in the seventeenth century, one that was guided by established 
legal rules and principles. Whilst arbitration has traditionally been linked in scholarship to the 
community and informal means of conciliation, it would appear that the process had greater 
ties to the law than previously recognised. Of course, it can and should be questioned just 
how widespread this legal practice had been at the time. The sources used for this analysis 
were legal in nature and intended, though perhaps not exclusively, for a legal audience. Yet 
given the noted litigiousness of the period, where the levels of litigation brought before the 
courts throughout the legal system appear to have represented some of the highest in English 
history, it would be mistaken to assume that the rules and practices examined in this 
discussion were entirely detached from what occurred in practice.134 At the very least, if 
parties wanted to be able to seek enforcement from the courts, they would have to ensure that 
the way in which they conducted their arbitration complied with what the law prescribed. But 
neither was the law a static or immovable force to be applied against arbitration. This 
discussion has also revealed, through its coverage of issues such as the concurrent authority 
of umpires or the question of whether an award could be a deed, that the law as it related to 
arbitration was reactive and capable of change. As we shall see, such a recognition will be 
important to understanding the enforcement procedure of the Arbitration Act, but on a more 
general scale, it serves to illustrate that there was in fact  interaction between the law and 
arbitration. The relationship was not just one of the law prescribing arbitration; the law and 
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Figure 3: Diagram of the ‘law’ of awards 
 
*This rule could be avoided by the parties forming their submission using conditional bonds.
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2. Arbitration in Practice 
 
 
Having examined the elements of arbitration in the previous chapter, this discussion will 
move on to explore its practice in the seventeenth century. By analysing accounts of 
arbitration found in contemporary diaries and letters, this chapter will attempt to re-create 
what it was like to arbitrate a dispute at the time. This objective has been largely inspired by 
the works of previous historians who have undertaken similar efforts with regard to 
litigation.1 To make sense of the high levels of lawsuits brought during the period and to 
assess whether the resulting litigiousness had an impact on social relations, these historians 
have sought to relate the ‘experience’ of litigation for early modern individuals and the 
reasons contemporaries had for pursuing it.2 One of the consistent findings of these historians 
was that litigation was rarely initiated with the intention to reach a judgment; rather, it was 
commenced with the objective of securing an out-of-court settlement, most notably by 
arbitration. As James Sharpe claimed, ‘the initiation of a lawsuit with the aim of achieving an 
extra-legal settlement, and the frequent recourse to arbitration as a means of reaching this 
end, were two of the distinctive characteristics of litigation in Elizabethan and Stuart 
England’.3 But whilst these historians have been prepared to explore the purpose and practice 
of litigation in a critical way, they have proven less willing to apply their same methods to 
arbitration. As a result, the term ‘arbitration’ as used in scholarship has evolved into a sort of 
by-word for conciliation, with little consideration given to the complexities and motivating 
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factors of the process. The aim of conducting this study, then, is to begin the effort to offset 
this imbalance, focusing on two issues in particular. First, why did contemporaries choose to 
arbitrate their disputes? Second, what was the practice or ‘experience’ of arbitration at the 
time? The purpose in addressing these issues will not be to refute that arbitration was a means 
to resolve disputes and to reconcile parties, but rather to provide a more complete picture of 
the process in its entirety. 
1. Choosing arbitration 
 
Before we can examine the practice or ‘experience’ of arbitration in the seventeenth century, 
it is necessary to consider why contemporaries decided to arbitrate their disputes. Arbitration 
was, of course, only one of several methods of dispute resolution employed at the time, so 
what led contemporaries to choose it? By posing this particular question, one might be 
inclined to think that contemporaries actively chose arbitration over other dispute resolution 
methods. The reality is, however, that contemporaries rarely sought to arbitrate their disputes 
at the first instance; instead, they resorted to the process only after more informal and 
consensual methods had failed to bring about a settlement. This later resort to arbitration, 
rather than an initial preference for it, can be clearly observed in the dispute between the 
Yorkshire yeoman Adam Eyre and his tenant Edward Mitchell which broke out in 1647. Eyre 
and Mitchell had both previously served under the command of Sir Thomas Fairfax in some 
of the early skirmishes of the First English Civil War, and it was presumably through this 
connection that Eyre had come to lease the ground floor of his farmhouse to Mitchell the 
preceding year.4 After implementing this arrangement, however, Eyre and Mitchell soon fell 
into disagreement about the terms of the lease. Whilst they initially tried to sort out the 
matters themselves and, when that failed, through the mediation of their mutual friend 
William Rich, the dispute had so escalated by the winter of 1647 that the two were no longer 
on speaking terms.5 Recognising that a more drastic approach would be needed to settle the 
matter, Eyre wrote to Mitchell on 16 December stating that he was ‘willing to referr [himself] 
to [his] neighbours’, and a few days later he and Mitchell met at another friend’s home 
‘where we referred ourselves for all controversyes between us to the arbitrement of Ralph 
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centuries, ed. C. Jackson (1875), pp. 79-80 [henceforth cited as ‘Adam Eyre’]. 
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Wordsworth and W[illiam] Rich, and became bound in either of us 100l. to the other to abyde 
their end’.6 As this account illustrates, the use of arbitration was a later step in the dispute 
resolution process which saw contemporaries turn to increasingly formal and authoritative 
practices should their disagreement persist.7 By choosing to arbitrate their dispute, 
contemporaries acknowledged that the matter was contentious or complex enough that 
resolution could not be reached on their own. 
 Yet if contemporaries resorted to arbitration when their dispute could not be resolved 
by less formal methods, the same could be said for litigation. And whereas both procedures 
resulted in a more authoritative decision, one that was imposed on the disputing parties rather 
than being reached between them, the judgment of a court was the more coercive option, it 
being possible to sue out execution to implement the decision. Accordingly, it seems that the 
more critical question to ask is not why contemporaries chose arbitration, but why they might 
have chosen it over litigation. The rest of this section will be used to explore this question in 
more detail, particularly as it has been an area of concern for previous scholarship, arbitration 
having been widely depicted as an out-of-court alternative to litigation. 
 Perhaps the most significant reason that contemporaries might have chosen arbitration 
over litigation was that the process was more likely to reconcile the disputing parties. As 
Martin Ingram and James Sharpe have noted, this was largely a result of the procedural 
differences between the two processes, both in terms of the matters that could be addressed 
and the types of decision that could then be made.8 With litigation, for example, there could 
only be one cause of action for initiating proceedings before a court, something which might 
not have reflected or encompassed the full extent of a dispute between parties. Moreover, in 
deciding the matter, not only would the court assign fault wholly to one party or the other, 
precluding the very real possibility that both parties were to blame, but the remedy it would 
then provide might not have been deemed satisfactory to the party entitled to it, potentially 
exacerbating the dispute rather than ending it. With arbitration, by contrast, the parties could 
specify that any number of issues between them be addressed by their arbitrators, and in 
making their award, the arbitrators could devise a solution that worked for all the parties 
involved—provided, of course, that it complied with the legal rules discussed in the previous 
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chapter. Due to this greater procedural flexibility, then, arbitration was typically better suited 
than litigation to bring an end to a dispute, something that was reflected in the ways in which 
contemporaries often described the process in their writing: arbitrators were supposed to 
‘settle’, ‘compose’, or ‘end’ a dispute and to ‘make friends’ of the disputing parties; and their 
award was equated to ‘peace’, ‘unity’, and ‘love’. 
 Given that arbitration was more likely than litigation to resolve a dispute, there were 
also strong social pressures placed on contemporaries to make use of the process. As many 
social historians have shown, it was a prescriptive, although perhaps not descriptive, norm of 
the period that contemporaries were to maintain peaceful and ‘neighbourly’ relations within 
their communities, so it should not cause much surprise that when disagreements did occur, 
contemporaries were encouraged to settle their issues by arbitration and not by litigation.9 
The Cheshire magistrate Sir Richard Grosvenor acknowledged this preference for arbitration 
in a letter of advice to his son in 1636, stating that whilst ‘differences and suits may 
commence betwixt deare freinds and loveing neighbours’, the proper course would be to find 
‘a faire & frendly way of composure’ which was ‘by reference to some able & judicious 
freinds whose endeavours may putt an end to the controversy’.10 When Grosvenor learned 
two years later that his son had ignored his advice and had sued a neighbour without first 
attempting to arbitrate the dispute, he was infuriated. Not only did he rebuke his son, chiding 
him to ‘let reason and not will rule you in all matters’, but he arranged for an arbitration to 
take place with the neighbour, ordering his son to attend.11 Grosvenor’s quick actions to 
rectify his son’s mistake suggest that the use of arbitration could also have an effect on 
reputation. Indeed, as scholars have demonstrated that contemporaries regarded litigiousness 
as antithetical to the ‘proper’ conduct of social relations and characteristic of a ‘bad’ 
neighbour, it is probable that any refusal to arbitrate a dispute would have relayed a similar 
message to the community at large.12 At least this appears to have been the view taken by the 
Quaker merchant-factor James Claypoole in his dealings with another trader in the early 
1680s. Having fallen into disagreement over the balance of their commercial account, 
Claypoole suggested that they put the matter to arbitration. When he sensed that the trader 
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was unwilling to submit to arbitration, Claypoole warned him that his refusal would be taken 
as ‘a sign that you do not intend honestly’ and that ‘it will neither be for your reputation nor 
peace of conscience’ if they did not at least try to arbitrate the dispute.13 Presumably this was 
enough of an admonition, for Claypoole was not required to write anything further to the 
trader to convince him of this course of action. 
 Whilst social norms and expectations clearly played a significant role in choosing 
arbitration over litigation, they were not the only factors to influence this decision. The 
diaries and letters consulted for this study reveal that there were other, more practical reasons 
why contemporaries might have preferred to arbitrate their dispute. Amongst the most 
obvious of reasons was that arbitration was less expensive than litigation. Whilst Christopher 
Brooks and others have shown that the cost of bringing a lawsuit even in the central courts at 
Westminster was not prohibitively expensive at the time, a point which has helped explain 
the high levels of litigation during the period, litigants were nonetheless expected to pay 
significant sums of money in legal fees.14 By contrast, if the disputing parties instead chose to 
arbitrate the matter, they would at most remunerate their arbitrators for making an award and 
pay the clerk or scrivener who drafted their submission for the service. For example, in the 
dispute between Adam Eyre and Edward Mitchell that was discussed above, they both paid 
one shilling to each of their arbitrators and six pence to the scrivener who drew up the 
conditional bonds used to form their submission.15 Yet even these payments were not always 
necessary, especially when it came to remunerating the arbitrators. At least in the seventeenth 
century, it was not in fact typical for parties to pay their arbitrators for making an award; in 
most cases, arbitrators appear to have assumed the role without any expectation of payment. 
The Essex vicar Ralph Josselin’s many accounts of serving as an arbitrator in the disputes of 
his parishioners are illustrative of this norm. Despite assuming this position on numerous 
occasions in the 1650s-1660s, Josselin never once recorded being paid for his efforts and, in 
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one instance, he actually lent money to one of the disputing parties so that the party could 
perform his award.16  
 Another reason why contemporaries might have favoured arbitration over litigation 
was its lack of formality: its proceeding did not have to comply with a strict set of rules and 
could instead be conducted at the discretion of the people involved. This had two important 
consequences. First and more pragmatically, arbitration could be conducted more quickly 
than litigation. A dispute which might at law take several months or even years to reach 
judgment could be resolved by arbitrators in a single sitting and at a time and place 
convenient for the parties. For example, the diarist Samuel Pepys had been engaged in 
litigation over a disputed debt with Thomas Trice, the son of Pepys’ aunt from a former 
marriage, for almost two years when the two met in London in October 1663 to discuss ‘why 
we could not think, being friends, of referring it or stating it first ourselfs, and then put it to 
some good lawyer to judge in it’.17 They agreed to meet again that evening with their clerks 
and lawyers at the Pope’s Head tavern near Lombard Street where, after some deliberation, 
their counsels made an award on the matter, requiring Pepys to pay Trice one hundred pounds 
in satisfaction of the debt and Trice to spend forty shillings on the night’s entertainment.18 
The second consequence of the relative informality of arbitration was that its proceeding 
could not be dismissed for failing to adhere to the ‘niceties’ of the law. This was a recurring 
point of criticism for litigation: that a lawsuit could be overturned not just on the merits of the 
case but because the parties had not followed the correct rules and procedures. Such an issue 
can even be seen in the suits brought to enforce arbitration. In the Common Pleas case of 
Bretton v Prat (1600), the plaintiff sued the defendant for not performing an award that had 
required the defendant to assign him a life interest over an estate. Whilst the justices ruled 
that this provision was valid, because the plaintiff had not averred in his pleadings that the 
award had been made at the place specified in the parties’ submission, the justices also held 
that he had ill-pleaded and so gave judgment against him by default.19 Not only, then, was the 
plaintiff denied his life interest by the defendant not performing his part of the award, but the 
plaintiff was also denied his right to a legal remedy due to a mere technicality. 
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 Arbitration could also be conducted privately so that the matters raised by the 
disputing parties would remain confidential. This was in stark contrast to litigation where 
most stages of a lawsuit were carried out in public, often before an eager and attentive 
audience.20 There were several reasons why contemporaries might have wanted to avoid their 
dispute being aired before others. Merchants, for example, might have sought to keep their 
account disputes private so that news of their commercial transactions and debts could not 
impact on their credit.21 More broadly, contemporaries might also have wanted to employ 
arbitration strategically to ‘silence’ issues before they became public knowledge. This was 
what led Samuel Pepys to suggest to Mrs Goldsborough, a tenant on his late uncle’s estate, to 
arbitrate an outstanding debt she owed to him as his uncle’s administrator and heir. He 
recounted in his diary that he had met the woman one afternoon in October 1661 to discuss 
the payment of the debt and, having seen ‘how she talks and how she rails against my uncle’, 
he offered to put the matter to arbitration.22 Pepys clearly feared what she might reveal about 
his uncle, especially as it could in turn harm his own reputation, so when they later 
reconvened with their arbitrators to resolve the issue, Pepys was more lenient in his demands 
‘for I would not by any means go to law with a woman of so devilish a tongue as she is’.23 
Yet this strategic use of arbitration might also have signalled that a party who sought to 
arbitrate a dispute had something to hide. The Lancashire Nonconformist minister Adam 
Martindale opposed efforts to submit to arbitration a lawsuit that had been brought against 
him in the early 1660s for this very reason. Martindale had been indicted at the Cheshire 
assizes for refusing to read the Book of Common Prayer to his congregation, an accusation 
which he believed had been orchestrated by his enemies to have him removed from his post 
as the vicar of Rotherston. As the accusation was false, Martindale having not yet received 
the prayer book that he would then be required to read during religious services, Martindale 
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sought to defend his innocence by denying or ‘traversing’ the allegation made against him. 
When it was suggested by an officer of the court ‘pretending great pittie to me for the 
vastnesse of my charges’ that Martindale should choose ‘not to traverse, but to submit’, 
Martindale maintained that he could not pursue such a course ‘in point of conscience’ as that 
would be ‘a tacit acknowledgment of a fault; and I had neither done as the bill accused me, 
nor thought it any fault if I had’.24 
 A final reason why contemporaries might have chosen arbitration over litigation was 
that the process would have enabled them to hold greater sway over its outcome. Whereas 
with litigation the decision-making was taken entirely out of the hands of the disputing 
parties, a court’s judgment deriving from established and impersonal rules, with arbitration 
the parties retained some ability to influence what they would then be ordered to do, having 
picked the arbitrators who would make the award and having specified what issues they 
would be required to address. Accordingly, contemporaries might have chosen to arbitrate 
their dispute if they believed that they could secure a more favourable result through the 
process. After the ship which the merchant John Paige had chartered to acquire contraband 
slaves from Guinea was wrecked in 1651, killing most of the crew and cargo, he found 
himself facing demands from both the shipowners and the wives of the lost mariners for 
compensation.25 Following a decision by the court of Admiralty ordering payment of the 
mariners’ wages, Paige recognised that he would almost certainly be forced to pay the 
shipowners as well should the matter go to litigation, so he resolved that ‘if possible, I shall 
get the difference arbitrated rather than stand to a trial’.26 There is even reason to believe that 
contemporaries did not simply choose arbitration in the hopes of obtaining a more favourable 
decision; they might also have employed the process to exploit the control they wielded for 
less scrupulous ends. In a more Machiavellian example of fatherly advice, the Yorkshire 
landowner Sir William Wentworth counselled his son in 1604 that if ‘anie great man be to 
make an arbitrament betwixt yow and your adversarie wherin yow mean to have favour’, the 
best course to ensure this result was to ‘deal with some favorite of that great mans and 
enstruct him secrettlie and promise him a certaine reward, if your desire be effected’.27 Such 
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a suggestion was clearly a long way from the prevailing view that arbitration was employed 
for peaceful and neighbourly ends, and it thus serves to highlight the fact that contemporaries 
decided to arbitrate their disputes for more reasons than prescription alone might lead us to 
believe. Why contemporaries chose arbitration was in fact a far more complex issue than has 
previously been acknowledged.  
2. Initial steps 
 
Having considered the reasons why contemporaries decided to arbitrate their disputes, the 
rest of the chapter will be used to re-create, so far as is possible with the sources consulted, 
the practice or ‘experience’ of arbitration, from the initial steps needed for an arbitration to 
take place to the parties’ performance of the resulting award. This section will consider the 
steps the parties to a dispute would have taken so that an arbitration could occur, of which 
there were three: first, the parties would agree to arbitrate their dispute; second, they would 
nominate the arbitrators responsible for resolving the dispute; and third, they would enter into 
a submission. Whilst ostensibly straightforward, there was in fact much variation within each 
of these steps, so the aim of this section will be not only to account for how each step was 
implemented, but also to examine the various reasons and motivations contemporaries might 
have had for implementing the step in a particular way. 
 
2.1 Agreeing to arbitrate 
 
The first step in any arbitration was for the disputing parties to agree to arbitrate their 
differences. At first glance, this might appear to have been a relatively straightforward matter 
to address, but in practice it was often far more difficult to carry out. If, for example, the 
parties were no longer speaking with one another, how could they reach this agreement? Or if 
one or more of the parties denied that they were to blame for the matters in dispute, how 
could they be convinced to engage in the process? There were, then, various ways in which 
an agreement to arbitrate a dispute could be made, with each reflecting to some extent the 
level of contention in existence between the parties. The most obvious way for this agreement 
to be reached was for the parties to consent to it between themselves. The Chester alderman 
and later mayor Roger Whitley recounted such an occasion in his diary when, in 1687, he was 
accused by one of his neighbours, a Mr Davyes, of trespassing on his fields. Whitley denied 
the claim, arguing that he had a right of way over the land in question, but in concession he 
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offered that if a path were designated through the fields, he would not stray from it. To decide 
where the path would be located, Whitley suggested that they submit the matter to Davyes’ 
lawyer to decide, a proposal which Davyes was ‘well satisfyed’ to accept. As a further sign of 
goodwill, Whitley recorded that at the conclusion of their discussions he gave Davvyes a 
bottle of ale.28 To avoid the possibility that they might not be so accommodating when a 
dispute broke out between them, contemporaries could also come to an understanding at an 
earlier date that they would turn to arbitration should any difference arise that they could not 
resolve on their own. Such an understanding might have been set out in a contract like the 
one the merchant and Cumberland landowner Sir Christopher Lowther made with his 
business partner Rowland Jackson in 1632. In it they agreed to refer any future disagreement 
between them to two arbitrators, one a London merchant and the other a Cumberland 
gentleman, although Lowther admitted in a letter to his uncle that ‘I hope we shall never 
neede [them]’.29 But the understanding that contemporaries would employ arbitration should 
any dispute later arise could also be more general. For example, it was conventional for 
merchants to resolve their disagreements by arbitration, and so ingrained was this practice 
that they sometimes went to great lengths to ensure that such an arrangement would occur.30 
The London merchant-factor James Claypoole attempted for more than a year to convince Sir 
Thomas Clutterbuck, a distinguished merchant and landowner, to agree to arbitrate a 
disagreement over a commercial account, travelling to Clutterbuck’s estate in Hertfordshire 
on multiple occasions, both ‘in the dead of winter, [and] other times in the wind and rain’, to 
speak with him.31 Whilst Claypoole was ultimately successful in his endeavours, Clutterbuck 
sadly died before their arbitration could be completed.32 
 Yet it was often the case that the parties to a dispute were so at odds with one another 
that they would not have been able to agree to arbitration on their own. Instead, they would 
have to be persuaded or directed by others to reach this agreement. Family members often 
bore this burden, particularly when the parties were themselves related. After Samuel Pepys 
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and his uncle Thomas had been engaged in litigation for some time over the inheritance of 
another uncle’s estate, it was Pepys’ cousin Roger, an attorney, who was able to get the two 
sides to arbitrate the matter in 1662.33 The disputing parties might also have been convinced 
to reach this agreement by friends or neighbours. The vicar Ralph Josselin recorded in his 
diary that in 1647 he was able to persuade his friend and patron, the gentleman Thomas 
Harlakenden, to arbitrate his disagreement with a neighbouring landowner after the two had 
been at law for several months.34 That Josselin felt the need to document this event suggests 
that getting disputing parties to agree to arbitration could be a feat in itself. This was certainly 
the case in the lease dispute between Adam Eyre and Edward Mitchell that was discussed 
earlier in the chapter. Whilst it was noted that Eyre and Mitchell had agreed to arbitrate their 
dispute in December 1647, when it became clear that the arbitrators they had chosen were 
unlikely to make an award, the two quickly reverted to their previous state of hostility. Whilst 
at first they restricted themselves to minor acts of provocation, Mitchell distressing Eyre’s 
horse by repeatedly unbolting the doors to the stable, and Eyre, in retaliation, leaving open 
the front door to the farmhouse ‘as often as I went in or out’ so that the wind could upend 
Mitchell’s belongings, matters soon escalated to litigation.35 In early January, Eyre sued out 
process to initiate proceedings against Mitchell in the court of King’s Bench, and a few days 
later Mitchell had Eyre indicted for slander at the local quarter sessions.36 With their relations 
so impaired, it was only at the intervention of their friends and neighbours that Eyre and 
Mitchell were able to reconsider arbitrating their dispute. Once Eyre had received word from 
numerous acquaintances that Mitchell was again willing to ‘have an end of the buisinesse’, he 
contacted his friend William Rich to arrange for another arbitration. This time the process 
appears to have been successful, for Eyre recorded in his diary that on 1 February 1647/8 
William Rich and a Mr Ramsden had been able to resolve the matter.37 
  Contemporaries were also prepared to take a more unilateral approach to ensure that 
their opponents in a dispute would agree to arbitration. As James Sharpe has shown in his 
study of defamation suits brought before the consistory courts of York, contemporaries often 
began legal proceedings against opponents to convince them to arbitrate the disagreement.38 
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Not only were the costs and delays of litigation a burden that few contemporaries were 
willing to bear, but as Sir George Croke, a puisne justice of the court of King’s Bench, 
explained in 1614, to bring a lawsuit against another had even wider repercussions on the 
party’s livelihood: it ‘impeaches [the party’s] credit, and hinders his liberty…for by reason of 
this, he dares not go about his business’.39 Sometimes merely invoking the law could be 
enough to persuade an opponent to agree to arbitration. At least this was the view of the 
Cumberland landowner Sir Christopher Lowther when, in 1635, he wrote to two individuals 
who had been withholding payments he believed to be owed. After specifying the amount of 
money he sought to recover, Lowther admitted that he would prefer to resolve the 
disagreement ‘in love’ but stated that if they refused his offer, he would ‘proceed against yow 
which will be to your great cost and charges’. To add to his threat, Lowther recounted how 
another person had once tried to avoid repaying ‘but as I have made him satisfye me for all 
his boasts, soe will I yow if you doe not satisfye’.40 Whilst going to law or threatening to do 
so appears to have been a useful way to convince others to arbitrate a dispute, there was the 
danger that such an approach could instead exacerbate matters. In a property dispute with Sir 
Gilbert Talbot, the earl of Shrewsbury, which spanned the first decade of the seventeenth 
century, the Yorkshire landowner Sir William Wentworth sued the earl with the explicit aim 
‘for composycion’. Yet despite Wentworth’s entreaties to Talbot, reminding the earl that he 
‘should haue yt very cheape’ if a ‘lawyer and gentleman of eyther syde might compound’ the 
issue, Talbot refused to settle out of court, stating that he would ‘haue a new tryall’ against 
Wentworth in retaliation.41 
 A less contentious but equally one-sided tactic to convince an opponent to agree to 
arbitration was by petition. A party to a dispute might have solicited the help of someone else 
to persuade his opponent to consent to the process. Typically this third party appears to have 
been in a position of authority so that he had the power or influence to ensure that the parties 
would reach this agreement. Roger Whitley, who was serving his fourth term as mayor of 
Chester in 1695, was in such a position, which might explain why he was asked by several 
linen drapers in the city to convince the aldermen of their company to arbitrate a 
disagreement. Whitley was initially hesitant, stating that he should not interfere with the 
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company’s affairs; nonetheless, he recorded in his diary that he was able to arrange a meeting 
between the two sides some days later to ‘endeavor to compose the businesse’ between 
them.42 Petitions could also take on a more formal character: as both John Dawson and Derek 
Roebuck have shown, dealing with petitions for arbitration constituted a significant portion of 
the work undertaken by the Privy Council in the Elizabethan and Stuart periods.43 Examples 
of these petitions are found in abundance amongst the papers of the Norfolk gentleman Sir 
Nathaniel Bacon, son of the lord keeper Nicholas Bacon and half-brother to Sir Francis 
Bacon, as he was frequently called on by the Privy Council to serve as an arbitrator in the 
disputes which it had been petitioned to provide redress. One such example was the petition 
of Adam Robinson, a glazier from Norwich, from 1589. Robinson explained that he had 
fallen into disagreement with a gentleman named William Warner and so had suggested that 
Warner ‘shold make choise of fower men…and [Robinson] would choise twoo of them, and 
what ende soever they did sett downe [Robinson] would perfourme it’. Robinson’s overture 
to arbitrate was, however, rejected, with Warner instead pursuing Robinson ‘withall vigour of 
law’, so Robinson requested that the Privy Council ‘graunt your honours letters unto some 
worshipfull of the same shire for the hearing and determyninge’ of the dispute.44 That 
Nathaniel Bacon was able to make an award resolving the matter some months later45 would 
appear to lend support to the claim of the historian Steve Hindle that contemporary efforts at 
conciliation often depended not just on ‘ideals of neighbourliness’ but on ‘the injection of 
some measure of public authority into the “disputing process”’.46 
 Petitions were not the only occasion in which some form of ‘public authority’ could 
be wielded to make contemporaries agree to arbitration. As Hindle himself has noted, it was 
possible for justices of the peace (JPs) to compel disputing parties to arbitrate their 
disagreements by issuing a recognizance, a legal instrument similar to a conditional bond 
whereby a party would be forced to pay a sum of money if he did not perform a specified 
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task.47 A JP might, for example, make the recognizance conditional on a party agreeing to 
arbitrate his dispute, even going further to require the party to comply with the process in full. 
In essence, the recognizance would therefore have served the same function as a conditional 
bond used to form a submission, the principal difference being that if the party failed to 
comply, he would not be liable to his opponent but rather to the crown.48 But JPs most 
frequently employed recognizances to compel parties to ‘keep the peace’ or to ‘be of good 
behaviour’, a practice  Hindle has shown contemporaries to have used strategically as a 
means to obstruct or constrain their opponents in the midst of a dispute.49 Accordingly, a JP 
might only grant a party’s request to issue a recognizance in these circumstances if the party 
first agreed to arbitrate the dispute. This appears to have been the approach of the Surrey JP 
Bostock Fuller when in 1612 four individuals came to him seeking recognizances to keep the 
peace against each other. Fuller recorded in his justicing notebook that whilst he granted their 
request, he also ‘comytted the matter to arbitryament’, a tactic which appears to have been 
successful, for some months later he was able to document that he had discharged the parties 
of their recognizances, presumably as they were no longer needed.50 
 A final way in which the parties might agree to arbitrate their dispute was if they were 
directed to do so by the order of a court. This occurred when a court ordered that the matters 
in a pending lawsuit be referred to one or more arbitrators to decide, and for this reason the 
process was often called a ‘reference’ and the arbitrators ‘referees’.51 References appear to 
have been a pervasive feature of court practice across jurisdictions52 and at all levels of the 
legal system,53 lending support to the findings of previous historians that not all litigation had 
been intended to reach a judgment.54 Whilst there were many reasons why a court might have 
ordered a reference to occur, at least one of them was in recognition that the interests of the 
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litigating parties would be better served if their suit were resolved by arbitration. The 
barrister John Manningham recounted such an occasion when, in February 1602/3, the suit of 
two ‘poore men’ was argued before the justices of the court of King’s Bench. Having taken 
into consideration the parties’ limited circumstances and the fact that the issue was ‘verry 
doubtfull’, the justices ‘moved that they would referr the matter to some indifferent men that 
might determine soe chargeable and difficult a controversy’.55 Particularly in the court of 
Chancery, the principal court of equity in the realm, a reference could also develop out of the 
implementation of the court’s own proceedings, the commissioners appointed by the court to 
examine the parties to a suit in the counties often being authorised to ‘hear and determine’ the 
suit as well.56 As these commissioners would be empowered to summon the parties and to 
administer oaths to help facilitate the undertaking of their examination on behalf of the court, 
they therefore had additional powers than those of a ‘normal’ arbitrator.57 Accordingly, the 
parties to a dispute might sometimes have initiated proceedings in the court of Chancery so 
that their referees would have these powers. In 1607, the Norfolk magistrate Sir Nathaniel 
Bacon in fact encouraged the parties whose dispute he had been attempting to resolve by 
arbitration to exhibit a bill into the court for this purpose, having realised that he would be 
unable to make an award unless he could examine their witnesses under oath, writing to 
Thomas Egerton, the Lord Chancellor, to forewarn him of this development.58 
 
2.2 Nominating arbitrators 
 
Once the parties to a dispute had agreed to arbitrate their differences, the next step would be 
to nominate their arbitrators. From the viewpoint of the parties, this would undoubtedly have 
been the most important step to take, for the arbitrators they nominated would then be 
responsible for resolving the dispute, ordering the parties, for better or for worse, to carry out 
certain tasks so as to bring effect to their decision. For this reason, contemporaries appear to 
have been on the whole prudent in selecting their arbitrators, a cautiousness which Sir 
Richard Grosvenor noted when, as the sheriff of Cheshire, he made an address to voters in the 
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1624 parliamentary election, likening the nomination of arbitrators to the election of 
Members of Parliament (MPs): 
 
If Anie of us hath a controversie with another and bee contented to refer the 
difference to frends, how warie will wee bee in nominatinge our arbitrators. 
And if our judgment blind us not wee will choose such to deale for us as wee 
suppose are for their wisdom able to discerne of our right and title, and in 
regard of their affection and professed love are soe fast knit and tyed unto us 
that we dare trust them. And shall wee bee thus carefull in our own particulers 
for trifles and toyes, which deserve not to bee spoken of in comparison to 
those more greate and publique affaires? And ought wee not to bee much more 
care[ful] whom wee elect in this greate arbitrement (as I may call it) of our 
owne and our posterities future happines?59 
 
Whilst it is evident that nominating arbitrators to resolve a dispute was an important decision, 
what is less clear are the ‘mechanics’ that went into the making of this decision. The 
following discussion will therefore be used to examine this nomination process in more 
detail, focusing on three separate issues: the qualities contemporaries sought in their 
arbitrators; the types of arbitrators that were typically chosen; and the reasons why a person 
might have agreed to be an arbitrator.  
 The first issue to consider are the qualities which contemporaries tended to seek in 
selecting their arbitrators. As the previous chapter has shown, there were no legal 
requirements prescribing who could be an arbitrator, but the treatises on arbitration 
nonetheless advised that disputing parties nominate arbitrators who were both ‘skillful’ and 
‘indifferent’.60 Whilst the matter of skill and expertise will be discussed in examining the 
types of arbitrators on which contemporaries relied, it is worth scrutinising the matter of 
impartiality more closely here. An impartial or ‘indifferent’ arbitrator would have been 
expected to decide the parties’ dispute without showing favour to either side and to make his 
award based on the merits of the issues presented to him.61 Was this a quality that 
contemporaries would have wanted in their arbitrators? In some cases, it certainly appears so. 
During the winter of 1681-1682, the merchant James Claypoole wrote several letters to 
William Chare, an English merchant residing in Hamburg, in an attempt to persuade him to 
nominate arbitrators from London to decide their dispute over a commercial account. Chare 
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had intended for the arbitrators chosen to be from Hamburg, the disagreement having arisen 
from transactions conducted there, but Claypoole insisted that it would be ‘very unequal for 
me to refer a difference to those that are your friends and intimates, which are strangers to me 
and I to them’.62 Whilst Claypoole’s appeals failed to convince Chare to change his mind, 
Claypoole did not give up hope that the arbitrators might still decide the disagreement in an 
impartial manner. In prefacing his letter to the two arbitrators whom Chare nominated later 
that year, Claypoole explained that although ‘he never had the opportunity to converse with 
you either by word or writing’, he was confident that they would nonetheless be able to 
resolve the issue on ‘equal terms’.63 Claypoole’s evident concern for impartiality appears to 
have been shared amongst merchants on a more general scale. As the merchant Gerard 
Malynes explained in his commercial treatise and manual Consuetudo, vel Lex Mercatoria, 
when arbitrators were nominated to make an award in a commercial dispute, they were 
expected not only to observe the ‘custome of merchants’ but to ‘be void of all partialitie or 
affection more nor less to the one, than to the other’.64 To ensure that such a result could be 
achieved, Malynes listed several nomination practices that were then in use by merchants and 
that could be employed to a similar end by his readers. The disputing parties could each name 
four or six potential candidates and then ‘referre the naming or electing of foure out of them 
by reciprocall proceeding, when one named the first person, another the second, and then 
againe the third, and the other the fourth person’. They could equally involve a ‘meere 
stranger’ who would then be tasked with selecting the arbitrators by pricking their names 
from the back of a piece of paper with a pin, by drawing their names by lot, or by rolling 
dice. As Malynes concluded, essentially any method of ‘pointing, numbring, or describing’ 
would suffice so long as it tended ‘to one end, to have indifferencie, and that partialitie may 
be avoided by all meanes’.65 
 The sources consulted for this chapter reveal, however, that contemporaries did not 
always want their arbitrators to be impartial. Perhaps as frequently, they sought instead to 
nominate arbitrators who could be trusted to represent or advocate for their interests in 
making an award. In such cases, the arbitrators nominated might be seen as taking on more of 
an agent-based role, where they would be expected to broker a deal on the parties’ behalf. In 
the present day, this sort of advocacy would more properly be associated with negotiation 
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than with arbitration, the impartiality of arbitrators having become a defining characteristic of 
the modern practice of the process.66 Yet it is clear that contemporaries of the seventeenth 
century had no issue with conceptualising the role of arbitrators in this way. As the London 
merchant John Paige explained in a letter to his business partner in 1653, after a lawsuit had 
been initiated in an account dispute between Paige and the owners of a frigate he had 
chartered, both sides resolved to refer the matter ‘unto two arbitrators, Mr Stephen Slaney 
being for me’.67 For their part, arbitrators do not appear to have been especially concerned 
with assuming an advocate-like role and seeking to favour one party over another. When 
Samuel Pepys was nominated by the merchant John Bland in November 1663 to decide a 
dispute that had concerned the victualling of the newly-acquired garrison at Tangier, Pepys 
actively tried to ensure that the award would be made to Bland’s advantage.68 Pepys and 
Bland had become acquainted in the preceding months due to their interactions through the 
Tangier Committee, the council charged with overseeing the foreign garrison and its 
surrounding territory, Pepys serving as one of its commissioners and Bland as one of its 
principal suppliers, so Pepys resolved to ‘endeavour to do Mr Bland all the just service I can 
therein’.69 Although Pepys was ultimately unable to convince the other arbitrator to take his 
side and to absolve Bland entirely of fault in the dispute, Pepys made sure to note in his diary 
that he had succeeded in reducing the amount of money Bland would be required to pay, 
something which he reckoned was ‘well enough ended for Mr Bland for all that’.70 
 The second issue to consider regarding the nomination of arbitrators are the types of 
arbitrators typically chosen to resolve disputes. The focus on types of arbitrators rather than 
who specifically could be an arbitrator is intentional, for the sources consulted for this study 
reveal that a wide cross-section of the population took on the role; serving as an arbitrator 
was not limited to a single group, class, or profession. In the broadest sense, then, it is 
possible to discern three types of arbitrators on whom contemporaries would rely: the 
‘specialist’ arbitrator, the ‘horizontal’ arbitrator, and the ‘vertical’ arbitrator. The ‘specialist’ 
arbitrator, as its name suggests, was a person nominated for the skill or expertise he could 
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bring to resolving a dispute. In previous scholarship, ‘specialist’ arbitrators have most 
commonly been associated with merchants given that commercial knowledge and expertise 
were often promoted by merchants themselves as a prerequisite for deciding their 
differences.71 Not surprisingly, when selecting their arbitrators, it was conventional for 
merchants to justify their choice of candidate by referring to his practice or experience in 
trade. When the London merchant William Freeman attempted to fix the freightage cost for 
hiring a ship with another merchant in 1679, he suggested that if the merchant did not agree 
with his valuation, they should ‘referr itt to an indifferent p[e]rson heer to decyde’. Rather 
than wait for his response, Freeman proceeded to propose that John Fleet, another London 
merchant, serve as their arbitrator for the reason that he was ‘the most competent judge we 
know…he being the only great buyer in London’.72 Yet ‘specialist’ arbitrators were not 
limited to merchants; the skill or expertise that an arbitrator could bring to the resolution of a 
dispute could take other forms. It might have been based on a familiarity with particular 
customs or practices, such as when Thomas Rokeby and Giles Eyre, two of the assize judges 
who administered common law trials in the counties, nominated their colleagues in 1689 to 
make a decision in their disagreement over the payment of shared travel costs whilst on 
circuit, the other judges being the only ones who knew how costs were typically 
apportioned.73 Rokeby was, however, frustrated with their decision, being forced to pay more 
than he had thought was reasonable, so the next time in which he and Eyre were assigned to 
the same assize circuit, in 1696, he made sure to keep his travel arrangements entirely 
separate from Eyre’s.74 A ‘specialist’ arbitrator’s expertise might also have been connected to 
the particular skills that he could offer to settle a dispute. This might explain why Roger 
Lowe, an apprentice shop-keeper in a village in Lancashire, was nominated on multiple 
occasions in the 1660s-1670s to serve as an arbitrator despite being inferior to the disputing 
parties in both age and social standing. Lowe seems to have ‘moonlighted’ as a scrivener, 
perhaps the only one in his village, so his neighbours would look to him for help when their 
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dispute would have involved the drafting of legal documents.75 Lowe recounted one such 
instance from 1663 when he was chosen as the sole arbitrator in a dispute between father and 
son which had previously been the subject of litigation. The dispute appears to have 
concerned some sort of debt or other payment, for once Lowe made an award, bringing 
‘peace’ to the two relations, he accompanied them to an alehouse where he ‘made bond for to 
pay such a sum of moneys att such a time’.76 
 Whilst the characterisation of a ‘specialist’ arbitrator related to what the arbitrator 
could bring to the resolution of a dispute, that of a ‘horizontal’ arbitrator instead concerned 
the arbitrator’s position relative to the disputing parties. Essentially, a ‘horizontal’ arbitrator 
was someone who came from the same social class as the parties and so included friends, 
neighbours, and kin. Craig Muldrew, who also characterised arbitrators in terms of their 
horizontal and vertical relations, posited that nominating ‘horizontal’ arbitrators was of more 
importance to contemporaries than choosing ‘vertical’ arbitrators, persons who were in 
positions of authority relative to the parties.77 The sources consulted for this study do not 
overwhelmingly support this view; instead, the impression given is that contemporaries just 
as often relied on their social betters to resolve their disputes. Yet there were certain groups 
that appear to have turned to ‘horizontal’ arbitrators with greater frequency. The country 
gentry, for example, preferred to resolve their disagreements within their own social milieu 
perhaps because, as Anthony Fletcher has shown, their reputation was largely based on being 
seen as upholding peace and social order, a view that could have been undermined if they 
instead appealed to more authoritative powers.78 This might help explain the differences in 
the types of nomination requests Sir Nathaniel Bacon received from the Privy Council and 
from petitioners themselves. Whereas Bacon was directed by the Privy Council to serve as an 
arbitrator in disputes involving a wider range of the social spectrum, the requests he received 
directly came almost exclusively from other gentlemen. One such request was made in 1604 
when Sir Edward Coke, who, in addition to being Attorney-General at the time, was also a 
member of the Norfolk gentry, wrote to Bacon and Sir Miles Corbet entreating them to 
resolve a land dispute between him and Sir Edward Paston, another Norfolk gentleman. Coke 
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explained that whilst he and Paston had previously litigated the matter, he hoped to resolve 
the dispute out of court because lawsuits ‘are mothers of unkindnes’.79 In a separate letter to 
Bacon alone, Coke further expressed the ‘desire I have of quietnes’ as his reason for seeking 
Bacon’s help in the matter.80 
 Yet one drawback of ‘horizontal’ arbitrators was that, relative to the disputing parties, 
they would not have been imbued with a sense of authority which would have made it more 
likely that the parties would comply with their requests and demands. Depending on how 
contentious the dispute was between the parties, a ‘horizontal’ arbitrator might have lacked 
the ability to make the parties see the process through to its conclusion. The Leeds antiquary 
and wool-merchant Ralph Thoresby attempted in 1691 to act as an arbitrator in a dispute 
between two of his relatives who had for some time been engaged in litigation before the 
court of Chancery. Despite meeting with the parties on several occasions, however, Thoresby 
was prevented from making an award by the ‘obstinacy’ of one of the parties and so reported 
in his diary that ‘they must now to Chancery again’.81 Examples such as this might help 
explain why contemporaries did also nominate ‘vertical’ arbitrators to resolve their disputes. 
The fact that a ‘vertical’ arbitrator would have been in a position of authority relative to the 
disputing parties might have placed additional constraints on the parties to comply. When 
James Claypoole, in his dispute with Sir Thomas Clutterbuck, realised that Clutterbuck was 
not receptive to their original arbitrator, Claypoole nominated William Penn to serve in the 
role instead, someone who, by virtue of being a leading figure in the Quaker community, 
would have been in a far more authoritative position, both Claypoole and Clutterbuck having 
been Quakers. Claypoole was in fact explicit in stating that he had nominated Penn for the 
greater weight he wielded: Claypoole noted that Clutterbuck ‘pretends to have great esteem 
for’ Penn and for that reason the arbitration was more likely to succeed.82 Selecting 
arbitrators for the authority they could provide to an arbitration was probably also why JPs 
were often nominated for the role. The justicing notebooks of the JPs Walter Powell (1603-
1654),83 Bostock Fuller (1608-1622),84 and Robert Doughty (1662-1665)85 all provide 
numerous examples of them serving as arbitrators and, as James Rosenheim has 
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acknowledged, the examples recorded likely represented only a small portion of the actual 
number of arbitrations they conducted.86 Not only were JPs typically chosen from the highest 
ranks of the country elite, but they were also empowered to coerce compliance through the 
issuing of recognizances and other warrants, so it is plausible that they would have been 
perceived as the ultimate ‘vertical’ arbitrator within a local community.87 This, at least, was 
the view taken by Adam Eyre in 1647 when he advised his neighbours to refer their dispute 
first to the churchwardens or overseers of their parish but ‘if they could not agree, then to goe 
before some justice of peace’.88 
 The third and final issue to consider regarding nominating arbitrators was why a 
person would have agreed to take on the role. As noted earlier, arbitrators were rarely paid for 
their efforts, so there would have been little financial incentive for assuming the position. Nor 
was the role particularly easy: the sources consulted give the impression that more often than 
not, attempting to make an award in a dispute was tedious and time-consuming. For example, 
the vicar Ralph Josselin once recorded in his diary that he was only able to come to a decision 
in a dispute after ‘many journeyes and much trouble’, and Roger Lowe, the apprentice shop-
keeper, recounted one instance in which he spent an entire day attempting to resolve a dispute 
between two villagers, leaving his shop unattended to do so.89 Yet in spite of the burdens of 
serving as an arbitrator, few contemporaries appear to have turned down requests to assume 
the role. In fact, of all the accounts of arbitration that have been examined for the purposes of 
this study, only one instance has been uncovered where the person nominated expressed real 
reluctance to take on the role, but even then he ultimately agreed to it. In the Chancery case 
of Norton v Mascall (1687), it would appear from the entry recorded in the court’s files, 
which are far more detailed in their descriptions than their common law equivalents, that the 
plaintiff Norton, who had been ‘young [and] vnacquainted with the Affaires of the world’, 
had become associated with the defendant Mascall, a goldsmith and ‘Cunning man’, and had 
over a series of transactions assigned most of his estate to Mascall to satisfy various debts and 
obligations Mascall had pretended to be due. After much resistance and denial from Mascall, 
the matter was put to arbitration in 1683, with the parties selecting two gentlemen to serve as 
their arbitrators and, in the event that they could not make an award, to have Thomas Rokeby, 
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then a leading lawyer in York, serve as their umpire. When the arbitrators proved incapable 
of making an award, the parties approached Rokeby to make an umpirage, something which 
he was initially ‘vnwilling to Doe’, but, as the entry states, ‘at the last through Importunity of 
all the said [par]tyes he was p[re]vailed with’ to make a decision, one whose performance 
would later be contested before the court of Chancery.90 
 Although the sources consulted do not provide any explicit explanation for why 
contemporaries agreed to serve as arbitrators, it is possible to discern several reasons for this 
apparent norm, some of which were specific to the circumstances of the arbitration in 
question, whilst others were instead more widely applicable. In terms of specific reasons, 
contemporaries might have felt obliged to take on the role given their relationships with the 
disputing parties or other persons involved. The nominated arbitrators might have been 
related to the parties, as evidenced in several of the accounts of arbitration discussed earlier in 
this chapter,91 but they might equally have been enjoined to assume the position by a patron 
or another influential figure. Ralph Thoresby, the Leeds antiquary, once worked 
uninterrupted for nearly fourteen hours to make an award in a dispute at the behest of the 
wife of Samuel Sykes, the ex-mayor and leading alderman of the city,92 and the Essex vicar 
Ralph Josselin agreed to serve as an arbitrator in several disputes involving, either directly or 
indirectly, his patron Thomas Harlakenden.93 It would also appear that contemporaries 
accepted nomination requests to reinforce what the historian Bernard Capp has called an 
‘economy of mutual favours’: they assumed the role to compensate for some previous favour 
done to them or to ensure that they would be owed a favour in the future.94 The Yorkshire 
yeoman Adam Eyre who, as we have seen, had served in the parliamentarian New Model 
Army, might have agreed to his friend Nicholas Greaves’ request that he act as an arbitrator 
in an ongoing dispute because Greaves had recently helped him put to rest a rumour 
circulating that Eyre had spoken ill of Sir Thomas Fairfax, who had been his commanding 
general.95 Moreover, in many of the letters in which Sir Nathaniel Bacon was petitioned to 
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serve as an arbitrator, the writers would often frame their appeals in terms of their 
indebtedness to Bacon should he accept the role. When Bacon was asked by Sir Edward Coke 
to resolve his land dispute with Sir Edward Paston, Coke assured Bacon that both he and 
Paston would be ‘much beholding to you for your paynes and indifferency’ if Bacon made an 
award on the matter.96 
 On a more general scale, contemporaries might have agreed to serve as arbitrators to 
bolster or legitimise their own position within a group or community. This concern would 
have been especially relevant for ‘specialist’ arbitrators, for taking on the role would have 
signalled to others that they had the skill or expertise to resolve the matters in dispute 
between the parties. Such a concern for legitimacy appears to have been one of Samuel 
Pepys’ motives for agreeing to the merchant John Bland’s request that he serve as an 
arbitrator in Bland’s dispute concerning the victualling of Tangier. As his diary reveals, 
Pepys had perceived his appointment to the Tangier Committee in 1662 as evidence of his 
growing importance as a naval administrator, so when Bland made his nomination request, 
Pepys was eager to have another opportunity to show his worth. As he soon discovered, 
however, the dispute was far from straightforward, and, after his first meeting with the 
parties, Pepys recorded that ‘their minds are both so high, their demands so distant, and their 
words so many and hot against one another, that I fear we shall bring it to nothing.’97 Yet 
Pepys also observed that he was ‘glad to see myself so capable of understanding the business 
as I find I do’, and he took time to remark on his own competence in handling the matter on 
other occasions as well.98 In one telling example, Pepys recorded that he had grasped the 
issues raised by the parties better than the other appointed arbitrator, one Mr Clerke, a 
merchant whom Pepys made sure to note, adding in brackets to his own account, was very 
‘able as to his trade’.99 Thus, whilst Pepys might not have found the experience of serving as 
an arbitrator particularly enjoyable, he might well have persisted in the effort given that his 
involvement in the matter would have served to enhanced his image as someone fit to 
understand and decide commercial issues.100 
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 A concern for legitimacy might also have been a factor in a JP’s decision to serve as 
an arbitrator. JPs provide an interesting case study given that their involvement in an 
arbitration would have been in addition to and, perhaps, an added burden on the undertaking 
of their official magisterial tasks. Yet given that acting as an arbitrator would have complied 
with what the late sixteenth-century legal writer William Lambarde called the magistrate’s 
‘common duetie in charitie’ that he should ‘occupie himselfe…in pacifying the suites and 
c[o]ntroversies, that do arise amongst his neighbours’, it may well be that JPs had perceived 
the act of serving as an arbitrator as a means to legitimise their more official functions.101 By 
agreeing to be an arbitrator, a JP could therefore realise the ‘broad social roles rather than 
specialised administrative functions’ that Michael Braddick has claimed were critical to 
legitimising or ‘legitmating’ an office-holder in the eyes of his community.102 This might in 
turn clarify why it seems to have been conventional for JPs to include in their justicing 
notebooks precedents of the documents and instruments used in arbitration, despite the fact 
that their making and implementation would not have been an official part of a JP’s duties. 
For example, in the notebook of William Holcroft, who served as a JP for Essex in the second 
half of the seventeenth century, the preamble to an award was set out as one of only eight 
precedents Holcroft had included under the heading of ‘Justice’s Business’.103 Moreover, in 
the memorandum book of John Locke senior, the father of the famous philosopher who, as 
we shall see, would play an important role in the drafting of the Arbitration Act, a precedent 
of the condition of a bond used to form a submission was recorded as one of the legal 
instruments used in proceedings of the Somerset quarter sessions for the period of 1629-
1631.104 It would appear, then, that serving as an arbitrator, whilst not an official part of a 
JP’s duties, would have nonetheless been key to the execution of this office. 
 Finally, agreeing to serve as an arbitrator might simply have been indicative of the 
widespread participation in local government that historians claim to have characterised the 
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period.105 Although previous scholarship has tended to focus on the contemporary 
participation in office-holding, if we accept, as Steve Hindle has argued, that one of the basic 
functions of government had been to resolve disputes, thereby preventing social conflict, it is 
possible that the role of an arbitrator could have been as critical to achieving this end as any 
official position.106 Contemporaries might therefore have viewed their acceptance of 
nomination requests as a sort of public duty, perhaps even more so when the dispute they 
were nominated to resolve could have had an adverse effect on the community at large. The 
Yorkshire yeoman Adam Eyre encountered no difficulty in securing the help of Daniel Clark, 
the vicar of a neighbouring parish, to act as the sole arbitrator in an ongoing dispute between 
Eyre and the other parishioners of Penistone, on the one hand, and their vicar Christopher 
Dickinson, on the other. The parishioners had sought to replace Dickinson with a more 
‘godly’ minister, but the vicar had refused to surrender his post, getting ‘very hott’ with Eyre 
when the possibility of his replacement was first raised.107 In spite of the doubtful precedent it 
would have set for one vicar to decide the fate of another, Clark ultimately made an award on 
the matter in May 1647, ordering Dickinson only to ‘tary til Midsomer, but to preach no 
more’ and for the parishioners to pay him forty pounds as a final allowance.108 Perhaps the 
need to avoid further conflict in Penistone outweighed any reservations Clark might 
otherwise have had in agreeing to be the arbitrator charged with resolving this dispute. 
 
2.3 Entering into the submission 
 
Once the parties had nominated their arbitrators and the arbitrators had in turn accepted the 
role, the final step needed for an arbitration to take place was for the parties to enter into the 
submission, the contract in which they agreed to perform the award that their arbitrators 
would then make. Whilst the previous chapter’s discussion of the submission would suggest 
that this was an important step to take, one that often involved the drafting of deeds to 
enshrine the terms of the parties’ agreement, the diaries and letters examined for this chapter 
depict a markedly different view. Not only does it appear that submissions by deed were 
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employed less frequently, but the act of entering into the submission was not often a point 
worth mentioning in the writers’ accounts. Whilst this difference in depiction is noteworthy, 
for two reasons it should not be found especially surprising. First, given the legal nature of 
the treatises consulted for the previous chapter, the works were bound to emphasise the 
submission, it being what made arbitration legally enforceable, and to the take time to discuss 
the forms of submission that would have provided the best options for enforcement, the 
works having been intended principally as practice manuals. To a large extent, the noted 
difference in views can therefore be attributed to the ‘spin’ of the sources examined, a useful 
reminder to the historian that no single type of source should be used at the expense of others. 
Second, it must be recognised that a sort of universal truth about contracts, one that applies 
even today, is that a contract will only really become important when it is needed—that is, 
when one of the parties to the agreement breaches its terms. As the writers of the sources 
consulted for this study tended to record events either as they occurred or very soon 
thereafter, they might not have felt it necessary to make note of their submission as, in most 
cases, they would have entered into the agreement in good faith and would not have expected 
to encounter any problems with enforcement. This would have been especially true for oral or 
‘parol’ submissions, for contemporaries were unlikely to recount the exact words spoken 
between them and the other parties, particularly if the agreement constituted only  part of a 
larger discussion in which the previous two steps scrutinised in this section were also 
deliberated. Presumably agreeing to arbitrate the dispute and nominating the arbitrators 
responsible for resolving it would have been of greater concern to the writers at the time. 
 Yet it is important to stress that entering into the submission would always have been 
an initial step in arbitration to avoid the assumption made by previous historians that 
contemporaries only engaged in a type of arbitration that had the ‘force of law’ when a 
‘legally binding bond was written up’.109 Not only does this inaccurately reflect the law at the 
time, which clearly held that an oral agreement was equally binding provided that the parties 
had mutually promised to adhere to its terms,110 but it leads to an oversimplification of the 
reasons contemporaries might have had for choosing one form of submission over another. 
Take, for example, a parol submission. Whilst this form was undoubtedly used when the 
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‘informal neighbourly pressures’ which the historian James Sharpe has claimed to be in 
operation ‘at a more popular level’ were considered enough of a constraint to ensure that 
parties would comply with their arbitration, there were other reasons why this form of 
submission might have been adopted.111 For example, whilst merchants customarily formed 
their submissions using conditional bonds, they were nonetheless advised in commercial 
treatises and practice manuals to rely instead on oral agreements when their dispute was 
relatively straightforward and ‘the question be upon only one point to be determined’, 
presumably to avoid the costs and delays associated with drafting legal documents.112 Yet 
contemporaries might also have chosen to enter into a parol submissions specifically to make 
it harder to be sued for enforcement. For although this form of submission was legally 
binding, it would have been more difficult for an aggrieved party to succeed in his action 
without written evidence to attest that he and his opponent had agreed to perform the award. 
Accordingly, contemporaries might have insisted on using this form of submission when they 
were unsure of whether they would comply with an arbitration or not. This appears to have 
been the ‘strategy’ of Samuel Pepys when in 1662 he refused to enter into a submission by 
conditional bond in an inheritance dispute with his uncle Thomas. At an earlier date, Pepys 
and his uncle had made an oral agreement to perform the award of the four arbitrators they 
had nominated to resolve the dispute, two of which had been appointed by Pepys, but when 
the relatives met with the arbitrators with a view to making the award, Pepys soon became 
troubled that his arbitrators would not be able to convince the others to formulate a decision 
in his favour. Consequently, when it was later suggested that Pepys and his uncle enter into 
conditional bonds of £2,000 to perform the award, Pepys made the excuse that he had to 
consult with his father, who would have also been affected by the outcome, to avoid giving 
his uncle the occasion to sue him for such a great amount if he decided not to perform.113 
 There were also several reasons why contemporaries might have chosen to enter into 
a written submission enshrined in a deed. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find 
accounts of parties using an indenture to form this contract, which might itself speak to the 
frequency with which the instrument was used, but there are enough examples of parties 
drawing up conditional bonds to suggest that the reasons for entering to a submission by deed 
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went beyond the fact that the contract would have been easier to enforce. Of course, 
enforceability was still an important reason for forming a submission by deed, particularly if 
the parties were not willing to reach some sort of settlement. For example, when lawsuits 
were referred to arbitration on the order of a court, it was common for the court to require the 
parties to enter into conditional bonds to perform the ensuing award, thereby providing the 
means for an aggrieved party to seek enforcement should his opponent refuse to comply with 
the process.114 Yet the very fact that a submission by deed helped to facilitate enforcement 
might also have signalled that a person could not be trusted to see an arbitration through, so 
to avoid being characterised in this way, contemporaries sometimes actively refused to enter 
into this form of submission. This was especially true for members of the gentry, perhaps 
because, as both Anthony Fletcher and Linda Pollock have shown, they would have 
considered it an affront to their honour if they could not be trusted to keep their promises and 
agreements.115 When, in 1593, Sir Nathaniel Bacon’s negotiations with his future son-in-law 
over the dowry he would provide for his daughter’s marriage became so contentious as to 
require external intervention, Bacon sought the help of Sir Edward Coke to make an award on 
the matter. Yet Bacon flatly refused to enter into a submission by conditional bond, telling 
Coke that such a measure would be unnecessary as ‘what you judge herin shalbe by me 
performed’.116 Some years later, the Norfolk gentleman William Cobbe similarly rejected the 
possibility of entering into this form of submission in a property dispute for which Bacon had 
been nominated as an arbitrator, asserting that he would only agree to be bound ‘in bandes of 
perpetual frendshipp’.117  
 Whilst entering into a submission by deed might have implied that the parties could 
not be trusted to comply with an arbitration, it might equally have been used to impart the 
opposite. Particularly with conditional bonds where the parties risked paying the bond’s 
penalty if they did not perform the award, an insistence on this form of submission could 
communicate just how committed a party was to the process. In his correspondence with Sir 
William Stapleton, the governor of the Leeward Islands, over a disputed commercial account, 
the merchant William Freeman conveyed his willingness to arbitrate the matter by employing 
this very tactic. After raising objections with the estimates Stapleton had made regarding the 
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account, Freeman sought to assure Stapleton that he was nonetheless committed to resolving 
the issue by arbitration, declaring that he ‘will be bound to make good the same’ even if it 
meant jeopardising ‘all I am worth’ to do so.118 As Freeman’s comment suggests, the value of 
a conditional bond’s penalty could also be an important gauge of a party’s commitment to an 
arbitration. Whilst it was the convention at the time to fix the penalty at twice the value of the 
matters in dispute, a party might suggest an even higher sum to show just how willing he was 
to comply with the process.119 In the Yorkshire yeoman Adam Eyre’s lease dispute with 
Edward Mitchell, after the initial attempt at arbitration, which saw both parties enter into 
conditional bonds of £100 to perform the award, was unsuccessful, Eyre was convinced that 
the only way for the matter to be decided was through litigation. Yet he soon learned from his 
neighbours that Mitchell hoped to try again to arbitrate the dispute, being so committed to the 
effort that he was willing to enter into a conditional bond of £1,000.120 This appears to have 
persuaded Eyre to agree to the attempt, for as we have previously seen, he was able to record 
that the two chosen arbitrators made an award on the matter.121 Whilst the effect of the 
submission, to oblige the parties to perform their arbitrators’ award, was always the same, 
how this contract was made and what form it took could be revealing about the parties’ 
intentions and the nature of their dispute. 
3. Proceeding 
 
To this point, the chapter’s discussion on the ‘experience’ of arbitration has concerned what 
occurred before an arbitration could take place. What has yet to be examined is the arbitration 
proceeding itself—that is, what happened between the disputing parties entering into their 
submission and the arbitrators later making their award. This might be seen as the public 
‘face’ of arbitration, for it would have been during an arbitration proceeding that the parties 
would relate the matters of their dispute to the arbitrators, and the arbitrators would in turn 
take any necessary steps to come to a decision. It would have been abundantly clear to all that 
attempts were being made to resolve the dispute. One might therefore expect that the sources 
consulted for this study would be useful for describing how an arbitration proceeding took 
place, particularly as contemporaries were more likely to record in their diaries and letters 
 
118
 ‘William Freeman’, p. 219. 
119
 Refer to pp. 33-34 above. 
120
 ‘Adam Eyre’, p. 92. 
121
 Ibid., p. 94. 
 84 
what they thought about a specific event and any issues they might have encountered. Yet 
one of the more surprising findings of the research conducted for this analysis is that 
contemporary writers rarely commented on how an arbitration actually proceeded. Even in 
cases where the writers served as arbitrators and were consequently well-positioned to relate 
the particular steps they had taken to make an award, they tended to focus their descriptions 
instead on more straightforward matters such as how long the process took or, even more 
commonly, whether or not they were able to come to a decision. Typical of this trend were 
the Essex vicar Ralph Josselin’s many accounts of acting as an arbitrator in the disputes of his 
neighbours in the village of Earls Colne. To take one example, in his diary entry for 30 April 
1655, Josselin recorded that ‘this morning I ended a great difference between landlord and 
tenant, which could not in any ways agree formerly’.122 No further detail on the dispute or on 
how Josselin was able to resolve it was provided. Of course, the apparent lack of commentary 
on arbitration proceedings might simply be a result of the particular sources that have been 
consulted. Perhaps if a wider range of contemporary accounts were considered, it would be 
possible to uncover more detailed descriptions of this process. But the very fact that so many 
of the accounts found resembled that of Josselin’s might itself be revealing. It could be that 
contemporaries did not consider it all that important to record what an arbitration proceeding 
entailed. Perhaps what really mattered, both for the purposes of documentation and, indeed, 
for practice, was instead its outcome. 
 This is not to say that there were no accounts of what occurred during an arbitration 
proceeding in the sources consulted for this study. When the writers were themselves the 
parties to a dispute rather than the arbitrators nominated to resolve it, they did tend to provide 
more detail about the process, presumably because they would have been more invested in 
the proceeding and its outcome. From these accounts as well as the few occasions in which 
the writers were more expounding in relating what they did as arbitrators, it is possible to 
sketch out what appear to have been the basic features of an arbitration proceeding. Generally 
speaking, there were three stages to the process. First, the parties would inform their 
arbitrators of the dispute, presenting their version of events and any claims they wished to put 
forward. Whilst this was often communicated in person, at a convenient meeting place such 
as a tavern, a neighbour’s home, or even a parish church, it could also be done by written 
correspondence, particularly when the parties did not reside nearby. This was frequently the 
case in arbitration proceedings involving merchants, the nature of their business being such 
 
122
 ‘Ralph Josselin’, p. 345. 
 85 
that they could fall into a disagreement with someone located a far distance away. For 
example, when in 1682 the London merchant William Freeman sought to terminate his 
commercial partnership with Captain John Bramley, a plantation owner on the Caribbean 
island of Montserrat, he demanded that any outstanding matters between them be decided by 
arbitration, with Bramley to ‘make choyce of any planter in England’ to serve as their 
arbitrator. As Bramley remained in the West Indies for the course of the proceeding, it 
necessarily took place by correspondence.123 There is some doubt as to whether the disputing 
parties would have invariably been expected to present their side of a dispute before the 
arbitrators could make their award. Probably in most cases contemporaries would have 
wanted the opportunity to persuade the arbitrators to take their point of view, but from one 
peculiar account, it would appear that this was not always the case. The episode in question 
concerned the dispute between James Claypoole and Sir Thomas Clutterbuck that has been 
discussed at earlier points in the chapter.124 Once Claypoole succeeded in convincing 
Clutterbuck to agree to nominate the Quaker William Penn to resolve their dispute, 
Clutterbuck suggested that Claypoole explain the matters to Penn on behalf of them both.125 
Admittedly, this might have been a delaying tactic: Clutterbuck had previously found excuses 
to avoid progressing in the arbitration, and even Penn expressed some concern as to ‘whether 
it may be proper to end [the dispute] without hearing both parties’.126 Yet the episode is 
nonetheless worth noting as it might suggest just how different an arbitration proceeding 
could be from what in a legal context would have been deemed patently unjust.127  
 Once the parties had informed their arbitrators of the dispute, the second stage in an 
arbitration proceeding would be for the arbitrators to gather any additional evidence they 
would need to make their award. This fact-finding effort could take many forms: it could 
involve the further examination of parties or the hearing of witnesses; alternatively, the 
arbitrators could adopt a more hands-on approach by physically inspecting the subject matter 
of the dispute. When the Leeds antiquary Ralph Thoresby was nominated along with one of 
the aldermen from the city to resolve a dispute concerning a nearby estate, Thoresby and the 
alderman travelled to the estate in January 1694 to survey the land before making their 
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decision. Their efforts appear to have been worth the journey, for Thoresby recorded in his 
diary that only days later he and the alderman ‘happily put an end to’ the dispute.128 Yet one 
disadvantage of this particular stage was that the type or extent of information that the 
arbitrators could glean about a dispute was often dependant on the cooperation they received 
from the parties or any other persons involved. Unless separately empowered by some form 
of commission, arbitrators lacked the means to coerce others to assist them in their 
endeavours, so if a party or witness proved unwilling to participate in the process, this could 
adversely affect their ability to make an award. In one colourful example, Sir Nathaniel 
Bacon recounted how in a dispute referred to him by Sir Christopher Wray, then the Lord 
Chief Justice, one of the parties, a man named Gillet, by his own behaviour prevented Bacon 
from making an award. Not only did Gillet spit in the face of his opponent when the party 
informed him that he was to be examined by Bacon, but when Gillet eventually appeared, 
supposedly to present his evidence, Bacon explained that he ‘hath not brought his bookes nor 
any matter in wrighting for our direction’.129 For this reason, Bacon was forced to write to the 
Lord Chief Justice to say that he could not resolve the dispute. 
 The final stage in an arbitration proceeding occurred when the arbitrators would 
deliberate the making of their award. Due to the nature of the sources consulted, there is 
disappointingly little insight into what this stage entailed. It cannot be said, for example, what 
factors the arbitrators typically took into account in formulating their decision or whether 
they would have considered certain types of evidence to be more persuasive than others. Yet 
it is probable that their deliberations would have been shaped by the role they were expected 
to take in deciding the dispute—that is, whether they were nominated by the parties to serve 
as an ‘indifferent’ judge of the matters in dispute between them, or whether they were instead 
chosen with the expectation that they would advocate for one party over another. Presumably 
with the former, the arbitrators’ deliberations would have involved careful consideration of 
all the evidence presented so that they could reach a balanced decision. The merchant John 
Paige, who had been nominated by his business partner William Clerke in 1657 to resolve an 
account dispute between him and his cousin, was forced to write to Clerke after hearing the 
cousin’s demands to say that he feared ‘there may be more than you were pleased [for me] to 
discover’ about the account and so he would be unable to make an award that would be 
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entirely favourable to his partner.130 Where arbitrators were instead nominated to assume a 
more agent-based role, their deliberations might have instead resembled a negotiation, with 
each arbitrator trying to convince the other to take their side. At least this appears to have 
been the case in the Tangier freightage dispute for which Samuel Pepys had been nominated 
by John Bland to resolve, for as Pepys noted, he was able to persuade the other arbitrator to 
lower the amount of money Bland would be required to pay from an initial sum of £1,300 to 
just £202.131 As to when or where these deliberations would take place, there seems to have 
been a considerable about of variation. Arbitrators did not always meet privately to discuss 
the making of their decision; their deliberations could also occur with the parties physically in 
attendance.132 There is even indication that the arbitrators did not have to meet with one 
another to make their award. Despite the fact that a dispute between two Norwich residents 
had been referred to both Sir Nathaniel Bacon and Sir William Paston in 1598, Paston wrote 
to Bacon to suggest that he alone could try to resolve the dispute on behalf of them both and, 
if he were unsuccessful, that Bacon could then do the same. Only if they were both unable to 
reach at a decision, he explained, ‘will [I] then meete with you to that ende to doe what good 
we maye betwene them’.133 Whilst an arbitration proceeding might have been the public 
‘face’ of arbitration, there was clearly much variation within each of its stages, reflecting the 
discretion of both the parties to the dispute and the nominated arbitrators over the process. 
4. Performance 
 
The final issue that this chapter will consider regarding the practice of arbitration in the 
seventeenth century is performance. Once the arbitrators had made their award, would the 
parties actually perform the tasks which had been ordered to do? One might reasonably 
question why the focus here is on performance rather than the award itself. Indeed, as the 
previous section examined the proceeding of an arbitration, it would seem to follow that the 
next logical step would be to consider the contents of the arbitrators’ decision, it being the 
result of that examination and fact-finding process. Yet there are essentially three reasons for 
framing this analysis as stated. First, whilst the award would have been the most important 
part of an arbitration from the viewpoint of the parties as it would have stipulated how their 
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dispute should be resolved, the contents of an award tell us relatively little about the overall 
practice of arbitration at the time. Award were necessarily specific to the matters in dispute 
between the parties, so whilst they might provide insight into the types of dispute that were 
put to arbitration, they are less illustrative of how the process was conducted. Second, on a 
more pragmatic note, Derek Roebuck has devoted an entire chapter of his book on 
seventeenth-century arbitration and mediation to the study of awards, investigating in 
particular what sorts of issues were often the subject matter of these decisions and whether 
awards actually complied with the many legal rules that dictated their form and substance. To 
conduct a similar analysis would therefore be redundant; it is far more preferable to direct 
readers interested in these areas to Roebuck’s work instead.134 But the third and most 
compelling reason for focusing on the performance of awards is that the issue has often been 
overlooked in previous studies. Works which have pointed to the contemporary recourse to 
arbitration as evidence that the high levels of litigation during the period did not undermine 
social order and relations have largely assumed that arbitration would reconcile the disputing 
parties with one another. But was this always the case in practice? Did contemporaries 
invariably perform awards, thereby putting into effect the settlement that their arbitrators had 
envisaged? 
 It is probable that in many, if not most, cases, there would not have been an issue with 
performance. The parties would have performed the award for the simple reason that it was a 
decision worth implementing. Not only did the parties have a significant amount of control 
over what an award would entail, having nominated the arbitrators and having specified the 
matters they were to address, but in making their award, the arbitrators had considerable 
scope to formulate a decision that could resolve the dispute in a definitive manner. It seems 
likely, then, that contemporaries would have often been satisfied with what their arbitrators 
decided and would have proceeded to perform their part of the award soon after it was 
pronounced. This might explain why it was common for contemporary writers to equate the 
making of an award with the ending of a dispute; the fact that the parties would abide by the 
decision was largely taken for granted. To illustrate this presumption, consider the 
antiquarian Ralph Thoresby’s account of making an award in a dispute between two relatives 
in April 1692. Thoresby recorded in his diary that he had met one evening with the other 
arbitrators nominated to resolve the dispute and together they had ‘now determined the 
controversies betwixt mother and son’, yet neither in that diary entry nor at some later date 
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did Thoresby document whether the relatives had in fact performed the award.135 Of course, it 
is possible that the mother and son had been present at the meeting and had carried out what 
Thoresby and the other arbitrators had directed them to do, but given that Thoresby only 
made note of the other arbitrators in the entry, this reading appears unlikely. What seems 
more plausible is that Thoresby and the other arbitrators had simply finalised their decision 
and Thoresby, in recording the event, assumed that the parties would adhere to it. He felt 
certain enough about the award and its subsequent performance to claim that the 
controversies between the parties were determined. 
 Yet there were undoubtedly instances in which the parties would not have been 
satisfied with the award. For example, they might have felt that the arbitrators failed to 
address the matters in dispute in an adequate manner, or the nature of the dispute might have 
been such that the blame or onus would have fallen disproportionately on one party over 
another. The impression given by the accounts consulted for this study, however, is that even 
in these circumstances contemporaries would still perform their awards. When the merchant 
William Freeman and his then business partner Captain John Bramley fell into disagreement 
with the master of a ship they had hired in 1682, the matter was put to arbitration and the 
arbitrators made an award that would have resulted in considerable financial loss for both 
Freeman and Bramley. Yet when Freeman wrote to Bramley to inform him of the decision, 
he insisted that it was immaterial whether they were content to bear the loss or not, for ‘wee 
must doe soe, the arbitrators haveinge soe accorded it’.136 Such firm adherence suggests that 
there were factors other than the parties’ approval of an award that affected their willingness 
to perform. One of these factors was certainly the reputational damage a party would have 
faced if he refused to carry out what his arbitrators had decided. Just as contemporaries were 
likely to be viewed unfavourably by their peers and others if they refused to arbitrate their 
dispute, the sources reveal that a party who did not perform an award might similarly be 
branded as ‘contentious’ or a ‘froward [and] obstinate sort’.137 Indeed, it is possible that such 
labels would have applied more readily to a non-performing party, for by his intransigence he 
would have effectively wasted the time and effort given by the arbitrators and anyone else 
involved to carry out the process. When Nathaniel Bacon asked Richard Spratt, the steward 
of his estates, to serve as an arbitrator in a dispute between two labourers in 1602, Spratt took 
time to meet with the parties and their witnesses on multiple occasions and to formulate a 
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decision that would ‘quiet’ the matters in dispute. Once Spratt pronounced his award, 
however, one of the parties refused to perform it, causing Spratt to complain to Bacon that he 
had ‘never mette with a more untoward and perverse fellow’.138 
 But probably the most important factor affecting a party’s willingness to perform 
were the legal repercussions he would face if he did not comply with his arbitrators’ decision. 
If a party failed or refused to perform the award, he would have breached the terms of his 
submission and could therefore be sued by his opponent for enforcement. As noted earlier in 
the chapter, this could occur even if the party and his opponent had only entered into a parol 
submission, for oral agreements were as legally binding as those enshrined in a deed. Of 
course, the opponent might have more difficulty in proving to a court that a submission had 
been made, but this would not necessarily have precluded him from initiating proceedings, 
James Sharpe and others having shown that contemporaries often began litigation with no 
intention of continuing a suit to the ‘bitter end’.139 In as litigious and ‘law-minded’ a society 
as seventeenth-century England, it would be misguided to think that contemporaries would 
not have pursued this course of action.140 Indeed, the hundreds of reported cases brought 
before the common law courts during the period are a clear testament to the contemporary 
willingness for it. Simply because contemporaries had initially sought to resolve their 
disputes out of court did not mean that they were averse to turning to the courts at later point 
for enforcement, a fact that would have undoubtedly weighed heavily in the minds of parties 
when they considered whether to perform or not. To re-fashion Michael Clanchy’s resonant 
idiom, ‘love’ might have easily led to ‘law’.141 
5. Conclusion 
 
Through its analysis of contemporary diaries and letters, this chapter has made the first 
attempt to re-create the practice or ‘experience’ of arbitration in the seventeenth century. It 
has shown that there were various reasons and motivations underpinning not just the decision 
to arbitrate a dispute but also the way in which the process was conducted. Whilst the 
 
138
 ‘Nathaniel Bacon, IV’, p. 293. 
139
 Sharpe, ‘Such disagreement betwyx neighbours’, p. 175.  
140
 C.W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and vipers of the commonwealth (Cambridge, 1986); ‘A law-abiding 
and litigious society’ in The Oxford illustrated history of Tudor and Stuart Britain, ed. J. Morrill 
(Oxford, 1996), pp. 139-55, at pp. 143-46; Law, politics and society in early modern England 
(Cambridge, 2008). 
141
 M. Clanchy, ‘Law and love in the Middle Ages’ in Disputes and settlements: law and human 
relations in the West (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 47-68. 
 91 
examination provides evidence to support the views of previous scholars that arbitration was 
a desired alternative to litigation and that the process could be employed for conciliatory and 
‘neighbourly’ ends, it has also revealed that the contemporary practice of arbitration was not 
confined to these views. Arbitration could equally be employed for more practical or even 
dubious reasons, and there could be factors other than social norms and expectations affecting 
a disputing party’s decision to agree and comply with the process. The study has also 
explored the role that arbitrators played in the arbitration, a topic which has only received 
passing comment in previous scholarship. As James Sharpe once theorised but never 
explored, a consideration of who the parties nominated to resolve their dispute could be 
telling of the nature of their disagreement and the level of contention between the parties.142 
Moreover, the investigation of why an arbitrator would agree to take on the role shows that 
whilst there was clearly a contemporary norm to accept nomination requests, the reasons for 
doing so were more varied than simply out of a desire to promote harmonious relations.143 
The practice of arbitration would appear to be more complex than previously recognised.  
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3. Making the Arbitration Act – Enforcement 
 
 
With this chapter, there marks a shift in focus to the second aim of the dissertation: to explain 
why the Arbitration Act of 1698, the first statute on arbitration to be passed in England, was 
made. Whilst the previous two chapters have considered the elements and practice of 
arbitration over the course of the seventeenth century, this chapter and the next will each 
concern one facet of the Arbitration Act’s making: this chapter will focus on the enforcement 
procedure of the Act; and the next will examine the historical context of the Act’s drafting 
and enactment. To begin this study of the Act’s enforcement procedure, however, it is 
important to note that the use of this phrase ‘enforcement procedure’ is something of a 
misnomer. The Act did not in fact implement its own method of enforcement; rather, it 
allowed for an existing enforcement procedure, the process used by the courts to penalise 
contempt, to be applied in a novel way: to enforce arbitration. This was done by means of a 
legal fiction, the practice by which a court accepted some factual or procedural fallacy to 
bring about an outcome that would be otherwise unattainable.1 In the case of the Arbitration 
Act, the fiction was for a court to recognise a submission, the contract between parties to 
perform their arbitrator’s award, as one of its own rules, the effect being that if a party did not 
perform the award, the court could penalise his inaction as contempt. The provisions of the 
Act, which are transcribed in Appendix VI, therefore established a procedure to enable this 
fiction to occur, one that can be summarised as follows. When parties formed their 
submission, they would insert an additional provision in which they agreed that the contract 
be made a rule of a court of their choosing (lines 13-17). They would then present the 
submission to the court along with an affidavit, or sworn statement, made by a witness to 
attest that the parties had agreed to this procedure (lines 17-19). Once the affidavit was read 
and filed, the court would enter the contents of the submission into its rule book, thereby 
producing a rule directing the parties to perform their arbitrator’s award (lines 20-23). If a 
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party subsequently failed or refused to do so, he would therefore disobey the rule and could 
be ‘subject to all the penalties of contemning a rule of court’ (lines 23-25).2 
 Stepping away from the mechanics of the Arbitration Act’s procedure, it is worth 
taking a moment to appreciate just how peculiar the Act was. For whilst it is now clear how 
the Act ‘enforced’ arbitration, for several reasons this method was objectively strange. Take, 
for example, its use of a legal fiction. Although legal fictions were by no means uncommon at 
the time, they were typically created by the courts, having been a useful way to bend or 
circumvent existing legal rules without the need for reform.3 Yet the fiction of the Act was 
instituted by Parliament, unusual not just for having been created by this other body, but also 
because it marked a reversal of the traditional role that Parliament played in legal fictions. 
Generally speaking, Parliament was expected to ‘perfect’ fictions: to legislate reform so that 
the courts would no longer need to rely on a fiction to achieve their desired ends.4 Why, then, 
did it depart from its traditional position by perpetuating a fiction with the Arbitration Act? 
Another peculiarity of the Act was the effect of the fiction it created. As noted in the 
preamble of the Act itself, the sanction for ‘contemning’ the rule of a court was imprisonment 
(lines 3-4), so if a party did not perform his arbitrator’s award, he could therefore be 
imprisoned. This was quite an astonishing result: legal fiction aside, it meant that an Act of 
Parliament authorised the imprisonment of parties for breaching what was fundamentally a 
private contract.5 What is more, as a non-performing party would be imprisoned for 
contempt, he would not be afforded the normal protections under the law in cases where a 
person’s liberty was at stake. The process employed to imprison a party for contempt was 
summary in nature, designed, as William Blackstone explained, so that the contempt 
committed against the court could be immediately redressed.6 Yet as breaching the terms of a 
submission was only fictionally in disobedience of a court, the fact that a non-performing 
party could nonetheless be subjected to this process would appear out of proportion with his 
fault. Why, then, did the Act allow this to occur? 
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 But perhaps the most peculiar feature of the Arbitration Act, particularly in light of 
what has been discussed, was that its enforcement procedure was not entirely new. As Henry 
Horwitz and James Oldham have shown, the Act instead ‘built upon current judicial 
practice’, so any investigation of its procedure must be able to account for this earlier practice 
as well.7 Accordingly, this is the aim of the chapter, and to seek to explain this development, 
its analysis will be structured by three questions to be examined in turn: (i) why was the Act’s 
enforcement procedure needed (or was it)?; (ii) how did its enforcement procedure develop?; 
and (iii) why was its procedure implemented in 1698? As we shall see, answering these 
questions will not only help explain or contextualise what was peculiar about the Act, but it 
will ultimately show that an examination of the Act’s enforcement procedure cannot on its 
own account for why the Arbitration Act was made. 
1. Legal context 
 
To begin to understand why an enforcement procedure as peculiar as that of the Arbitration 
Act was made, it is necessary to consider why it might have been needed. It seems safe to say 
that Parliament would not have passed the Act without good reason, particularly in light of 
the fact that it could result in the imprisonment of a party for contempt, so there must have 
been a purpose for this particular procedure. The aim, then, of this section is to contextualise 
the Act’s enforcement procedure within the enforcement practices of the time, an objective 
which requires examining two specific issues. First, why imprison a non-performing party for 
contempt? Second, what were the existing methods of enforcement and, in particular, what 
where their legal remedies? Each of these issues will be considered in turn to reveal that the 
Act’s enforcement procedure did fill a ‘gap’ in the existing methods of enforcement. The real 
question, however, was whether contemporaries would have considered the procedure to be 
necessary. 
 Whilst legal scholarship has largely restricted its discussion of contempt to the court 
of Chancery, the principal court of equity in the kingdom, the threat of imprisonment for 
contempt having been how the court compelled compliance with its procedure, all courts of 
record—that is, every court that kept a lawful record of its proceedings—had the power to 
imprison individuals who had disobeyed their orders or process.8 As Sir Thomas Malet, a 
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justice of the court of King’s Bench, maintained in Langham’s Case (1641/2), ‘it is incident 
to every Court of Record, to imprison for a contempt done to the Court…if a Court of Record 
should not have such a coercive power, they should be in effect no Court’.9 The principle 
which appears to have grounded this power was that the authority of the courts and, by 
extension, the administration of the law should not be obstructed or delayed.10 In his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, written in the mid-eighteenth century, William 
Blackstone justified the courts’ ability to imprison disobedient parties in a similar way. He 
noted that the laws would be ‘vain and nugatory’ if there were not ‘a competent authority to 
secure their administration from disobedience and contempt’, which explained why it was ‘an 
inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal’ that the courts should be able to ‘suppress 
such contempts, by an immediate attachment of the offender’.11 Presumably because 
imprisonment for contempt was aimed at upholding the laws as administered by the courts, 
the sanction differed from other, more ‘conventional’ forms of imprisonment in two 
important ways. First, as Blackstone’s comments suggest, imprisonment for contempt was 
immediate: a party accused of disobeying the order or process of a court would be arrested on 
the issuing of particular writ known as a ‘writ of attachment’ and would then be examined 
and sentenced by means of a summary procedure, without trial or jury.12 Second, as Justice 
Malet’s statement indicates, imprisonment for contempt was coercive: a disobedient party 
would only be imprisoned for as long as he remained in contempt of the court. Once the party 
complied with the order or process or signalled his willingness to do so, he would be released 
from gaol, having ‘purged’ himself of the offence.13 Accordingly, the sanction was not 
punitive; instead, it was intended to compel the party to carry out what the court had required. 
 The purpose and nature of imprisonment for contempt help shed light on why the 
Arbitration Act’s enforcement procedure made use of this sanction. It was not that 
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imprisonment for contempt was merely the most convenient form of imprisonment that could 
be applied to the scenario of a party not performing his arbitrator’s award; rather, it 
concerned what the sanction could in turn bring about. Given that imprisonment for contempt 
was immediate, it would have represented a strong deterrent against non-performance, there 
being few individuals who would have wanted to find themselves in gaol for failing to 
comply with their arbitrator’s decision. But perhaps more importantly, given that 
imprisonment for contempt was coercive, its effect would have been to compel a non-
performing party to perform the award. As the rule which the court would find the party to 
have disobeyed was the fictionalised rule of his submission, the only two ways in which the 
party could purge himself of his contempt and be released from gaol was either to perform his 
arbitrator’s award outright or, if he could not carry out the required tasks from gaol, to give 
security that he would perform the decision once released. Accordingly, through the use of 
the sanction of imprisonment for contempt, the Act’s enforcement procedure provided a 
summary way to enforce the performance of awards. Viewed in this light, the fact that a party 
could be imprisoned for contempt for not complying with his submission would therefore 
appear less peculiar. 
 Whilst the Act’s enforcement procedure might seem less peculiar when the effects of 
imprisoning a non-performing party for contempt are considered, what still needs to be 
answered was whether the result or ‘remedy’ of the Act’s procedure, to enforce in a summary 
manner the performance of an award, would have been innovative for the period. The short 
answer was yes: prior to the Arbitration Act, the only way that an aggrieved party could seek 
enforcement from the courts was to sue his opponent by way of legal action, a process which 
was not only far from summary, but one that could only result in the aggrieved party 
receiving a sum of money as a remedy. The aggrieved party would not have been able to 
convince the courts into forcing his opponent to perform the award. Contrary to the views of 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century legal scholars who were wont to depict the courts as 
covetous of the business handled by arbitration, the existing methods of enforcement and the 
remedies they provided were not intended to discourage the use of arbitration.14 Rather, they 
were a by-product of how the common law system was structured at the time. In the 
seventeenth century, to sue an opponent in the common law courts, it was necessary for an 
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aggrieved party to purchase what was known as an ‘original writ’.15 This writ was more than 
a ‘pass’ to admit potential suitors into a court; it also dictated the form of legal action that 
could then take place, both in terms of its procedure and the remedy it provided. There was, 
however, limited variation to the types of original writ that could be purchased, so if the 
aggrieved party could not find a writ suited to the circumstances of his case, he would be 
unable to sue his opponent, giving rise to the rule of ‘no writ, no remedy’.16 As one might 
expect, there was no original writ to enforce arbitration, so to sue an opponent for not 
performing the award, an aggrieved party would have had to shape his claim to fit one of the 
existing writs. Whilst this was possible to do with several types of writ, the legal actions 
ensuing from them had as their legal remedy some form of monetary payment. This was the 
real reason why the courts would not force a party to perform his arbitrator’s award: it was 
not within the remit of the legal actions available to provide such a remedy. 
 Although each of the legal actions an aggrieved party could use to sue his opponent 
would result in him receiving a sum of money, the actions varied as to the amount of money 
the party could receive and as to when the actions would be available to him. Accordingly, it 
is worth briefly summarising how these actions worked in the context of enforcing 
arbitration, if simply to provide a more complete picture of the methods of enforcement 
available before the Arbitration Act was made.17 The first legal action that an aggrieved party 
could use was the action of assumpsit, the action used in cases where there had been a breach 
of a promise.18 To bring a claim under this action, the aggrieved party would plead that his 
opponent had undertaken and faithfully promised (assumpsit et fideliter promisit) to perform 
the award, so by breaking his promise the opponent had caused the aggrieved party to suffer a 
loss and should therefore be made to pay compensation.19 The type of compensation to which 
the aggrieved party would be entitled was damages, a sum of money that would be assessed 
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by an inquest jury only after the proceedings of the case had concluded,20 so given the 
inherent uncertainty of this sum and the possibility that the aggrieved party might be 
dissatisfied with the amount assessed, it appears that this action was not often used in 
practice. Yet the advantage of the action of assumpsit was that it could be employed 
regardless of the form of the parties’ submission, the action being grounded on their promise 
to perform the award rather than the physical document (if any) enshrining it, so it might 
have been viewed by an aggrieved party as a sort of action of ‘last resort’, when the other 
legal actions discussed below were unavailable to him.21 
 The second action that an aggrieved party could use to sue his opponent was the 
action of debt on award (‘sur arbitrement’), the type of debt action discussed in Chapter 1 in 
relation to the issue of whether an award could be a deed.22 As an award was taken by the 
courts to be a form of judgment, and since the courts had been prepared for centuries to 
enforce debts arising from judgments, if an arbitrator ordered one party to pay the other a 
sum of money, on the party’s refusal to pay the sum, the aggrieved party would be entitled to 
bring a claim under this action to recover it. The implementation of this action came, 
therefore, the closest to the courts enforcing performance, for by allowing the aggrieved party 
to recover the sum, they were in effect compelling the non-performing party to do what his 
arbitrator had ordered. Yet it must be emphasised that the courts saw themselves as merely 
enforcing a debt that had become due, a point borne out by the fact that they would not 
compel the non-performing party to perform any other stipulation that the arbitrator might 
have required, nor would the action have been available to the aggrieved party had the 
arbitrator not ordered the non-performing party to pay. The action can therefore be seen as 
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Symonds (1626), Latch 213; Leake v Butler (1629), Lit. 312; Jennings v Vandeputt (1632), Cro. Car. 
263; Rose v Spark (1648), Al. 51; Hosdell v Harris (1668-1669), 2 Keb. 462, 497, 533, 536, 2 Wms. 
Saund. 61, 64. 
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 The third and final action that an aggrieved party could use for enforcement was the 
action of debt on an obligation (‘sur obligation’), the action used to recover the penalty of a 
conditional bond, the word ‘obligation’ being the Law French term for a bond.24 Accordingly, 
the action was only available to an aggrieved party if he and his opponent had formed their 
submission using conditional bonds, but given that approximately 75 per cent of the reported 
cases in which a party sued his opponent for not performing their arbitrator’s award were 
brought before the courts using this form of action, it would appear that this was not much of 
a restriction in practice.25 As a sum of money, the penalty differed from the previous types of 
payment considered above in two notable ways. First, it was set by the parties when they 
formed their submission, so an aggrieved party would know what exactly he could recover 
when he brought a claim against his opponent, unlike the action of assumpsit. Second, the 
penalty was typically for an exorbitant sum, intended, as Chapter 1 has explained, to 
disincentivise the parties from not performing their arbitrator’s award, so the amount would 
likely exceed even what an arbitrator might order in the award. This might help explain why 
parties appear to have preferred the action of debt on an obligation over the action of debt on 
award in cases where an arbitrator had ordered the non-performing party to pay, for in the 
calculus of choosing which action to employ, the fact that the aggrieved party could recover a 
larger sum would undoubtedly have been an important factor.26 For clarification purposes, an 
outline of the three legal actions discussed can be found in the following table: 
Type of action When available? Remedy 
Assumpsit All forms of submission Damages 
Debt on award All forms of submission + award orders payment of sum Recovery of unpaid sum 
Debt on an obligation Submission by conditional bonds Recovery of penalty 
 
Figure 4: Types of common law actions available for enforcement 
 
24
 ‘Obligation’ in J. Cowell, The interpreter (1607); T. Blount, Nomo-lexicon (1670). 
25
 This figure has been calculated by taking the total number of reported cases I have found involving 
arbitration and reducing the number to reflect only those cases in which a plaintiff sued his opponent 
for non-performance.. This reduced number was then used as the denominator to calculate the above 
percentage, the numerator being the number of reported cases explicitly brought using the action of 
debt on an obligation.  
26
 For explicit notice that both actions would have been available to the aggrieved party, see Gage v 
Gilbert (1593/4), 1 Brownl. 56. For examples of the action of debt on an obligation being used in 
instances where debt on award would have been available, see Duport v Wildgoose (1613), 2 Bulstr. 
260; Winch and Grave and Sanders (1620), Cro. Jac. 584; Fitzherbert v Hind (1664), 1 Keb. 753. 
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When compared to these legal actions, then, it is evident that the Arbitration Act would have 
provided a form of enforcement not previously available to an aggrieved party. By devising a 
way for the courts to compel a non-performing party to perform the award, the Act’s 
enforcement procedure would have filled a ‘gap’ in the existing methods of enforcement. We 
should hesitate to assume, however, that simply because the Act filled this gap, it was 
intended to ‘fix’ the existing system. For one thing, there appears to have been little—if 
any—criticism of the existing methods of enforcement and the remedies they provided. Of 
course, this does not mean that contemporaries were therefore uncritical of these methods, 
but in a period known for its proposals on law reform, one would expect there to have been 
greater outcry had these enforcement methods truly been considered a grievance.27 Indeed, 
only a single contemporary source has been found that discusses the possibility of enforcing 
the performance of awards in the context of legal reform, but even there the object in raising 
the issue was not intended to ‘fix’ how arbitration was then enforced but to address another 
issue entirely. In the lawyer and legal writer William Sheppard’s Englands Balme (1657), a 
work which set out his comprehensive plan for law reform as legal adviser to Lord Protector 
Cromwell, one of the proposals Sheppard advanced was ‘to let arbitrators have the power to 
give an oath to witnesses; and when they have made an award, to let it be performed’.28 
Whilst his proposal recognised that it was not at the time possible to enforce the performance 
of an award, Sheppard did not, however, advance the proposal because he found the existing 
methods of enforcement to be lacking. As Sheppard structured his work so that each of his 
proposals were categorised as a ‘remedy’ to some stated ‘grievance’, it is clear that he had 
recommended the proposal not as a means to provide an aggrieved party with a ‘better’ 
method of enforcement, but rather to help address the problem that ‘the courts at Westminster 
are overburthened with business’.29 Although Sheppard did not make his reasoning explicit 
for proposing the possibility of enforcing the performance of awards to remedy the high 
levels of litigation before the central courts, it is possible to speculate on his logic. 
 
27
 For scholarship on law reform, see G.B. Nourse, ‘Law reform under the Commonwealth and 
Protectorate’, LQR 75 (1959), pp. 512-29; S. Prall, The agitation for law reform in the Puritan 
Revolution, 1640-1660 (The Hague, 1966); M. Cotterell, ‘Interregnum law reform: the Hale 
Commission of 1652’, EHR 83:329 (1968), pp. 689-704; D. Veall, The popular movement for law 
reform, 1640-1660 (1970); B. Shapiro, Law Reform in early modern England 1500-1740 (Oxford, 
2019).  
28
 W. Sheppard, Englands balme: or, proposals by way of grievance & remedy (1657), pp. 58-59. 
Matthews has claimed that Sheppard’s work was ‘the most comprehensive design for the reform of 
English law and society published in the seventeenth century’. N.L. Matthews, William Sheppard, 
Cromwell’s law reformer (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 144. 
29
 Sheppard, Englands balme, p. 58. 
 101 
Presumably the reasoning was that by establishing such an enforcement method, fewer 
parties would have been inclined to break their agreements to perform an award, thereby 
reducing the number of lawsuits brought before the courts. Whilst it is likely that enforcing 
the performance of awards would have had this desired effect, it is also evident that this 
‘grievance’ had little bearing on the merits of the enforcement methods then available to an 
aggrieved party, a point made all the more clear by the fact that the intended beneficiaries of 
Sheppard’s proposal were the courts, not the parties. At least regarding Sheppard’s work, 
then, it would appear that enforcing the performance of awards was not seen to be needed to 
‘fix’ how arbitration was enforced at the time. 
But perhaps the more important reason why we should hesitate to view the Arbitration 
Act as implementing an enforcement procedure to ‘fix’ the existing system hinges on a 
consideration of how contemporaries typically sought enforcement from the common law 
courts. As noted above, approximately 75 per cent of the reported cases in which an 
aggrieved party sued his opponent for not performing the award were brought using the 
action of debt on an obligation, so it seems relatively safe to say that when contemporaries 
turned to the courts for enforcement, the remedy they most frequently sought was to recover 
the penalty of the conditional bond forming their submission. As Chapter 1 has explained, 
when parties entered into a submission using conditional bonds, they would deliberately set 
the penalty of the bonds at an exorbitant amount of money, typically twice the value of the 
matters in dispute, to disincentivise non-performance.30 A party would think twice about not 
performing the award as to do so would mean that he would become liable to pay the penalty 
to his opponent. Yet an additional reason for setting the penalty at such an exorbitant sum can 
be seen in the context of enforcement: if the party did in fact fail to perform the award, his 
opponent, the aggrieved party, would then be entitled to receive this large amount of money. 
Whilst recovery of the penalty would not have equated to performance, it is worth taking a 
moment to consider whether the aggrieved party would have been all that dissatisfied with 
this form of remedy.  
Let us assume that parties A and B, who are neighbours, fall into disagreement over 
who is responsible for repairing a pathway abutting both of their properties, a task which is 
projected to cost £100. The parties agree to arbitrate the dispute and enter into conditional 
bonds to perform their arbitrator’s award, the penalty of the bonds being set at £200 or twice 
the value of the matter in dispute as was the convention. The arbitrator then makes an award 
 
30
 Refer to pp. 33-34 above. 
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requiring party B to pay for the repairs, something that party B refuses to do, so party A sues 
party B in an action of debt on an obligation. If party A is successful in his claim, he will not 
be able to compel party B to pay for the repairs of the pathway; instead, he will only be 
entitled to recover from party B the £200 penalty. But given the facts as presented, would this 
be a particularly discouraging result? As the repairs to the pathway had been projected to cost 
£100, party A would receive from party B more than enough to pay for the repairs himself, 
effectively counteracting party B’s earlier refusal to perform the award. What is more, even 
when the costs of bringing his legal action are factored in, it is probable that party A would 
still ‘profit’ from suing party B for the simple reason that the penalty was worth so much 
more than the price of the repairs.31 It seems likely, then, that recovering the penalty would 
not have been perceived as an unsuitable remedy, both for party A and for aggrieved parties 
more generally. 
Of course, there were certainly instances in which an aggrieved party would have 
preferred for his opponent to perform the award than to receive the penalty, particularly in 
cases where it would have been difficult to value the matters in dispute between the parties in 
monetary terms, but it is doubtful that this position would have been characteristic of all or 
even most of the parties seeking enforcement from the common law courts at the time.32 
Instead, it is probable that the scenario depicted above was often closer to the aggrieved 
party’s actual position, which might in turn help explain the lack of contemporary criticism 
for this enforcement method. Thus, whilst the Arbitration Act might have implemented a 
procedure that could enforce the performance of awards, in light of the existing methods of 
enforcement available to contemporaries, it might not have been especially needed. 
2. References 
 
Whilst the previous section examined the ‘why’ of the Arbitration Act’s enforcement 
procedure, explaining the effect of it enabling the courts to imprison a non-performing party 
for contempt and questioning whether this form of enforcement would have been needed, this 
section will instead concern the ‘how’: how did the Act’s enforcement procedure develop? 
 
31
 For a scholarly work considering how contemporaries might have sought to benefit or profit from 
the penalty of conditional bonds, see T. Stretton, ‘Written obligations, litigation and neighbourliness, 
1580-1680’ in Remaking English society: social relations and social change in early modern 
England, eds. S. Hindle, A. Shepard, J. Walter (Woodbridge, 2013), pp. 189-210. 
32
 For a fuller discussion on these two remedies and their situations of use, see Simpson, CLC, pp. 
595-98. 
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As Henry Horwitz and James Oldham have shown, the Act had ‘built on current judicial 
practice’, but given the discussion of the existing methods of enforcement available to an 
aggrieved party, the judicial practice in question was clearly not related to the type of 
enforcement the courts provided when a party sued his opponent by way of legal action.33 
Rather, the practice from which the Act’s enforcement procedure developed concerned 
references, the type of arbitration whereby a court ordered that the matters in a lawsuit be 
referred to an arbitrator or ‘referee’ to decide. This section will therefore be used to examine 
how references were both ordered and enforced in the common law courts, an investigation 
that will both explain and contextualise the two features that made the enforcement procedure 
of the Arbitration Act possible: first, the legal fiction on which it relied so that a submission 
could be made a rule of a court; second, the approbation of the courts to enforce disobedience 
against this fictionalised rule by means of their contempt procedure.  
 
2.1 The assizes 
 
In the common law courts, a reference was most typically ordered when a lawsuit was being 
tried at the assizes, the circuit courts headed by the common law justices to administer trials 
in the counties.34 This might have been because the trial stage of a suit, unlike the pleadings 
stage before it, was conducted with the parties physically in attendance, so in most cases it 
would have represented the first opportunity for the parties to consent to a reference.35 But as 
J.S. Cockburn has shown, referring a suit to arbitration was also a convenient way for the 
common law justices to reduce the number of cases they would have to hear whilst on 
circuit.36 As the assizes only took place twice a year, the number of cases awaiting trial for 
any given county was understandably high, with figures peaking in the 1650s-1660s.37 For 
example, in the Western Circuit, the only assize circuit for which most of its records from the 
period remain,38 there were 711 cases awaiting trial for the winter assizes of 1656, which 
 
33
 Horwitz and Oldham, ‘Arbitration’, p. 143. 
34
 For an overview of the assize circuits during this period, see Cockburn, Assizes, pp. 23-48. 
35
 A reference could also be ordered when legal arguments were raised in banc, presumably as it 
would have represented another instance in which the parties, or their legal counsel, could have 
consented to it. For a contemporary description, see J. Bruce, ed., The diary of John 
Manningham,1602-1603 (1868), pp. 129-30. 
36
 Cockburn, Assizes, pp. 136-37. 
37
 Ibid., pp. 137-38. The assizes normally took place during the Lent term vacation (February-March) 
and the Trinity term vacation (July-August). 
38
 For a discussion of the surviving records of the assizes, see J.S. Cockburn, ‘Introduction’ in 
Western circuit assize orders 1629-1648 (1976). 
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would have averaged to approximately 118 cases per county.39 Given that the justices 
remained in a particular county for no more than three or four days,40 to administer this many 
trials would have been a monumental undertaking, so it follows that the justices would have 
been eager to lessen the burden by referring suits to local arbitrators. By Cockburn’s 
estimates, it is likely that at least half of all cases awaiting trial were consequently dealt with 
in this way.41 
 Thanks to the survival of the Western Circuit’s order books,42 the records which 
documented the orders made by the justices as they administered trials, it is possible to know 
what an order referring a suit to arbitration, what will henceforth be called an ‘order of 
reference’, entailed. Whilst there was no standardised form for an order of reference, almost 
invariably it would contain three things: first, it would name the parties to the suit; second, it 
would appoint one or more arbitrators or ‘referees’ to resolve the matter; and third, it would 
direct the parties to perform the arbitrators’ award once it was made. This three-part structure 
can be seen clearly in the following order made at the Exeter assize in March 1648/9: 
It is ordered by this Court by consent of parties that all matters in difference 
betwene John Barnes George Foster and Henry Veale shalbe referred to the 
examinacion hearinge [and] endinge of Mr Christofer Savery and Mr Fowell 
two of the Justices of the peace of this County who are desired by this Court to 
call the parties before them and end the differences before them and all the 
said parties are to stand to and performe such order [and] award as shalbe 
made therein.43 
As one might expect, it was the third part of the order of reference, directing the parties to 
‘stand to and perform’ the award, that is most relevant to this discussion on the development 
of the Arbitration Act’s enforcement procedure. For by including this provision in the order, 
it meant that if a party did not perform the award, he would thereby disobey the order and 
could be held in contempt of court. This was even stated expressly in some orders of 
reference: for example, in an order made at the Launceston assize of July 1639 which referred 
a suit awaiting trial to two local JPs, it included the provision that ‘yf any of the said parties 
shall refuse to abyde by the award by the referrees made’, the JPs should ‘bynde over all 
 
39
 Cockburn, Assizes, p. 137. 
40
 Ibid., pp. 25-27, 136-38. 
41
 Ibid., p. 137. For a contemporary account of a reference being made for this purpose, see The diary 
of Mr. Justice Rokeby: printed from a MS. in the possession of Sir Henry Peek, bart. (1888), p. 29. 
42
 The circuit’s order books are the only ones of their kind to have survived from the period. Refer to 
n. 38 above. 
43
 TNA, ASSI 24/21, fol. 133v. 
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parties refractory to the next assizes there to answere their contempt therein’.44 Equally 
evident from the orders was that if a party did not perform the award, he could be imprisoned 
for contempt. Although the party would be given the chance to defend his actions at an 
interim hearing held at the assizes,45 if his reasons were found inadequate, the justice 
administering the hearing would order for his imprisonment in one of two ways: if the party 
had been present at the hearing, the justice would direct the sheriff of the county or some 
other local official to commit the party to gaol;46 if the party had not been present, having 
instead been represented at the hearing by legal counsel, the justice would order for a writ of 
attachment to be granted against the party so that he could be arrested.47 The party would 
then remain in gaol until he performed the award48 or provided sufficient security that he 
would perform it once released.49 
Whilst this overview makes clear that a party could be imprisoned for contempt if he 
did not perform the award resulting from a reference, it also reveals that this sanction and the 
procedure employed to implement it took place entirely at the assizes. From the viewpoint of 
the aggrieved party, it is plausible that this assize-specific process would have been less than 
ideal. For as the assizes were only held twice a year, there was a real possibility that the 
aggrieved party would have to wait for months for the next assize session to occur in order to 
commence enforcement proceedings against his opponent. Even then, multiple sessions of the 
assizes would have to pass before the non-performing party could be imprisoned for 
contempt. The Western Circuit’s order books suggest that the entire process normally took 
place over two sessions: in the first, the administering justice would be notified that the party 
had not performed the award, prompting him to order that the party attend the next assizes to 
‘answere his contempt therein’; in the second, the interim hearing noted above would be held, 
and, if the non-performing party did not put forward an adequate defence, he would be 
imprisoned. This process could be further extended if, for example, the aggrieved party was 
required to provide evidence that the award had not been performed,50 or if the matter was 
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 TNA, ASSI 24/20, fol. 202r. For similar examples, see TNA, ASSI 24/20, fols. 3v, 13r, 57v, 111r, 
114r, 116v-117r, 119v-120r; 20/21, fol. 77r; 20/22, fol. 36r. 
45
 TNA, ASSI 24/21, fols. 10v, 22v. 
46
 TNA, ASSI 24/20, fols. 48v, 109v; 24/21, fols. 174r-174v. 
47
 TNA, ASSI 24/20, fols. 13r, 124r-124v, 167v-168r; 24/21, fols. 10v, 11r. 
48
 TNA, ASSI 24/20, fols. 48v, 50r, 68r, 203v, 204v, 214v; 24/21, fols. 174r-174v. 
49
 TNA, ASSI 24/20, fols. 110r, 124r-124v, 181r-181v; 24/21, fol. 91r. 
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 TNA, ASSI 24/20, fols. 181r, 186r. 
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referred back to the referees who had conducted the reference for additional consideration.51 
Thus, whilst it was possible for a party to be imprisoned for contempt, due to the infrequency 
of assize sessions, it could have taken years for this sanction to be imposed, a situation that 
would have likely served to exacerbate the aggrieved party’s position. 
For a time, this situation could not be remedied by the aggrieved party turning to the 
common law courts, which were in session far more regularly than the assizes, for 
enforcement. This was noted in the legal writer and reporter William Style’s Practical 
Register (1657), an alphabetised compilation of rules made principally by the court of King’s 
Bench during the period in which Sir Henry Rolle served as its chief justice.52 Under the 
heading of ‘attachment’, referring to the writ issued by the common law courts to commence 
enforcement proceedings for contempt, can be found the rule that the courts ‘will not grant an 
attachment against one for disobeying an order made by justices of assize’.53 Whilst Style’s 
editorial comments, included in italics following the rule, indicate that this prohibition had 
been ordered by the court in Michaelmas term of 1647, attempts to learn more about the 
particular circumstances prompting the rule to be made have unfortunately proven 
unsuccessful.54 But rather than think of this rule as signalling a change to what had been the 
practice beforehand, it is possible that the court had merely been acknowledging the 
institutional divide that existed between the assizes and the common law courts. For although 
the purpose of the assizes was to administer common law trials in the counties, a purpose for 
which the justices of the common law courts would ride in circuit twice yearly to undertake, 
each assize circuit was technically a distinct court with its own clerical staff and records.55 A 
common law justice who made an order at the assizes would therefore do so in his capacity as 
a judge of that particular circuit and, as the Western Circuit’s order books attest, the order 
would be entered into that circuit’s own records. Accordingly, if a party disobeyed the order, 
he would only be acting in contempt of that assize circuit and could only be sanctioned 
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 TNA, ASSI 24/20, fols. 42v, 99v, 119v-120r, 128v, 139v, 141v, 164v, 204r; 24/21, fols. 77r, 91r, 
96r; 24/22, fol. 26r. 
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 W. Style, Regestrum practicale: or, the practical register (1657). Henry Rolle was appointed Chief 
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position until his resignation in 1655. S. Handley, ‘Rolle, Henry’, ODNB. 
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 Style, Practical register, p. 15 (my emphasis).  
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 Cockburn, Assizes, pp. 59-61. See also J.S. Cockburn, ‘Seventeenth-century clerks of assize: some 
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there.56 The common law courts would not imprison the party for contempt because they 
were unwilling; instead, it was simply not in their power to do so.  
 That this was likely the reason for the prohibition set out by the court of King’s Bench 
finds support in the appearance, beginning in 1662,57 of an additional provision included in 
some orders of reference that the order be entered into the rule book of the common law court 
from which the parties’ suit originated: 
It is ordered with the consent of the parties that the last juror be withdrawn and 
that the matters in controversy between the parties now at this assizes tried be 
put to the arbitrement of Edward Baynton knight to hear and determine the 
matters therein before the first day of November next. And with like consent 
the parties are obliged to perform the arbitrement of Edward Baynton. And 
that this rule be entered in the court of King’s Bench at Westminster next 
term.58 
Whilst this change appears to have occurred in the Western assize circuit in the 1660s, 
research conducted by Horwitz and Oldham, who have examined this development from the 
viewpoint of the common law courts, has shown that orders of reference were being entered 
into the rule books of the courts at Westminster as early as 1656.59 Such a difference in 
timing suggests that the implementation of this change had not been a coordinated effort 
across the assize circuits; rather, the impression given is that one or more of the justices, 
perhaps with the help of an especially imaginative clerk, came up with the practice and, over 
time, it spread and gained in popularity. For it is not difficult to see why the change would 
have been popular: by entering an order of reference into the rule book of a common law 
court, the order would have been fictionalised as having been made by the common law 
court. Consequently, if a party did not perform his referee’s award, not only would he 
disobey the assize order of reference, but he would also contravene the rule of the common 
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 Later editions of Style’s work (1670, 1694) would appear to support this view, as evidenced by the 
editorial comments included alongside the printed order. For the 1670 edn, see p. 25, and for the 1694 
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 TNA, ASSI 24/22, fol. 94r. The assize judges administering the session during which this change 
first took place were Robert Foster, the chief justice of the court of Common Pleas, and John Archer, 
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law court, the effect being that he could be penalised for contempt by either judicial body. 
This fiction was, therefore, the precedent for the Arbitration Act: it established the practice 
whereby a direction concerning a party’s obligation to perform an award could be made a 
rule of a court. Yet this examination does not just reveal how the legal fiction that would be 
applied by the Act developed; it also serves to put the development into context. The fiction 
appears to have been implemented to bridge the institutional divide between the assizes and 
the common law courts, allowing an aggrieved party to seek enforcement even when the 
assizes were not in session. In all likelihood, the fiction of the Act, which had seemed so 
peculiar when considered in isolation, had been based on a clear, practical concern. 
 
2.2 The court of King’s Bench 
 
The practice of entering orders of reference into the rule books of the common law courts was 
not the end of this development story, however. Despite the fact that the common law courts 
were now capable of enforcing a reference initiated at the assizes by means of their own 
contempt procedure, for a time the court of King’s Bench refused to do so, putting it at odds 
with the practice of the other two courts. This appears to have been a source of some 
consternation for the court, its justices noting in several cases that its practice differed from 
what the other courts were doing,60 but it stood firm in its refusal for a specific legal reason: 
the way in which the court examined whether a party was in contempt of one of its rules, if 
applied to references, could result in the party being unlawfully imprisoned. Obviously, this 
requires some explaining, and it is best to begin with the court’s examination process, which 
can largely be pieced together from a various assortment of contemporary sources.61 When a 
party was accused of acting in contempt of one of the court’s rules, the matter would be 
directed to the Crown Office of the court, the clerical staff in charge of its criminal 
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 Kene v Fleming  (1666), 2 Keb. 22; Derbishire v Canon (1669), 2 Keb. 579; Tremenhere v Tresilim 
(1670), 2 Keb. 664. 
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For reports of cases that include comments as to the examination being conducted by clerks and by 
means of interrogatories, see Derbishire v Canon (1669), 2 Keb. 579; Tremenhere v Tresilim (1670), 
2 Keb. 664. 
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proceedings, which would then issue a writ of attachment so that the party could be arrested 
and brought in for questioning. With the party present, he would be sworn to answer a series 
of written questions or ‘interrogatories’ to establish whether he had violated the rule as 
accused, and, on the basis of this examination, the party would either be imprisoned for 
contempt, if found to have contravened the rule, or else discharged, if found to have not. Yet 
because of the nature of this process, administered as it was by the clerks of the court and by 
means of interrogatories, the scope of the examination was limited to matters of fact. 
Presumably in most cases this would not have posed any issue, for it would have been 
apparent from the facts alone whether the party had violated the rule or not.62 But when it 
came to applying this process to references, such a limitation would have been problematic, 
for the question of whether a party had not performed his referee’s award and was, 
consequently, in contempt of court was as much a matter of law as it was a matter of fact, an 
issue we must consider next. 
 As Chapter 1 has shown, in the seventeenth century there was a veritable ‘law’ of 
awards, a set of legal rules that dictated not only whether an award was valid or void, but also 
whether a party would be obliged to perform it.63 If an award complied with these legal rules, 
the decision would be valid or ‘good’ and the party would be obliged to perform it; but if the 
award went against these rules, the decision would instead be void and the party would be 
under no such obligation. In both scenarios, an award would have factually been made, but 
only in the first scenario would there legally have been an award, for the courts treated a void 
award as if no award had been made (‘void arbitrement est nul arbitrement’). This distinction 
was therefore crucial to the question of performance, but it was also one that the court of 
King’s Bench could not address using its existing contempt procedure. A party accused of 
violating one of the court’s rules by not performing his referee’s award would only be 
examined to determine whether in fact he had failed to perform, but in turn the party would 
not be able to raise any legal objections against the award to justify his inaction. As the court 
acknowledged in Kene v Fleming (1666), the result would have been that ‘all awards would 
be affirm’d as good how void soever’, for a party could have been imprisoned for contempt 
even when his referee’s award was void.64 Not only would this have been unlawful, but as 
John Kelyng, then the chief justice of the court, explained in Tremenhere v Tresilim (1670), it 
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would have established a ‘new practice’ whereby the court could ‘imprison the body of men 
without having heard them’.65 To prevent such a possibility from occurring, the court appears 
to have made the decision not to enforce references in this way. 
 Yet it must be noted the decision taken by the court would not have been the only 
option available for dealing with this issue. As the court was in charge of its own procedure, 
it could have instead changed the way it examined accusations of contempt in situations 
involving references so that a non-performing party would have the opportunity to object to 
his referee’s award before the justices in banc, the only venue in which matters of law could 
be decided. As we shall see, this is what the court ultimately did, but for a period of about 
fifteen years, from the mid-1650s, when orders of reference first began to be fictionalised as 
rules of the common law courts, until the early 1670s, the court was unwilling to implement 
this change. The court’s reluctance is not easily explained, not least because contemporary 
sources only rarely made note of issues pertaining to procedure,66 but one factor that appears 
to have contributed to this evident inertia was the fact that there was another way to enforce 
references at the time.  
Whilst this ‘other’ way of enforcing references has not been discussed so far in this 
analysis, neither is the enforcement method unfamiliar. As a reference was simply a type of 
arbitration, when the parties to a lawsuit consented to have the matter be determined by a 
referee, they would enter into a submission, binding them to perform their referee’s award. 
The submission could be by deed, in some cases the parties even being directed by the assize 
judge to choose this particular form;67 but equally it could be made orally or by ‘parol’, 
presumably a safer option than when an agreement to arbitrate was formed privately, for the 
parties’ consent to the reference would have been communicated in an open session of the 
assizes, with plenty of witnesses to attest that the agreement had been made. Whatever the 
form, the fact that the parties would have entered into a contract to perform their referee’s 
award meant that if one of the parties subsequently failed or refused to do so, the aggrieved 
party could sue him using one of the legal actions discussed in the previous section. It was, 
then, still possible for an aggrieved party to seek enforcement from the court of King’s 
Bench. By refusing to enforce references by means of its contempt procedure, the court did 
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not preclude enforcement; rather, it merely restricted the type of enforcement that would have 
been available.  
It is worth noting that the court would not likely have viewed this restriction as 
especially constraining or callous, for the benefit of the legal actions used to sue an opponent 
for non-performance was that the court would have been able to assess the validity of awards. 
As Chapter 1 has explained, the pleading structure for these actions was such that if the non-
performing party, the defendant, maintained the plea that his referees did not make an award 
(nullum fecerunt arbitrium), either by special verdict or on demurrer the defendant would be 
able to argue in banc that the award was void, a void award, as we have seen, being treated as 
if no award had been made.68 This is what occurred in Copping v Hernault (1669-70).69 As 
reports of the case reveal, the plaintiff sued the defendant ‘in debt on obligation conditional to 
stand to [an] award by rule at assize’, and after the defendant pleaded that the referees had not 
made an award, the matter came before the justices on demurrer so that the defendant could 
argue that the award was void, the referees having made it only after they had appointed an 
umpire to decide the dispute. Confirming their position in Travers v Twistleton (1665-66), the 
justices sided with the defendant, holding that the referees had ‘deserted’ their authority on 
appointing the umpire, and so ruled that the award was void.70 The plaintiff’s case was 
consequently dismissed. Given the existence of this enforcement method, one that allowed 
the court to decide whether an award was valid or void, it is at least plausible that one reason 
why the court had refused to change its contempt procedure to accommodate the enforcement 
of references was that it deemed the change to be unnecessary.  
Whilst the court might have taken this view, it is unlikely that an aggrieved party 
would have been so sanguine, for if his opponent had refused to perform their referee’s 
award, there would have been two clear advantages to penalising the disobedience as 
contempt. First, as we have seen, this form of enforcement could have resulted in the 
opponent’s imprisonment, a sanction which was not only more severe than the payment of 
money, but one which would have also compelled the opponent to perform the award, his 
release from gaol being conditional on ‘purging’ his contempt. Second and, arguably, just as 
important, penalising the opponent’s non-performance as contempt would have spared the 
aggrieved party from having to bring a separate lawsuit for enforcement. As the parties’ 
original suit, the one that had been referred to arbitration by order of an assize judge, was still 
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technically pending, no judgment having been entered on the record to conclude it, to 
commence enforcement proceedings, the aggrieved party would have only had to submit a 
motion to the court requesting that it issue a writ of attachment against the opponent to 
answer for his contempt, a step that would have likely saved the party both time and money. 
In light of these advantages, it is perhaps unsurprising that in spite of the avowed refusal of 
the court to enforce references using its contempt procedure, this did not prevent parties from 
attempting to obtain this type of enforcement. For example, in the case of Kene v Fleming 
noted above, the aggrieved party ‘prayed for an attachment’ to be granted against his 
opponent for the ‘non-performance of an award submitted by rule of the Court’, but his 
motion was nonetheless denied.71 
What appears to have been a turning point in this impasse was the case of Darbyshire 
v Canon (1669).72 Similarly to Kene v Fleming, the aggrieved party motioned the court to 
issue a writ of attachment against his opponent for not performing their referee’s award, but 
unlike the earlier case, it was also claimed that the aggrieved party was unable to sue his 
opponent for enforcement, the reason given being that ‘debt on award being too remote’.73 
What was meant by this reason is not entirely clear, although it can at least be ruled out that 
the aggrieved party had been barred from bringing an action of debt on award for exceeding 
the limitation period set by the Limitation Act of 1623,74 a report of the case noting that the 
reference had only been ordered at the previous session of the assizes and by no less a figure 
than John Kelyng, the chief justice of the court.75 The meaning of this reason aside, it is 
evident that the aggrieved party’s claim of being unable to sue his opponent convinced the 
court to approach the case differently. The logic behind this shift is not difficult to surmise: if 
the party could not sue his opponent and, additionally, if the court maintained its stance of 
refusing to enforce references by means of its existing contempt procedure, the party would 
have been without an option for enforcement, a result made all the more worrying given that 
the reference had been initiated by Kelyng himself. To prevent this from occurring, the court 
therefore changed its contempt procedure. The justices held that before they would grant a 
writ of attachment as the party requested, they would allow the non-performing party the 
opportunity to ‘shew cause why an attachment should not go’ by raising legal objections 
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against the referee’s award in banc.76 When counsel for the non-performing party then 
appeared and made his legal arguments, however, the justices found the objections 
insufficient and so ordered for a writ of attachment to be issued, commencing the court’s 
contempt procedure against the non-performing party as a result.77 
It is tempting to think that with the procedural change implemented in Darbyshire v 
Canon, the court of King’s Bench was from then on prepared to enforce references using its 
contempt procedure. Yet as the case of Tremenhere v Tresilim (1670) reveals, the willingness 
shown by the court to alter its procedure had been the exception rather than the rule.78 
Reports of this later case indicate that the initial suit between the parties had concerned a 
commercial dispute over the payment of mariners’ wages and of a ship’s repairs, and when 
the matter was referred to arbitration, it was agreed that Matthew Hale, then the chief baron 
of the Exchequer, should serve as the referee.79 Whilst Hale succeeded in making an award, 
one party refused to perform it, so the other motioned the court to issue a writ of attachment 
against him, citing Darbyshire v Canon as precedent.80 Yet John Kelyng, the chief justice, 
‘denied that any such rule was made’ in the case,81 and opposed granting the writ on the 
grounds that ‘the Court cannot without record take notice of whether the award be good or 
bad’, the same argument employed in preceding years to justify the court’s refusal to enforce 
references in this way.82 Whilst Kelyng was evidently against making the procedural change 
of Darbyshire v Canon absolute, it is worth noting the position of the other justices on this 
issue. As several reports of the case show, all three of the puisne justices disagreed with 
Kelyng (sed Curiam contra), so the court was adjourned to take the matter under further 
advisement.83 Despite their numerical advantage, however, the puisne justices appear to have 
been convinced to adopt Kelyng’s view, for it was later reported that the motion of the 
aggrieved party was denied.84 
What appears, then, to have caused the court to change its contempt procedure for 
good was neither additional legal discussion nor further procedural elaboration; rather, it was 
the death of the ‘peppery’ John Kelyng in May 1671 and the accession of the more liberal-
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minded Matthew Hale in his place.85 Admittedly, it is rare for such historical events to have 
an impact on legal practice or doctrine, and for this reason legal historians are wont to ignore 
them entirely, but consider the following three issues. First, as the reports of Tremenhere v 
Tresilim reveal, Kelyng appears to have been the only real remaining opposition to the court 
enforcing references using its contempt procedure, so with his death the court was ripe for 
change. Second, it is worth noting that Matthew Hale assumed his new position after having 
headed the court of Exchequer for several years,86 a court which had been prepared to 
penalise the non-performance of a referee’s award as contempt since the 1650s-1660s, so it is 
possible that he would have been more amenable to this enforcement procedure. Third, it 
must be remembered that it was Hale who had served as the referee in Tremenhere v 
Tresilim, his award seeming to have been an important commercial decision given that its 
contents were summarised in reports of the case, so the fact that the court of King’s Bench 
had been unwilling to enforce the performance of his award would have made him 
particularly well-placed to disagree with its existing procedure. In light of these issues, it 
should not cause much surprise that with the first case following Hale’s accession in which 
an aggrieved party sought to enforce a reference using the court’s contempt procedure, the 
court changed its position. The case was Miller v Clapshaw (1671), and when the aggrieved 
party motioned the court to issue a writ of attachment against his opponent for not performing 
their referee’s award, a motion that Thomas Twisden, a puisne justice of the court, opposed, 
Hale responded with what might have been thinly veiled frustration: ‘this attachment is for 
the delusion put on the Court on undertaking the award, therefore it’s fit either to allow no 
award or else to compel the performance thereof’.87 His ultimatum so delivered, Hale appears 
to have convinced his fellow judges, for at the next sitting in which the case was heard, the 
court ordered the non-performing party to ‘shew cause why an attachment should not be 
awarded’, thereby confirming the procedure that had been implemented in Darbyshire v 
Canon.88 The exception had become the rule. 
 By the 1670s, nearly two decades after orders of reference were first entered into the 
rule books of the common law courts, there was finally agreement across the courts on the 
enforcement of references, a point that was made abundantly clear in the case of Holt v Berry 
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(1677/8). When the non-performing party attempted to argue before the justices that ‘remedy 
ought to be taken on the award [and] not for the contempt of the breach of the rule’, the 
justices responded per curiam that the issuing of a writ of attachment had become ‘a setled 
course now’ and one that ‘ought not to be receded from’.89 With consensus reached between 
the common law courts in approving the enforcement of a fictionalised rule to perform an 
award by means of their contempt procedure, the stage was therefore set for this method of 
enforcement to be adopted and extended in the Arbitration Act.  
3. Explanation for enactment? 
 
The final question to consider in this discussion is why the Arbitration Act was enacted in 
1698. As the previous section revealed, the enforcement procedure on which the Act would 
rely had been fully developed in the context of references by the 1670s. All three common 
law courts were by then prepared to employ their contempt procedure against a non-
performing party for disobeying what was only a fictionalised rule. Had the Act been needed 
to ‘fix’ the existing methods of enforcement, a view that was questioned in the first section, 
one might expect the Act to have been enacted soon after the common law courts reached this 
consensus. Yet almost thirty years would pass before the Act was made, so what can account 
for the Act instead being enacted when it was? In legal scholarship, only one explanation has 
been put forward to explain why the Act was passed in 1698, so the purpose of this section is 
to consider the merits of this argument, particularly in light of what has been discussed in this 
chapter. However, as the argument relies heavily on the well-known theory of legal historian 
A.W.B. Simpson concerning the penalty of conditional bonds, it is necessary first to consider 
Simpson’s theory in more detail.90  
 Perhaps one of the most important doctrinal issues in twentieth-century legal history 
had been to explain the ‘rise’ of the action of assumpsit: how a legal action which had only 
reached maturity in the sixteenth century became the principal action for contractual disputes, 
underpinning the modern foundations of contract law.91 Part of the reason why this issue 
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caught the attention of so many scholars was that to explain the ‘rise’ of this particular action 
required accounting for the ‘decline’ of the action it supplanted—the action of debt on an 
obligation. Since the fourteenth century, the action of debt on an obligation had been the 
preeminent contractual action at common law, thanks in large part to the widespread use of 
conditional bonds to form agreements.92 The advantage of conditional bonds had always been 
their penalty, the fixed sum of money that a party would be liable to pay if he did not adhere 
to the terms of his agreement. By convention, the penalty was normally set at twice the value 
of the matter underlying the agreement, a manifestly large sum but one which served, as we 
have seen, two purposes: first, it disincentivised parties from breaking their agreements as to 
do so would result in them having to pay the penalty; second, in instances where a party did 
break his agreement, it provided a suitable remedy to the aggrieved party as he would then be 
entitled to recover the penalty.  
What was arguably A.W.B. Simpson’s most significant contribution to this doctrinal 
issue was not, then, on the rise of the action of assumpsit; rather, it was on the decline of the 
action of debt on an obligation, a development which he attributed to a change in how the 
common law courts perceived the penalty of a conditional bond. To summarise Simpson’s 
theory, he claimed that in the second half of the seventeenth century, the common law courts 
grew wary of the fact that because the penalty of a conditional bond was set at a sum far 
exceeding the value of the matter underlying an agreement, a party would be able recover 
from his opponent far more than the agreement was worth by suing him in an action of debt 
on an obligation for even the smallest of infractions.93 Consequently, the courts began to 
institute a new procedure, one that built on practices developed by the court of Chancery, that 
would prevent parties from recovering more than the actual value of the matter at issue if 
their suit were successful.94 This procedure was then put on statutory footing with the passing 
of two pieces of legislation, one in 1696/795 and the other in 1705,96 so that by the dawn of 
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the eighteenth century, penalties ‘were no longer penal in effect’.97 With the penalty 
incapable of disincentivising parties from breaking their agreements and of providing a 
suitable remedy in cases where an agreement was broken, the use of conditional bonds to 
form agreements became less frequent and, as a result, fewer suits were brought before the 
courts using the action of debt on an obligation.98 
 It is not difficult to see why Simpson’s theory has appealed to legal scholars 
attempting to explain the enactment of the Arbitration Act. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, most of the cases brought before the common law courts to sue a party for not 
performing the award were done so using the action of debt on an obligation, presumably 
because recovering the penalty would have been a suitable alternative to performance. With 
the penalty set at twice the value of the matters in dispute, in many, if not most, cases, its 
recovery would have allowed the aggrieved party to counteract the effects of his opponent’s 
non-performance and still retain a sizeable amount of money to help alleviate any hardships 
he might have experienced between the making of the award and the successful conclusion of 
his action. If, however, the aggrieved party were only able to recover the actual value of the 
matters in dispute, it is conceivable that this legal remedy would have appeared less 
agreeable. For one thing, it would have meant that the amount the aggrieved party could 
receive would not likely cover both the cost to counteract his opponent’s non-performance 
and to compensate the party for any additional loss or hardship he might have suffered. But 
perhaps more worryingly from the aggrieved party’s perspective would have been the fact 
that in limiting the amount of money he could recover, the courts would have effectively 
decided how much the matters in dispute between the aggrieved party and his opponent were 
worth. In cases where the dispute could not be so easily reduced to a specific amount, the 
possibility could arise that the courts would undervalue the matter to the aggrieved party’s 
detriment. It is plausible, then, that in light of the effects penalty relief would have had on 
enforcement, parties would have desired an enforcement procedure like that of the 
Arbitration Act to provide a more reliable remedy. 
 But of course the most compelling feature of Simpson’s theory was timing. Whilst he 
claimed that the common law courts began to relieve against the penalties of conditional 
bonds in the second half of the seventeenth century, the practice was supposedly codified 
with the enactment of two statutes in 1696/7 and 1705. Of the two statutes, it was the one 
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passed in 1696/7, known as the Statute against Fines and Penalties, that was in fact the more 
relevant to situations like arbitration where conditional bonds were being used to form 
agreements involving the performance of some act—for arbitration, the performance of an 
arbitrator’s award—as opposed to agreements for the payment of money.99 As the statute was 
enacted only a year before the Arbitration Act, legal scholars have understandably been quick 
to posit a causal link between the two statutes. In providing a background for his work on 
eighteenth-century commercial arbitration, Eben Moglen explained that ‘the English 
procedure through the end of the seventeenth century was to enforce penal bonds requiring 
obedience to arbitration awards; when the use of penalties was statutorily forbidden after 
1697, Parliament speedily provided an act to permit the direct judicial enforcement of 
arbitration results’.100 In Douglas Yarn’s work on the ‘institutionalisation’ of out-of-court 
methods of dispute resolution, he stated the following: ‘[The Statute against Fines and 
Penalties] emasculated the penalty bond on which pseudo-adjudicative arbitration relied for 
coercion and enforcement. The following year, Parliament passed “An Act for determining 
differences by arbitration”…[to establish] a more effective adjudicative use of arbitration’.101 
With the undoing of one enforcement method, the tantalising conclusion was that the 
Arbitration Act was passed to provide parties with a needed alternative. 
 Yet there are problems with this explanation. For one thing, had the Arbitration Act 
been passed in response to the ‘emasculation’ of conditional bonds, one might expect this to 
be mentioned in the Act itself. But the Act does not do so. Indeed, the only comment it makes 
regarding earlier legal practice concerns references: to justify implementing its enforcement 
procedure, the Act begins by stating that ‘whereas it hath been found by experience that 
references made by rule of court have contributed much to the ease of the subject in the 
determining of controversies…’ (lines 1-2). More damaging to the explanation put forward 
by legal scholars is that Simpson’s entire theory on penalty relief and the decline of the action 
of debt on an obligation has recently been put into doubt. In his article ‘Lex sequitur 
equitatem: fusion and the penalty doctrine’, the legal scholar Peter Turner dismissed 
Simpson’s claim that the common law courts began to relieve against penalties by the second 
half of the seventeenth century as a ‘scholarly invention’, arguing that the procedure Simpson 
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identified as implementing this relief was in fact geared towards another practice entirely.102 
Regarding the Statute against Fines and Penalties, the legislation which has been crucial to 
legal scholars’ claim that the Arbitration Act was passed in response to penalty relief, Turner 
was equally critical. Whilst he granted that the statute did sanction a form of penalty relief, he 
argued that the procedure was neither compulsory nor routinely applied.103 So whereas 
Simpson saw penalties as losing their penal effect by the start of the eighteenth century, 
Turner instead maintained that they preserved their disincentivising and remedial functions 
for at least another seventy years thereafter.104 
 However convincing Turner’s arguments may be, it is understandable that one might 
hesitate to dispense with as long-held a view as Simpson’s theory on penalty relief simply on 
the merits of a single work refuting it. But it is worth taking a moment to consider whether 
the effects of penalty relief as theorised by Simpson had in fact been felt in the context of 
arbitration. If penalty relief had been applied and then codified into legal practice by the end 
of the seventeenth century, one would expect to see both a drop in the use of conditional 
bonds to form submissions and in the reliance on the action of debt on an obligation for 
enforcement when the terms of a submission were breached. Yet in neither case does this 
appear to have occurred. There is no impression from the reported cases on arbitration that 
the action of debt on an obligation became anything less than the most common legal action 
for the enforcement of arbitration. Nor do legal treatises on arbitration suggest that the use of 
conditional bonds to form submissions had fallen out of favour. The treatise Arbitrium 
Redivivum (1694), published only years before the enactment of the Statute against Fines and 
Penalties, reaffirmed that the use of conditional bonds was still the normal practice at the 
time, stating that ‘now all submissions are usually by bond, conditionally [to perform the 
award]’.105 Even in eighteenth-century treatises on arbitration, where one might expect to find 
evidence of a change in practice given the amount of time that had passed following the 
claimed codification of penalty relief, there is no indication that conditional bonds stopped 
being used. Indeed, both of the principal works on arbitration from the period even make note 
of the penal effect of conditional bonds. In Matthew Bacon’s The Compleat Arbitrator 
(1731), he introduced the contemporary use of conditional bonds to form a submission as 
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follows: ‘a submission by bond, as it is the most frequent, so it is by far the best; the penalty 
of the bond should be more the value of the thing submitted, so that the party may rather 
abide by the award, than forfeit his obligation’.106 In referring to the fact that written 
submissions were most often formed using conditional bonds, Stewart Kyd stated in A 
Treatise on the Law of Awards (1791) that ‘when the submission is in writing, it is most 
commonly by mutual bonds, given by the parties each to the other, in certain sum penal, on 
condition to be void on performance of the award’.107 At least in the context of arbitration, 
penalty relief does not therefore appear to have had any discernible effect on contemporary 
practice. It seems unlikely, then, that Simpson’s theory can provide the answer to why the 
Arbitration Act was passed in 1698. 
 Yet if penalty relief cannot explain the enactment of the Arbitration Act, what does? 
As noted in the introduction to this section, the application of Simpson’s theory to the 
enforcement of arbitration has been the only explanation that legal scholars have offered for 
the making of the Act. If another small criticism may be laid against legal scholars, it is that 
they tend to seek out legal explanations for legal change. Yet the law did not occur in a 
vacuum: sometimes legal change can be better explained with reference to non-legal factors. 
As will be argued in the next chapter, the Arbitration Act was likely one such example. 
4. Conclusion 
 
As this chapter has covered a diverse array of issues relating to the enforcement procedure of 
the Arbitration Act, it is best to conclude this study by reviewing what it has revealed and 
what it has not. By detailing the mechanics of the Act’s provisions and by explaining the 
nature of imprisonment for contempt, the chapter has shown that the effect of the Act’s 
enforcement procedure was to make it possible for the courts to enforce the performance of 
awards in a summary manner. By investigating the development of the Act’s enforcement 
procedure in the context of references, the chapter has also revealed that the two features of 
this procedure, first, the legal fiction on which the Act would rely to allow a submission to be 
made a rule of a court and, second, the approbation of the courts to enforce this fictionalised 
rule by means of their contempt procedure, were both in place by the second half of the 
seventeenth century. Equally important, however, is what this chapter has not been able to 
reveal. It has not shown why the Act’s enforcement procedure was needed, for not only 
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would it appear that there was little—if any—criticism of the existing methods of 
enforcement, but there is reason to believe that contemporaries would have been satisfied 
with the methods then available to them. Nor has it accounted for why the Act was enacted in 
1698, for it refuted the explanation that has been put forward by legal scholars, relying on 
more recent scholarship to contend that the legal theory on which their explanation was based 
did not have the effect which it had advanced. Thus, whilst this examination has made the 
Act’s enforcement procedure appear less peculiar than when it was first introduced at the 
beginning of the chapter, it cannot alone explain the making of the Arbitration Act. Clearly, 
we must look elsewhere to account for this development, and it will be the purpose of the 




4. Making the Arbitration Act – Drafting and Enactment  
 
 
As the second of two chapters used to investigate the making of the Arbitration Act, this 
discussion will move away from the wider view taken in the previous chapter to examine 
instead the more immediate issues of the Act’s drafting and enactment. Proposed by the 
Board of Trade and Foreign Plantations, the committee established by William III in May 
1696 to administer the kingdom’s trade and colonial affairs, the Arbitration Act was 
developed with the explicit purpose of promoting trade.1 The trade-specific intention of the 
Act is clear from its provisions, set out in Appendix VI: the enforcement procedure of the Act 
was to be applied to make arbitration ‘more effectual’ in resolving disputes between 
‘merchants and traders or others’ that concerned ‘matters of account or trade or other matters’ 
(lines 5-7). In light of what has been discussed so far in this examination, the intended 
purpose of the Act might appear disjointed. Yet it must be noted that the Act was addressing 
a real concern for merchants at the time. As evidenced by the numerous commercial treatises 
printed in the second half of the seventeenth century, merchants found the existing legal 
system, and in particular the superior courts of common law and equity, incapable of 
resolving their commercial disputes in an effective manner.2 Their arguments can be boiled 
down to two essential points. First, litigation before the courts was ‘tedious and chargeable’ 
and the requirement of having to attend to a lawsuit had the undesired effect of ‘taking men 
off from their trade and business’.3 Second, the courts often lacked the capability to 
determine a commercial dispute, either because the matter concerned issues which the courts 
could not legally address or because the lawyers and judges handling the dispute were not 
sufficiently versed in affairs of trade to understand the disagreement, being no better in their 
 
1
 The Board of Trade was commissioned by William III on 15 May 1696 and was composed of 
sixteen members, eight of whom were ex officio and not in regular attendance whilst the other eight 
were working members with a yearly salary of £1000. The ex officio members were the Lord Keeper 
or Chancellor, the Lord President of the Privy Council, the Lord Privy Seal, the First Lord of the 
Treasury, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the two secretaries of 
state. The working members were John Egerton, earl of Bridgewater, who served as the president of 
the Board, Ford Grey, earl of Tankerville, Sir Philip Meadows, William Blathwayt, John Pollexfen, 
John Locke, Abraham Hill, and John Methuen. A copy of the Board’s commission, stipulating its 
powers and membership, can be found in TNA, CO 391/9, pp. 1-6. 
2
 Refer to pp. 182-85 of the Bibliography for a fuller list of works expressing this argument. 
3
 S. Bethel, An account of the French usurpation upon the trade of England (1679), p. 22. 
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attempts than ‘a blind man to shoot a hare’.4 As one writer put it, ‘a greater hell to merchants 
upon Earth cannot be undergone’ than to be forced to initiate proceedings before a court.5 
 Having examined the effect of the Arbitration Act’s enforcement procedure in the 
previous chapter, it is possible to see how the Act could have addressed these grievances. As 
it provided a way for the courts to enforce the performance of awards in a summary manner, 
merchants could avoid the law, opting instead to resolve their commercial differences by 
arbitration, but with the assurance that performance of the resulting award could be enforced 
summarily. Disputes which had been handled so poorly by the courts could essentially be 
‘outsourced’ to arbitration, a cheaper, quicker, and, if ‘specialist’ arbitrators were nominated 
to decide the matter, more effective option.6 Ostensibly, the Act gave redress to the issues 
merchants faced at law. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to explain how and why the 
Arbitration Act developed as a proposal for remedying these commercial issues. Regarding 
the ‘how’, it will examine the process by which the Act was proposed and drafted, taking 
time to investigate who was responsible for drafting its provisions. Concerning the ‘why’, it 
will look more broadly at the motives of the Board of Trade for advancing the Act, taking 
into consideration whether it was the proposal merchants had wanted. By exploring these 
particular issues, the chapter will ultimately be able to come to the surprising conclusion that 
the making of the Arbitration Act had neither been intended nor particularly desired.  
1. Substantive development 
 
As a proposal of the Board of Trade, the Arbitration Act followed a predictable path to 
enactment, the details of which are set out in the timeline of Appendix I. A bill was drafted 
under the supervision of one of the Board’s working members, John Locke, in the autumn of 
1696, a few months after the Board had been commissioned by William III.7 As the Board 
was answerable to the king, the bill was then submitted to the Privy Council on 21 January 
1696/7 by means of a ‘representation’, an official report that detailed the proposal and 
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 W. Cole, A rod for the lawyers: who are hereby declared to be the grand robbers & deceivers of the 
nation (1659), pp. 8-9. 
5
 T. Bland, Trade revived, or a way proposed to restore, increase, inrich, strengthen and preserve the 
decayed and even dying trade of this our English nation (1659), p. 24.  
6
 The notion of ‘outsourcing’ was first raised by Christian Burset. C. Burset, ‘Merchant courts, 
arbitration, and the politics of commercial litigation in the eighteenth-century British Empire’, LHR 
34:3 (2016), pp. 615-47, at pp. 616, 643. 
7
 For more information on the establishment of the Board of Trade, see R. Lees, ‘Parliament and the 
proposal for a council of trade, 1695-6’, EHR 54:213 (1939), pp. 38-66; I.K. Steele, Politics of 
colonial policy: the Board of Trade in colonial administration 1696-1720 (Oxford, 1968), pp. 3-18. 
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provided reasons for its advancement. There the bill remained for about a year, during which 
time it was amended, its revision having perhaps been delayed as the privy councillors 
finalised the peace arrangements concluding England’s war with France.8 After this revision, 
the bill was introduced to the House of Lords on 25 February 1697/8 and then to the House of 
Commons on 31 March 1698, with both houses making minor amendments to it. Finally, the 
bill received royal assent on 16 May 1698, its official title being ‘An Act for determining 
Differences by Arbitration’.9  
 Whilst this overview provides a useful framework for following the progression of the 
proposal that later became the Arbitration Act, it tells us very little about the Act’s 
substantive development. The purpose of this section is, therefore, to examine how the Act as 
we now know it was conceived, a process which was not as straightforward as its path to 
enactment might suggest. As it will be argued, not only was the Arbitration Act not the 
proposal which the Board of Trade had initially envisaged, but its substantive development 
occurred principally in two stages, the first during the time when the bill was being drafted by 
the Board and the second during its revision before the Privy Council. The Act in its final 
form had not been intended from the outset; rather, it came into being in a far more piecemeal 
fashion.  
 What is known about the Board’s original proposal can be found in a single entry 
written in the Board’s journal, the official record of its proceedings, a transcription of which 
is included in Appendix II. The entry from 19 August 1696 states that ‘Mr Locke was desired 
to draw up a scheme of some method for determining differences between merchants by 
referees, that might be decisive without appeal’.10 With the benefit of hindsight, knowing that 
these instructions would ultimately give rise to the Arbitration Act, scholars who have 
examined this entry have not done so critically, presuming that the word ‘referee’ was 
synonymous with ‘arbitrator’.11 As Chapter 3 has shown, however, contemporaries typically 
used the word ‘referee’ in the context of a reference, a specific type of arbitration which arose 
when a court ordered that the matters at issue in a lawsuit be referred to an arbitrator or 
 
8
 The Peace of Ryswick, which ended the War of the Grand Alliance, was finalised in September-
October 1697. An account of the signing of the general peace, &c. in a postscript to the Flying Post 
(1697). For an account of the war focusing on its effects on trade, see G.N. Clark, The Dutch alliance 
and the war against French trade, 1688-1697 (New York, 1971). 
9
 ‘An Act for determining differences by arbitration’, 9 & 10 Wm. III, c. 15. 
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 TNA, CO 391/9, p. 62. 
11
 For example, Henry Horwitz and James Oldham make no mention of the specific meaning of the 
word ‘referee’ when discussing the instructions which Locke received. Horwitz and Oldham, 
‘Arbitration’, p. 138. 
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‘referee’ to decide.12 It is possible, then, that whereas the enforcement procedure of the 
Arbitration Act would concern arbitration in the more ‘conventional’ sense, where parties 
agreed to arbitrate their dispute privately, without the involvement of a court, the proposal 
which the Board had first suggested was instead geared towards references. 
 Admittedly, the word choice of the 19 August entry is not on its own sufficient to 
claim that the Board had directed Locke to develop a scheme for references. Nevertheless, 
this view finds support in what Locke did after he received the Board’s instructions. As 
Locke’s correspondence reveals, he wrote to Benjamin Furly and Paul D’Aranda, merchants 
with close ties to the Dutch Republic, to enquire into how references were conducted in the 
Hoge Raad, the high court of Holland.13 This is evident not from Locke’s letters to these men, 
which, unfortunately, have not been uncovered, but rather from their responses to him. Both 
detailed how Dutch litigants could obtain and enforce a reference before the high court and 
included copies of the legal instruments that were used in the process—in Furly’s case, 
instruments that he himself had employed in a recent suit.14 The process which Furly and 
D’Aranda described can be summarised as follows. Parties to a lawsuit who wished to 
resolve the matter by arbitration would request that their lawyers seek a rule or 
‘condemnation’ from the Hoge Raad to that end.15 Upon motion, the court would order that 
the parties’ suit be referred to arbitration and require the parties not to abandon the process 
before their referees made an award. Once the award was made, the referees would send a 
sealed copy of the decision to the Hoge Raad, which would then issue a second condemnation 
confirming the award without the parties knowing of its contents beforehand. As both Furly 
and D’Aranda explained, this prevented the parties from having the time to formulate 
objections against the award should they dislike its outcome, for once the second 
condemnation was made, ‘there remayns no remedy, be the sentence what it will, [and] there 
is no appeal, being confirmed by the highest court in the nation’.16  
The emphasis Furly and D’Aranda placed on this ‘double condemnation’ process and 
its ability to prevent objections from being raised by the parties suggests what aspect of the 
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15
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law (Oxford, 1953 edn). 
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Hoge Raad’s reference procedure Locke had sought to understand.17 For whilst it was 
possible to enforce a reference in the English common law courts, either by suing an 
opponent for not performing the award or by accusing the opponent of acting in contempt of 
an order of reference, in both scenarios the opponent would have been able to raise objections 
against the referee’s award. In a commercial context, this would surely have been viewed as a 
disadvantage, merchants having lamented the delays caused by legal proceedings, so it is 
plausible that the Board of Trade’s initial proposal had concerned developing a procedure so 
that when a dispute between merchants was referred to arbitration, objections could not be 
raised against the resulting award. At the very least, this interpretation provides a more 
comprehensible account for what the Board had instructed Locke to do on 19 August: to 
develop a proposal for resolving merchants’ disputes ‘by referees’ that could be ‘decisive 
without appeal’. 
Yet whilst this might have been the Board of Trade’s original intention, it was not the 
proposal which the Board submitted to the Privy Council on 21 January 1696/7.18 A copy of 
the representation prepared by the Board was included in one of its supplementary journals, a 
transcription of which can be found in Appendix IV.19 Examining its provisions reveals that 
by the time that the proposal had left the Board, it contained most of the substance of the later 
Arbitration Act. Drafted in the form of a bill, the proposal would have enabled an award 
resulting from a private contract between parties to arbitrate their dispute to be enforced by 
means of a court’s contempt procedure. ‘Merchants, traders and others’ seeking this form of 
enforcement would insert into their submission a provision indicating their resolution to do so 
(lines 23-30). Upon presenting an affidavit to a court attesting to this resolution, the contents 
of the parties’ submission would be entered into the court’s rule book, thereby making it a 
rule of the court (lines 30-37). If a party later refused to perform the award, he would be held 
in contempt of court and process would be issued against him (lines 45-50). Notably, this 
enforcement procedure could not be stopped or delayed by ‘any order, rule, command or 
process of any other court, either in law or equity’ (lines 52-53). By early 1696/7, then, the 
scope of the proposal had evidently shifted away from applying to references, but the Board’s 
aim of creating a method that could be ‘decisive without appeal’ remained intact. 
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It can only be speculated why the Board’s proposal might have changed from one 
concerning the enforcement of references to one involving the enforcement of arbitration 
more generally. The only evidence of any sort of shift in thinking is found in the entry from 
the Board’s journal for 9 November 1696 recording that Locke had informed the Board that 
whilst he had ‘enquired into the methods practised in Holland’, he had found them ‘too 
intricate, and too different’ to be applied in England, so he had instead sought the help of men 
‘experienced in our laws’ to draft a bill.20 It is plausible, then, that having considered how 
useful a reference procedure would have been to address what the Board later called in its 
representation the ‘tedious determination of controversies between merchants…in our 
ordinary methods’, it might have been apparent to Locke that such a procedure would have 
fallen short of this mark. For a reference still required parties to initiate legal proceedings 
before a court. Indeed, as Chapter 3 has shown, a reference ordered by the common law 
courts typically took place at trial, only after the parties had completed the pleadings stage of 
their suit.21 Accordingly, much of the delay and expense of going to law would not have been 
avoided, so it is questionable how advantageous merchants would have considered a proposal 
involving references to be. By contrast, when merchants agreed privately to arbitrate their 
disputes, they eschewed the need for legal proceedings entirely, so by developing a procedure 
to enforce the performance of awards resulting from these agreements, it would have been 
possible for merchants to by-pass the tedium of the law and yet still secure an enforceable 
decision.  
It is unclear whether Locke actually came to this conclusion, however. As the 
following section will discuss in more detail, for several reasons the contents of the bill which 
he submitted to the Board on 9 November cannot be verified. Nonetheless, Locke was aware 
of the issues which merchants faced at law, having expressed in his notes several years earlier 
that ‘the intricacy of law’ was one of the principal hindrances to trade.22 Moreover, given that 
Locke reported to the Board that he had consulted with lawyers to draft his bill, it is not too 
far of a leap to surmise that it was with their help that Locke developed a way to enforce the 
performance of awards resulting from the private submission of parties, something which the 
courts had not previously been capable of doing.23 The Board’s journal might even provide 
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evidence to support the claim that the proposal’s shift in scope had occurred at the time when 
Locke was drafting his bill. Each entry recorded in the Board’s journal was given a 
corresponding heading, the one for the 19 August, when the Board instructed Locke to 
develop a proposal, being entitled ‘Trade Domestick. Referees’.24 The entry from the 9 
November, which recorded that Locke had reported on his progress and had delivered his bill 
to the Board, was similarly headed ‘Referees’. That said, the entry does not state that the 
Board had read the contents of Locke’s bill; it only indicates that Locke had delivered the bill 
to the committee and that the Board had in turn ordered that ‘a representation be drawn up, to 
lay before his majesty the usefulness of this designe of determining controversies between 
merchants’.25 By contrast, the entry from the 16 November, recording that the Board had 
made a representation on the bill and so had presumably read its contents, was given the 
heading of ‘Arbitration. Representation’, and all later entries on the proposal in the Board’s 
journal were similarly entitled using the word ‘arbitration’.26 The headings would seem to 
suggest, then, that not only had the Board’s original proposal concerned references but that 
the shift to arbitration more generally had occurred with Locke’s bill. 
The shift in the proposal’s scope was not, however, the only change to have affected 
the Arbitration Act’s substantive development. After the bill was sent to the Privy Council in 
early 1696/7, additional provisions were added to the bill that checked its ability to 
implement an enforcement procedure which could be ‘decisive without appeal’. These 
amendments are apparent when comparing the version of the bill that the Board presented to 
the Privy Council in 1696/7 to the version that was then submitted to the House of Lords in 
1697/8, a transcription of which is found in Appendix V.27 Following the final lines of text in 
the Board’s representation version, which had specified that the use of a court’s contempt 
procedure against a party who had not performed an award would not be stopped or delayed 
in its execution, a proviso was added in the draft of the bill submitted to the House of Lords 
stating ‘unless it shall be made appeare on oath, to such court, that the arbitrators or umpire 
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misbehaved themselves, and that such award, arbitration, or umpirage was procured by 
corruption or other undue means’ (lines 42-45). This proviso was then further developed in a 
supplementary paragraph added to the text in which it was explained that if one of these 
grounds for exception were proven, the award ‘shall be judged and esteemed void, and of 
none effect, and accordingly be set aside by any court of law or equity’ (lines 48-50). Taken 
together, the effect of these amendments was to make it possible for a non-performing party 
to raise objections against an award. If the party could show that some irregularity had been 
present in the making of the decision, not only could he prevent its enforcement, but he could 
ensure that it would be set aside by a court. 
 Like the previous substantive change, with the evidence available it is unclear why 
these amendments were made to the proposal. The records of the Privy Council’s meetings 
do not even mention the bill being received or considered by its members,28 and the minutes 
of William III’s cabinet, a smaller group of privy councillors who had, on other occasions, 
supervised the Board’s work, are equally silent.29 That said, it seems unlikely that the 
provisions were included for any commercial reason, for as it has been noted, the ability to 
raise objections against an award would have been viewed by merchants as a cause for delay. 
Instead, it is possible that the amendments were made to address a legal concern, one that was 
similar to what had prevented the court of King’s Bench from using its contempt procedure to 
enforce references in the 1650s-1660s. As Chapter 3 has shown, the principal reason why the 
court had refused to employ this enforcement method was that, in light of the way its 
contempt procedure stood at the time, a non-performing party would not have been capable 
of objecting against his referee’s award on legal grounds, giving rise to the possibility that he 
could have been imprisoned for not performing an award he was under no legal obligation to 
perform. It was only when this procedure was changed so that the party could raise legal 
objections against the award that the court began to use this method of enforcement on a 
regular basis.30 In the same vein, by introducing provisions to the bill to allow objections on 
the grounds that the award had been made by corruption or other ‘undue means’, the 
amendments precluded the possibility that a party could be imprisoned for not performing a 
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decision that was unlawful. The revisions might have been intended, then, as a sort of legal 
safeguard against the potential adverse effects of the bill’s enforcement procedure. Yet it is 
worth noting that by allowing parties to raise these objections against an award, the 
provisions diluted one of the original aims of the Board of Trade in developing its proposal. 
The bill’s enforcement procedure could no longer be ‘decisive without appeal’, for not only 
did the provisions allow for objections to be made to prevent enforcement, but a party could 
appeal the award in a separate lawsuit so that the decision could be ‘set aside by any court of 
law or equity’. By the time that the bill was introduced to Parliament, then, its substance had 
changed considerably from what had first been proposed.  
 Yet the substantive changes implemented by the Board and the Privy Council largely 
marked the extent to which the bill was amended. Although intended as an Act of Parliament, 
the bill underwent surprisingly little revision when introduced to both houses of Parliament. 
This is best illustrated by the bill’s review in the House of Commons, where it was submitted 
only after having been passed by the House of Lords. Whilst the committee in charge of 
reviewing the bill was enlarged on two separate occasions, the only revision which it 
recommended, as evidenced from the report of Edward Clarke, the committee’s chair, on 2 
May 1698, was that the word ‘unto’ be omitted from the first paragraph of the bill.31 The 
revisions made by the House of Lords were, by contrast, more substantial, but it is 
questionable how much these revisions can actually be attributed to the peers’ own scrutiny 
of the bill.32 Although the House of Lords’ journal records that the Earl of Bridgewater, the 
chair of the bill’s review committee, had reported on 11 March 1697/8 that it was fit to pass 
with ‘some amendments’,33 examining the draft of the bill which had been submitted to the 
Lords on 25 February 1697/8 and to which the peers had subsequently added their 
amendments reveals what exactly these revisions were.34 The first was to state from which 
date the provisions of the bill were to become lawful: the ‘eleaventh day of May which shalbe 
 
31
 CJ, vol. XII, p. 250. The significance of Commons’ review of the bill is discussed below at pp. 149-
50.  
32
 The bill had been committed for review on 28 February 1697/8 to at least five of forty-three named 
peers. In order of bench, the named peers were as follows. Bishops’ bench: Durham, Rochester, 
Exeter, St David’s, Peterborough, Lincoln, Chichester; Earls’ bench: Bolton, Newcastle, Halifax, 
Normanby, Bridgewater, Peterborough, Stamford, Thanet, Sandwich, Bath, Burlington, Macclesfield, 
Nottingham, Rochester, Abingdon, Marlborough, Tankerville, Jersey, Townshend, Lonsdale; Barons’ 
bench: Abergavenny, De la Warr, Ferrers, Willoughby de Broke, Willoughby of Parham, Hunsdon, 
Howard of Escrick, Byron, Colepepper, Granville, Craven, Dartmouth, Guilford, Jeffreys, Herbert of 
Chirbury, Haversham. LJ, vol. XVI, p. 221.  
33
 Ibid., p. 231.  
34
 HLRO, HL/PO/JO/10/1/498/1219. See Appendix V for a transcription of the draft bill. 
 131 
in the yeare of our Lord 1698’ (line 14).35 The second amendment was more significant: in 
the second paragraph of the bill, which explained that an award could be set aside by a court 
if misconduct, corruption, or other undue means were proven, the peers reviewing the bill 
added that the time period for bringing a complaint on these grounds would be limited to 
‘before the last day of the next [law] terme’ (lines 52-53) after the award was made. 
Presumably these words were included to prevent objections from being brought against an 
award long after the parties were supposed to have performed it, and so the amendment can 
be seen as limiting the potentially delaying effect of the Privy Council’s own revisions. 
Whilst this might lead one to conclude that the amendment was therefore made in opposition 
to what the Privy Council had included, the draft of the bill to which the peers made their 
amendments, having been the one submitted to the House of Lords from the Privy Council, 
shows that this was not the case. Instead, it appears that the Privy Council had intended for 
the House of Lords to make the amendments that it did, for at both points in the draft where 
the peers made their revisions, a blank space had been left in the original text of the bill so 
that words could be inserted at a later date. This would suggest that far from being innovative 
in the substance of its revisions, the House of Lords had in fact been following some sort of 
pre-arranged programme for amending the bill, a view which might find support in the fact 
that the Earl of Bridgewater, who had chaired the review committee, was also a privy 
councillor and the president of the Board of Trade.36 Perhaps he had played a guiding role to 
ensure that the bill would be finalised in this way.37 At least in terms of its substance, then, 
the Arbitration Act appears to have been more of a policy created outside of Parliament than 
within it. 
 Whilst much of this analysis has been speculative, being formed from the 
interpretation of sources which provide little direct evidence of the intentions behind the 
formulation of the Arbitration Act, this section has nonetheless provided a detailed study of 
how the substance of the Act developed. Far from being a proposal intended from the outset, 
the Act as we now know it instead arose gradually, as successive changes were made to what 
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the Board of Trade had first envisaged. The result was something bearing little resemblance 
to the ‘scheme’ the Board had instructed John Locke to create that would have allowed 
commercial disputes to be decided ‘by referees’ in a way that was ‘decisive without appeal’. 
This might in turn explain the finding of Henry Horwitz and James Oldham, the only scholars 
to have examined the making of this legislation in any detail, that the Act had not been ‘a 
project widely canvassed either in business or legal circles’.38 As a form of proposal, the 
Arbitration Act had not existed before it was drafted; rather, its substance was the result of 
this drafting process.  
2. Drafts and drafters 
 
As the previous section has argued, from the time when it was first proposed on 19 August 
1696 until reaching its final form, the substance of the Arbitration Act underwent two 
important changes: first, its scope shifted from the enforcement of references to that of 
arbitration more generally; second, amendments were made to allow objections to be raised 
against awards so that its enforcement procedure could no longer be ‘decisive without 
appeal’. Whilst it has been possible to pinpoint the making of these changes to two separate 
stages in the Act’s development, the first to when the bill was initially drafted by the Board of 
Trade and the second to when it was revised by the Privy Council, it is less clear who exactly 
had been responsible for the changes. Accordingly, the aim of this section is to examine the 
known drafts of the bill in an attempt to identify the ‘drafters’ of these changes. As we shall 
see, such an investigation will not only help clarify who we should see as responsible for 
‘making’ the Arbitration Act, but it will also reveal additional explanations for why these 
changes had been made. 
 
2.1 John Locke and William Blathwayt 
 
As the Board of Trade’s journal reveals, there were three drafts of the bill made during the 
time when the proposal was before the Board. The first was John Locke’s original version, 
which he composed with the help of men ‘experienced in our laws’ and delivered to the 
Board on 9 November 1696. However, as the entry from 18 December shows, ‘some doubt 
about the forme’ of the bill was then raised, so it was amended by William Blathwayt, 
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another working member of the Board. A copy of this second, amended version was 
subsequently sent to Locke, who had left London to spend the winter in the country,39 and on 
18 January 1696/7 the Board received Locke’s comments and ordered that the bill ‘be 
corrected according to these remarks’. This third version became the draft that was then used 
in the Board’s representation: as the entry from 21 January reveals, the Board signed and 
transmitted to the Privy Council a draft of the bill ‘according to the last corrections ordered to 
be made’. For the purposes of this subsection, the three drafts of the bill were therefore (i) 
Locke’s original bill, (ii) Blathwayt’s amended version, and (iii) a hybrid version comprising 
Locke’s revisions of Blathwayt’s draft which the Board presented to the Privy Council, 
hereinafter called the ‘representation draft’. 
 As the previous section noted, a copy of the representation draft was recorded in one 
of the Board’s supplementary journals, but included in Locke’s own manuscripts are two 
additional drafts of the bill, the texts of which are set out side-by-side on a single folio and 
written in the same hand.40 The verso of the folio bears the endorsement ‘Trade: Arbitration 
Bill 96’ in Locke’s hand, so it is possible, even likely, that the texts are the two earlier drafts 
made by Locke and Blathwayt.41 As explained above, Locke would have had in his 
possession a copy of Blathwayt’s amended version, for the Board had ordered that one be 
sent to him to revise in December 1696. In all likelihood, the document found in Locke’s 
manuscripts was prepared as it was so that Locke could more easily compare his original 
version of the bill to Blathwayt’s and consequently make the corrections which he then sent 
to the Board the following month. Yet the document does not specify which of the texts was 
Locke’s and which was Blathwayt’s. This is not all that surprising given that Locke would 
undoubtedly have been able to distinguish between the texts at glance. But for those of us 
examining the document centuries later, the absence of any straightforward means to identify 
who composed which text is problematic. Admittedly, it does not affect how we view the 
Arbitration Act in its final form, for no matter the provenance of the two texts it was still the 
representation draft that was sent to the Privy Council on 21 January 1696/7. It does, 
however, have an impact on whom we should see as responsible for what was ‘innovative’ 
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about the Act: the fact that it extended the way in which the common law courts had enforced 
references by means of their contempt procedure to apply to arbitration more generally. 
 A closer look at the two texts reveals that whilst they both authorised the use of the 
courts’ contempt procedure to enforce the performance of awards, they differed as to the type 
of arbitration to which this enforcement method could be applied. The left-hand text, like the 
later representation draft, applied the method to arbitration, but the right-hand text instead 
limited it to references. This is evident at several points in the two texts, the transcriptions of 
which can be found in Appendix III. For example, where the left-hand text stated that it 
would be lawful for an arbitration of ‘any controversie suit or quarrell controversies suites or 
quarrells’ (L, lines 15-16) to be enforced as a rule of a court, the right-hand text qualified this 
statement by including that only an arbitration of controversies, suits, or quarrels ‘for which 
any action personal hath been brought’ (R, lines 16-17) could be enforced in this way. And 
whereas the left-hand text explained that parties could specify in their submission that it be 
made a rule in ‘any of his majesty’s courts of record which the parties shall chuse’ (L, lines 
18-19), the right-hand text held that the parties should make their submission a rule in the 
court ‘in which such suit or action at the time of such submission was or is depending’ (R, 
lines 20-21). Only the left-hand text, then, reflected what the Arbitration Act would later 
authorise. The right-hand text, in limiting its scope to references, merely codified what all 
three common law courts had been doing since the 1670s. It is therefore important to 
determine who composed the left-hand text as it would reveal whether the Arbitration Act 
was substantively Locke’s doing. Should we attribute, as the previous section has, the 
innovation of allowing the courts’ contempt procedure to be used to enforce arbitration to 
Locke and the lawyers whom he consulted? Or should this development be instead credited to 
Blathwayt? 
 Based simply on the texts themselves, it is difficult to say either way which text 
should be attributed to whom. There is in fact plenty of logic for saying that the left-hand text 
was not Locke’s original bill. For if it were, it would have meant that when Locke was sent 
Blathwayt’s version in December 1696, he ignored almost all the amendments Blathwayt had 
made and instead recommended to the Board that it form its representation draft from 
essentially his original bill, the left-hand text being the more similar version of the two texts 
to what the Board then presented to the Privy Council. Ostensibly this would appear to be a 
peculiar reading of the bill’s revision process, which might explain why Horwitz and Oldham 
came to the conclusion that ‘the righthand text was the earlier of the two and that the lefthand 
text was probably the version sent by the board to Locke in the country after undergoing 
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revision chiefly at William Blathwayt’s initiative’.42 Yet if this conclusion were true, it would 
mean that Locke had not been responsible for introducing what was ‘innovative’ about the 
Arbitration Act. As the composer of the right-hand text, his original proposal would have 
applied only to references, so at most it could be claimed that Locke had been prescient 
enough to recognise the significance of Blathwayt’s amendments to have recommended the 
changes to the Board. But it would be misleading to say, as many scholars have done, that the 
Arbitration Act was fundamentally Locke’s statute.43 
 It is fortunate, then, that there is sufficient evidence to support the view that Locke 
was in fact the composer of the left-hand text. Consider, first, the argument that it would have 
been strange for Locke to have ignored most of the amendments Blathwayt had proposed, the 
strongest grounds for saying that Locke drafted the right-hand text. If the relationship 
between Locke and Blathwayt, the ‘most important untitled members of the Board’, is taken 
into account, it becomes much less surprising that Locke might have acted in this way.44 For 
as several scholars have noted, the relationship between these two men was far from 
collegial.45 Indeed, the historian Peter Laslett has claimed that Blathwayt hated Locke, a 
feeling which appears to have been mutual.46 This enmity was in part political, Blathwayt 
having been a long-standing Tory and Locke an avowed Whig,47 but it was also tied to their 
views on how the Board should be run and, importantly, who should be in charge of running 
it. For Blathwayt was, amongst other roles, the de-facto head of England’s colonial 
administration, having served as the auditor-general of royal revenues in the colonies since 
1680 and as the secretary to the Lords of Trade, the predecessor council to the Board of 
Trade, since 1679.48 He therefore epitomised what Locke and the other Whig members of the 
 
42
 Horwitz and Oldham, ‘Arbitration’, p. 135, n. 9. 
43
 American legal scholars in particular tend to refer to the Arbitration Act by mentioning John Locke. 
For example, see J. Oldham, ‘The historically shifting sands of reasons to arbitrate’, JDR 1 (2016), 
pp. 41-54; C. Conklin, ‘A variety of state-level procedures, practices, and policies: arbitration in early 
America’, JDR 1 (2016), pp. 55-79; J. Oldham and S. Kim, ‘Arbitration in America: the early 
history’, LHR 31:1 (2013), pp. 241-66; Horwitz and Oldham, ‘Arbitration’. 
44
 Steele, Politics of colonial policy, p. 22. 
45
 P. Laslett, ‘John Locke, the Great Recoinage, and the origins of the Board of Trade: 1695-1698’, 
WMQ 14:3 (1957), pp. 370-402, at p. 391; ‘William Blathwayt, imperial fixer: muddling through to 
empire, 1689-1717’, WMQ 26:3 (1969), pp. 373-417, at p. 398. 
46
 Laslett, ‘Locke, recoinage, Board of Trade’, p. 391. 
47
 L. Leder, Robert Livingston 1654-1728 and the politics of colonial New York (Chapel Hill, N.C., 
1961), pp. 101-2. 
48
 For further information on William Blathwayt, see G.A. Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, a late 
seventeenth century English administrator (New Haven, C.T., 1932); L. Cappon, ‘The Blathwayt 
papers of Colonial Williamsburg, Inc.’, WMQ 4:3 (1947), pp. 317-31; S. Webb, ‘William Blathwayt, 
imperial fixer: from Popish Plot to Glorious Revolution’, WMQ 25:1 (1968), pp. 3-21; ‘Blathwayt, 
imperial fixer: muddling through to empire’. 
 136 
Board sought to change, the previous administrators of England’s commercial and colonial 
endeavours being largely held responsible for the economic issues which the kingdom was 
facing at the time.49 The early months of the Board, the very period in which the bill was 
drafted, are thus replete with examples of these men and their factions working against one 
another to assert control over the Board’s affairs. To recount just one episode, Locke, with 
the help of Baron John Somers, the Lord Chancellor, was able to secure the appointment of 
William Popple, the English translator of his Letter Concerning Toleration, as the Board’s 
secretary in place of Thomas Povey, Blathwayt’s kinsman and deputy at the Lords of Trade.50 
Upon learning of this development, Blathwayt retaliated against what he perceived as an 
attack on his patronage by having Povey remove the Lords of Trade’s records to his estate at 
Dyrham Park and instructing his contacts in the colonies to address their letters directly to 
him—effectively hamstringing the Board’s ability to deal with ongoing colonial matters.51 If 
such blatant antagonism was typical of the interactions between these two men, it is perhaps 
less peculiar that Locke would not have accepted Blathwayt’s amendments of his bill. Indeed, 
one might even say that it would have been more out of character had Locke been amenable 
to Blathwayt’s suggestions. 
 There is even reason to believe that Blathwayt had not intended for his amendments to 
be particularly useful. For if Blathwayt had composed the right-hand text, what did his 
revisions do to further the Board’s objective? As noted above, the changes made in the right-
hand text would limit the application of the bill’s enforcement procedure to references; 
essentially, the text codified existing court practice. How, then, would this have benefitted the 
resolution of merchants’ disputes? The apparent futility of these changes might be more 
comprehensible if we consider whether Blathwayt had another reason for introducing them: 
to obstruct the finalisation of Locke’s proposal. As the Board’s journal makes clear, 
Blathwayt had only sought to amend the bill at the proverbial eleventh hour. The entry from 
18 December 1696 reveals that the Board had been prepared to send a representation of the 
bill to the Privy Council, but it was only then that ‘some doubt about the forme’ of the bill 
was expressed and Blathwayt was permitted to revise it.52 Equally notable is that Blathwayt 
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expressed his reservations only after Locke had left London, presumably under the 
assumption that his work on the proposal was complete. Locke departed for the country 
before 16 November, the date on which a representation of his bill had been agreed upon by 
the Board, but Blathwayt only voiced his concerns sometime after this date.53 Could 
Blathwayt have waited for so long to introduce his amendments deliberately to derail Locke’s 
efforts? He certainly could have put forward his reservations at an earlier date, having been 
present at the meetings of 9 November, when Locke first delivered his bill to the Board, and 
16 November, when the Board approved the bill’s representation. It would also have been 
clear to Blathwayt that the bill was Locke’s personal enterprise. It was in fact the first 
proposal that Locke introduced to the Board following Blathwayt’s return to England in mid-
October, Blathwayt having spent the summer in the Netherlands serving as William III’s 
personal secretary.54 It is at least plausible, then, that Blathwayt’s revision of Locke’s bill 
might have represented another instance of antagonism between these two men—in this case, 
of Blathwayt showing that he could obstruct Locke’s efforts even on an issue in which Locke 
had played a leading role. This might in turn explain why the Board had been so careful to 
solicit Locke’s views of Blathwayt’s amendments, despite the fact that Locke was no longer 
in London. On 18 December the Board directed William Popple to send a copy of 
Blathwayt’s version of the bill to Locke, and on 18 January, after receiving Locke’s 
comments, the Board ordered that the ‘draft be corrected according to these remarks’ so that a 
representation could be made ‘in that manner’ to the Privy Council. 
 Beyond the question of whether Locke would have accepted Blathwayt’s amendments 
of his bill, there is additional evidence to support the view that Locke had drafted the left-
hand text and was therefore responsible for what was ‘innovative’ about the Arbitration Act. 
On at least two separate occasions, Locke appears to have signalled his ‘ownership’ of the 
matter. The first occasion has been touched on briefly in the previous section: when the bill 
was committed for review in the House of Commons in April 1698, it was Edward Clarke, 
Locke’s close friend and ‘mouth-piece’ in Parliament, who chaired the committee.55 Had 
Blathwayt been the one to decide that the bill’s enforcement procedure should be applied to 
arbitration rather than to references, it would seem likely that he would have been the one to 
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sponsor the bill, having been only MP on the Board and therefore its de-facto representative 
in the House of Commons.56 Yet despite the fact that more than fifty MPs were ultimately 
appointed to the parliamentary committee, Blathwayt was not amongst those who were 
named.57 The second occasion in which Locke appears to have signalled his ownership of the 
proposal is of a more intimate nature. Also found in Locke’s manuscripts is a copy of a report 
that had been sent to the House of Commons detailing the Board’s achievements up until 
March 1699/1700, only months before Locke’s retirement from the Board.58 Included in the 
report was the notice that ‘to prevent delays in determining differences about matters of trade 
we prepared a bill for determining such differences by arbitration which has since past into 
law’.59 The name of the bill has been underlined in the text as have other sections in the 
report which refer to the Board’s efforts in fixing the rate of guineas and amending the Poor 
Laws.60 As these other issues have been identified by scholars to be attributable to Locke, it is 
possible that Locke had therefore read through the report and marked out the matters which 
he claimed as his own.61 
 For the reasons detailed above, it seems probable that the provenance of the drafts 
found in Locke’s manuscripts is as follows: the left-hand text was Locke’s original draft and 
the right-hand text was Blathwayt’s amended version. This would mean that Locke was 
responsible for extending the way in which the common law courts had enforced references 
to apply to arbitration generally; he can retain his position to us in the modern day as the 
‘maker’ of the Arbitration Act. But as a final point by way of conclusion, it is worth noting 
that there was one important amendment introduced in the right-hand text that was preserved 
in the representation draft: who could employ the bill’s provisions. Whereas the left-hand text 
limited its use to ‘merchants and traders’ for their disputes concerning ‘account or trade’ (L, 
lines 8-9), the right-hand text permitted a more general application of the provisions by 
stating that it could be employed by ‘merchants traders and others concerning matters of 
accompt, trade or other matters’ (R, lines 9-10, my emphasis). These words, which were 
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retained in the Arbitration Act, have been singled out by scholars as a key feature in allowing 
the Act to exceed beyond its original commercial scope to apply to any arbitration, regardless 
of the identity of the parties or the subject matter of their dispute.62 If we are to accept, then, 
that the right-hand text had been composed by Blathwayt, it would mean that the wider 
application of the Arbitration Act was Blathwayt’s doing. However unintentionally, 
Blathwayt might have played a far greater role in the long-term significance of the Act than 
scholars have previously acknowledged. 
 
2.2 Sir John Holt 
 
As the discussion of the Act’s substantive development has shown, the Arbitration Act in its 
final form was not entirely drafted by members of the Board of Trade. Its concluding 
provisions, allowing parties to raise objections against awards on grounds of corruption or 
other ‘undue means’ and authorising the courts to set aside awards for these reasons, appear 
to have been made when the bill was before the Privy Council. The draft of the bill which 
lends support to this view is the one found in the manuscripts of the House of Lords, a 
transcription of which is included in Appendix V.63 The body of the text, including the 
additional provisions, was written in one scribal hand, whereas the amendments made by the 
Lords’ committee charged with reviewing the bill were instead written in another hand, the 
same which endorsed on the verso of the bill the dates of its first and second readings before 
the upper house. This would suggest that the provisions in question had already been added to 
the bill when it was submitted to the House of Lords in February 1697/8, and given that they 
were not included in the representation draft which the Board had presented to the Privy 
Council the year earlier, by process of elimination it would follow that the provisions were 
made at the direction of the Privy Council. 
 Turing to the provisions themselves, they are notable in that they appear to have been 
introduced for a legal, rather than commercial, reason. The provisions prevented a party from 
being imprisoned for contempt of court for not performing an award which had been made 
unlawfully, a possibility that could have otherwise arisen had the Board’s original intention 
of creating a proposal that would be ‘decisive without appeal’ been maintained. Yet by 
allowing parties to raise objections on the grounds of corruption or ‘undue means’ and by 
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authorising the courts to set aside an award if such grounds were proven, the provisions 
effectively gave the courts oversight to review awards and to look into how they were made. 
If parties sought to rely on the Act’s enforcement procedure, they would have to ensure that 
the way in which their arbitration was conducted complied with what the courts deemed to be 
lawful. The provisions were therefore crucial to what legal scholars have called the 
‘legalisation’ of arbitration, for as awards came increasingly under the courts’ scrutiny, the 
entire process of arbitration became more law-related in terms of its procedure and in the 
parties’ choice of arbitrator.64 It is for this reason that the Arbitration Act has often been 
credited with giving rise to the legalised practice that arbitration is today. In its effect, the Act 
laid ‘the foundation stones of the modern law and practice of arbitration in England’.65 
 In light of the long-term significance of these provisions, it is therefore worth 
knowing who drafted them. Yet it must be noted that identifying the drafter of the provisions 
is a more difficult task than that of the previous subsection given that there are not just two 
candidates to consider. Indeed, as there is no surviving account of the Privy Council revising 
the bill, it is hard to say which of the privy councillors might have made the amendments. It 
cannot even be said for certain that the provisions were at all drafted by the councillors, for it 
is possible that the Privy Council had instead delegated the task to someone else. But if we 
make the admittedly large assumption that the amendments were drafted by a member of the 
Privy Council, for several reasons the most probable candidate would be Sir John Holt, the 
Lord Chief Justice.66 Holt had been present at the Privy Council on 21 January 1696/7, the 
date when the Board of Trade recorded in its own journal to have transmitted its 
representation of the bill to the council.67 Moreover, as chief justice of the court of King’s 
Bench, Holt would have had the legal knowledge to recognise the necessity of allowing 
parties to object against awards which had been made unlawfully. Holt had even expressed 
familiarity with the process by which the court of King’s Bench had come to enforce 
references by means of its contempt procedure, remarking in the case of Forster v Brunetti 
(1696) that the court had first granted a writ of attachment against a party for not performing 
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his referee’s award when John Kelyng had been chief justice.68 Yet attendance and legal 
expertise are not enough to single out Holt as the drafter of the Arbitration Act’s final 
provisions. For one thing, these criteria could have equally applied to Baron John Somers, the 
Lord Chancellor, who had also been present at the council on 21 January.69 Nor should too 
much reliance be placed on the attendance of this one meeting. The councillors might not 
have dealt with the revision of the bill when it was first presented to them, or they might have 
assigned the matter to a councillor who had not been present at the time. Under these 
circumstances, Sir John Trevor, Master of the Rolls, would also emerge as a possible 
candidate.70 
 Instead, what makes John Holt the most likely of the privy councillors to have drafted 
the amendments to the bill relates to the substance of the provisions, and particularly to the 
specific grounds for which the courts would be able to set aside an award. For by limiting 
these grounds to issues concerning corruption or other ‘undue means’, the provisions were 
consistent with Holt’s decisions on the court of King’s Bench in relation to the enforcement 
of references. This requires some explaining. When the court of King’s Bench first began to 
enforce references using its contempt procedure by allowing the non-performing party to 
‘shew cause’ why a writ of attachment should not be granted against him, the legal arguments 
that the party would then raise concerned the ‘law’ of awards, the legal rules prescribing 
whether an award was valid or void.71 During his tenure as the court’s chief justice, however, 
Holt sought to exclude these legal arguments from being made, as is evident from several of 
his decisions in the late 1690s, the very period in which the bill under consideration was 
being drafted. In the case of Forster v Brunetti mentioned above, Holt ruled that the court 
was prepared to grant a writ of attachment against parties for not performing their referees’ 
awards ‘though they be not legally good’, and in the case of — v Palmer (1698), he made this 
exclusion even more explicit by pronouncing that ‘[t]he common exceptions against an award 
will not hold here’.72 The grounds for which Holt would allow a party to object against his 
referee’s award were equally clear. As he explained in an anonymous case from 1698, ‘where 
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an award is made by rule of court, it shall not be set aside; unless there was practice with the 
arbitrators, or some irregularity as want of notice of the meeting’.73 By the 1690s, then, the 
‘law’ of awards was no longer sufficient to prevent the enforcement of a reference; instead, a 
non-performing party would have needed to show that there had been some apparent injustice 
in carrying out the process. 
The provisions added to the bill therefore aligned with the more limited grounds for 
objection which Holt had imposed on the enforcement of references. This not only lends 
support for claiming that Holt had made the amendments to the bill when it was brought 
before the Privy Council, but it also offers an additional explanation for why these specific 
provisions were included. By allowing the same grounds for objection whether parties sought 
to enforce an award made by a reference or in accordance with the Act, the provisions 
ensured that the courts would apply their contempt procedure consistently across both 
scenarios. It is possible, then, that the amendments were made with the intention of 
standardising the courts’ method of enforcement in cases where the non-performance of an 
award was penalised as contempt, something that Holt, as the Lord Chief Justice and, 
therefore, head of the common law system, would undoubtedly have wanted to ensure. At the 
very least, this was the view that Lord Mansfield, chief justice of the court of King’s Bench 
for the period of 1756-1788, took of the provisions some sixty years later. In a case 
concerning the grounds on which a party could raise objections against an award, Mansfield 
explained that the Act ‘put submissions to arbitration in cases where there was no cause 
depending, upon the same foot as those where there was a cause depending’.74  
3. Reception 
 
Whilst this chapter has so far centred on the Arbitration Act’s development, this section 
marks a shift in focus to consider how the Act was instead received. This particular issue 
merits consideration as there does not appear to have been much immediate commentary on 
the Act’s passing, an altogether surprising fact given how well-known and well publicised 
were the commercial grievances which the Act was supposed to address. In the absence of 
such commentary, the views of eighteenth-century legal writers like Matthew Bacon and 
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William Blackstone who claimed that ‘submissions by rule of court are now very frequent’ 
and that matters relating to the Arbitration Act have ‘now become a considerable part of the 
business of the superior courts’ have been taken to represent the Act’s overall reception.75 It 
has been largely presumed that the Act was adopted and applied without issue. More recently, 
however, the findings of Henry Horwitz and James Oldham have brought this assumption 
into question. By examining the rule books of the courts of King’s Bench and Common Pleas 
in the decades following the passing of the Arbitration Act, they discovered that well into the 
eighteenth century there was no significant increase in the number of rules entered pursuant 
to the Act’s provisions.76 The enforcement procedure implemented by the Act had not in fact 
been regularly employed.  
 Horwitz and Oldham admitted that the infrequent use of the Act’s procedure is not 
easy to explain. They dismissed the idea that the courts might have actively discouraged its 
use out of a fear of losing business to arbitration, a view popular amongst nineteenth- and 
early-twentieth-century legal scholars and practitioners to describe more generally the courts’ 
opinion of arbitration, finding sufficient evidence to the contrary.77 They also doubted 
whether the very existence of the Act’s more coercive form of enforcement might have 
deterred contemporaries from not performing awards so that the actual recourse to its 
enforcement procedure was rarely necessary, for whilst this view could provide an 
explanation for why the Act was not often employed in the first half of the eighteenth 
century, it does not account for the sudden rise in the number of rules entered pursuant to the 
Act in the 1770s-1780s.78 The aim, then, of this section is to offer a possible explanation for 
Horwitz and Oldham’s findings, one that can account for both the initial, infrequent recourse 
to the Act and the later increase in its use. It will suggest that the Arbitration Act was not at 
first employed because it was not the solution that merchants themselves had wanted. Instead, 
merchants had sought to establish a merchant court to decide their differences, but the Board 
of Trade chose to advance the Arbitration Act for policy considerations tied to concerns about 
its own survival. Only later, once the likelihood of erecting a merchant court diminished as 
many of the substantive issues that merchants had complained about were incorporated into 
the existing legal system was the Act more regularly applied, for it addressed one lingering 
issue that such substantive change could not fix: procedural delay. The following discussion 
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will expand on this explanation in two parts, the first addressing the reasons why the Board 
advanced the Arbitration Act in spite of the support for a merchant court, and the second 
covering the changes to the existing legal system which would have made the Act a more 
attractive option. 
 
3.1 Merchant courts 
 
Whilst the Arbitration Act had been advanced to address the issues which merchants faced at 
law, this does not mean that it was the solution that merchants themselves had wanted. As is 
evident from numerous commercial treatises that were published in the seventeenth century, 
merchants had instead called for the establishment of a court manned by merchants and 
equipped with a summary procedure to determine their disputes.79 Proposals for a merchant 
court, or a ‘court merchant’ as it was more commonly known, were often couched in terms of 
the benefits it could provide to commerce. Such a court would allow merchants to ‘see short 
ends to their differences, and not to be detained at home to attend long issues’, which would 
mean that merchants could devote more time and resources to trade.80 Set against the 
backdrop of England’s commercial rivalry with the Dutch Republic and France, both of 
which had merchant courts, the proposals also took on a geopolitical slant. The prominent 
merchant Sir Josiah Child lamented that the lack of a merchant court in England, so unlike 
the ‘great cities and towns in France [and] Holland’, was a ‘great bar to the progress and 
grandure of the trade of this kingdom’.81 The economic writer Roger Coke pointed to the ease 
with which commercial disputes were resolved in the Dutch Republic as a reason why ‘Dutch 
merchants may and do improve their trades better than the English’.82 Depicted in these ways, 
proposals for a merchant court appear to have been compelling. When, in December 1695, 
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the House of Commons sought to appoint a council of trade to address the beleaguered state 
of the kingdom’s commerce, it included amongst its resolutions that the proposed council 
would be ‘empowered to consider the best methods for settling a court merchant’.83 
 Yet as is well known, the parliamentary council never came to fruition. In what was 
viewed at the time as a constitutional issue between the king and Parliament, William III 
instead commissioned the Board of Trade in May 1696 and the council proposed by the 
House of Commons was apparently abandoned.84 What is less well known, however, is why 
the Board developed the Arbitration Act in light of the support shown for a merchant court 
amongst merchants and in Parliament. It is unlikely that the Board would have been ignorant 
of the proposal, something that was demonstrably true for John Locke. Not only had he 
recorded in his notes the resolutions of the House of Commons regarding its proposed council 
of trade85 but he also retained in his library many of the commercial treatises advocating for a 
merchant court and was in correspondence with some of their authors.86 Why, then, did 
Locke and the Board decide to advance the Arbitration Act in place of a merchant court? 
Whilst the surviving records do not provide a clear answer, it will be argued in this 
subsection that their decision was made for policy considerations linked to the Board’s own 
survival. The choice to advance the Arbitration Act was less of a value judgment between the 
two options as it was a promotion of the scheme that was the most feasible to adopt. 
 To understand why the Board would have been concerned about its survival, we must 
consider the Board’s position in the early months of its existence, the very period in which 
Locke had been tasked with developing his proposal. As noted above, the Board had been 
commissioned by the king despite attempts by the House of Commons to establish a council 
of trade only months previously. For several reasons, contemporaries viewed this 
development unfavourably. Merchants worried that the Crown-appointed Board was too 
similar to its predecessor council, the Lords of Trade, which they held responsible for many 
of the trade-related issues the kingdom currently faced. As one merchant put it, ‘the council 
of trade was excellently propos’d at first by the Parliament; but the interest of the Court 
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quickly beat out its brains, and from this establishment I doubt little good will arise’.87 Tory 
and ‘country’ politicians were also disparaging of the Board given that most of its members 
were affiliated with the Whig party.88 Indeed, scholars have claimed that the establishment of 
the Board in place of the House of Commons’ proposed council was broadly perceived by 
contemporaries as a victory for the Whig Junto.89 Such widespread opposition to the Board 
only helped fuel rumours that it was not destined to last. As the parliamentary session in 
which the House of Commons had proposed its council of trade was prorogued before the 
proposal could receive its final reading, it was not clear whether the House would resume its 
efforts at the next parliamentary session. John Methuen, who had been appointed as one of 
the Board’s working members, refused to leave his ambassadorial post in Portugal until he 
knew ‘of what duration this commission is like to be, at least whether it is like to outlive the 
next sessions of Parliament’.90 As late as June 1696, Robert Henley, a colleague of William 
Blathwayt’s on the Transport Board, reported to him that at the Royal Exchange, odds were 
set at forty to one that the House of Commons would again seek to establish its proposed 
council.91  
 In the months following its inception, then, the Board was in a precarious position. It 
needed to show that its commission was warranted, especially if it were to fend off potential 
attempts to undermine its authority. This would have become all the more pressing when 
Parliament returned on 20 October 1696 and soon after the House of Commons requested that 
the Board compile a report on the progress it had made, a potential warning sign that the 
House was preparing to resume its attempts to create a council of trade.92 With this context in 
mind, could the Board have advanced the Arbitration Act to serve as a token achievement of 
its early efforts? And could its concern about demonstrating the progress it had made by the 
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autumn of 1696 have affected its decision to promote the Act over a merchant court? There is 
some indication that the Board had intended for the Act to be one of its early achievements. 
The Act concerned an issue which the Board had been assigned to address when it was 
commissioned in May 1696: to ‘enquire into the several obstructions of trade and the means 
of removing the same’.93 It is also worth noting just how early on in the Board’s ‘lifespan’ 
Locke had been directed to develop the proposal. When Locke received his instructions on 19 
August, the Board had met a mere handful of times and had only recently settled into its 
rooms in Whitehall.94 But perhaps the clearest sign that the Board had considered the Act to 
be one of its early feats can be found in the report which the Board drafted in response to 
House of Commons’ request.95 Not only did the Board identify the ‘difficulties which 
controversies between merchants meet with, in the ordinary way of decision’ as a principal 
‘clog’ to trade, but it implied that it was in the process of finalising a measure to resolve the 
issue.96 That it felt the need to advertise its efforts, without having anything to show for it at 
the time, suggests just how important an achievement the Board believed itself to be on the 
cusp of attaining. 
 Yet for the Act to be one of the Board’s early achievements, it had to be a measure 
that could be readily implemented. This might explain why the Board decided to advance a 
proposal involving arbitration rather than a merchant court: it was the more feasible option to 
adopt. Consider the logistics necessary to establish a merchant court. Despite repeated calls 
from merchants for such a court, there was no consensus on what the court would look like. 
How many judges would serve on the court, and for how long? Would they be current or 
retired merchants? Would there be only one court and, if so, where would it be located? A 
more difficult issue would be how to incorporate a merchant court into the existing legal 
system. How would its jurisdiction be specified, especially as the existing courts already 
heard and tried commercial disputes? And given that merchants lamented that a suit could be 
appealed before several courts, how would erecting an additional court address this 
complaint? By contrast, the Arbitration Act would have been far easier to implement given 
that its enforcement procedure, whereby a party could be imprisoned for contempt for not 
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performing an award, was already in use by the common law courts in the context of 
references. Comparatively speaking, it would have been much less complicated to extend the 
application of this procedure to apply to arbitration as well than to create a merchant court de 
novo.  
 The Board’s journal might in fact show such a comparison being made between the 
two measures. On 26 October 1696, the Board requested the advice of an Italian Jewish 
merchant named Angelo Fermi on how to implement ‘some projects for the advantage of the 
kingdom in relation to trade’.97 Fermi’s response, which was submitted to the Board on 9 
November, was to suggest the establishment of several merchant courts or tribunals, each 
with jurisdiction over a trade-related issue.98 The Board evidently took Fermi’s suggestions 
seriously, for it ordered that his proposal be recorded in full in one of its supplementary 
journals.99 Yet after this was done, no further action was taken by its members and neither 
Fermi nor his proposal were again mentioned in the Board’s records. As this entire episode 
occurred at the same time when Locke presented his original proposal to the Board—indeed, 
Fermi’s had responded to the Board on the very day that Locke had delivered his arbitration 
bill—it is worth considering whether the existence of Locke’s proposal might have played a 
role in why the Board appears to have abandoned Fermi’s proposition to establish merchant 
courts. Perhaps when faced with both proposals at once, it was clear to the Board which of 
the two options would have been easier to adopt. 
 A second and more immediate issue which the Board would have had to consider was 
how likely the two proposals were to pass through Parliament. If a proposal encountered 
significant opposition from either House, it could not be readily implemented and become the 
token achievement which the Board so needed. Of the two proposals, a merchant court would 
surely have been the more contentious option. Although the merchants in Parliament, and 
particularly in the House of Commons, would have favoured such a proposal, the lawyers 
would have been extremely hostile to the notion given that a court manned by merchants 
would have impinged on their own business and fees.100 Their opposition had in fact 
prevented an earlier attempt to establish a merchant court from proceeding. In 1659 a bill was 
introduced to the House of Commons for ‘the establishment of a court-merchant in 
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London’;101 however, as one contemporary explained, it was abandoned soon after having 
been ‘hindred especially by the lawyers’.102 By contrast, the Arbitration Act would not have 
incited such hostility from the lawyers in Parliament. They might even have supported it, for 
the Act’s enforcement procedure provided new opportunities for court involvement. And 
whilst the merchants in Parliament might not have promoted the scheme, neither would they 
necessarily have opposed it. Merchants had long relied on arbitration to resolve their 
disputes, so it seems unlikely that they would have objected too strenuously to a proposal that 
built on a practice which they regularly employed. 
 Yet when the House of Commons had proposed its council of trade, it had resolved to 
consider ‘the best methods for settling a court merchant’, so we can assume that there was at 
least some resistance to passing the Arbitration Act. This may help explain what occurred 
when the bill was committed for review in the House on 2 April 1698. Although the 
committee reviewing the bill had initially been composed of thirty-three named MPs,103 it 
was later enlarged on two occasions: on 9 April another seventeen named MPs were added to 
the committee;104 and on 27 April it was ordered that ‘all members that are merchants, and all 
that serve for the cloathing counties’ be included as well.105 In spite of these changes, when 
Edward Clarke, the committee’s chair, reported to the House on 2 May, the only amendment 
which the committee put forward was that the word ‘unto’ be omitted from the first 
paragraph of the bill.106 On its own, this would appear to be a peculiar sequence of events, but 
the episode becomes more comprehensible if we consider whether the committee had been 
‘packed’ to ensure that the bill would be recommended. Whilst there might have been a 
number of MPs who opposed the bill on the grounds that it did not advance a merchant court, 
by adding enough MPs to the committee, this opposition could have effectively been 
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drowned out. This might also explain why a large number of known placemen and supporters 
for the Whig Junto as well as most of John Locke’s close friends in the House of Commons 
were named to the committee.107 It could be that the Board had deployed all of its lobbying 
power to see that its proposal would pass.108  
 Of course, the proposal did pass, but in light of what this subsection has shown, it is 
worth considering whether the Arbitration Act would have been viewed favourably by 
contemporaries and, particularly, by merchants. John Lowther, a Cumberland industrialist 
and one of the MPs who had been named to the committee reviewing the bill, wrote to his 
steward a few days after the bill had received royal approval to say that the Act ‘wil [sic] be 
of use’.109 But the views of merchants outside Parliament might have been less supportive. 
The merchant and economic writer Alexander Justice was more disparaging in his assessment 
of the Act, which he included in his commercial manual entitled A General Treatise of 
Monies and Exchanges, first published in 1707.110 Whilst he admitted that ‘the intent of this 
Act be very good’, he argued that it could easily be frustrated so that ‘were it allowable for 
me to christen it instead of, An Act for determining differences by arbitration, as ‘tis now 
called, I would stile it, An Act for preventing the determination of differences by 
arbitration’.111 His argument against the Act was largely composed of two points. First, to 
make use of the Act, merchants were required to have the terms of their submission entered 
into a court’s rule book, a process which involved ‘the performance of several tedious 
punctilio’s with which merchants are so little acquainted’, any omission of which would have 
given ‘occasion to the party who shall think himself a sufferer by the sentence of arbitration 
to depart therefrom’ so that instead of the one dispute between the parties ‘they’ll have two or 
three’.112 Second, the fact that a non-performing party could raise objections against the 
award had the potential to delay the resolution of a dispute, for once it was questioned 
‘whether the sentence of arbitration was procured by corruption or other undue means’, it was 
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almost certain that ‘some flaw will be found in the arbitration, or some matter of Equity will 
be suggested and then away to Chancery go my gentlemen, and there we may safely leave 
‘em and come again in time to find them perhaps till their dying day’.113 In light of these 
issues, Justice concluded his assessment by proposing the establishment of a merchant court. 
Acknowledging that ‘there is not any probability of effecting an entire removal of all the 
grievances attending law-suits’, he hoped that at least merchants ‘might be dispens’d from the 
necessity of neglecting their other affairs…to follow those courts’, an objective which could 
‘very easily be done by erecting a merchant-court, for the decision of differences arising upon 
matters of commerce’.114 Clearly, then, the passing of the Arbitration Act had not put an end 
to the contemporary desire for a merchant court. 
 As the only detailed assessment of the Arbitration Act to be uncovered, it is not clear 
how representative Justice’s opinions were of merchants at the time. Nonetheless, his views 
suggest that the Act might not have been considered by merchants to be as advantageous as 
the Board of Trade had claimed. By prioritising concerns about its own survival, the Board 
might have fallen short of developing a proposal that could resolve the trade-related issues it 
had been commissioned to address. For this reason, it is conceivable that the Act would not 
have been used with any great frequency in the years following its enactment. Here, too, 
Justice’s assessment of the Act might be able to provide some insight. As he explained, 
because the Act ‘only obliges such persons as are inclinable of themselves to take that course, 
to end their differences by arbitration’, it was far more likely that, rather than employ the 
Act’s provisions, merchants would arbitrate their disputes privately, thereby avoiding 
recourse to the law.115 Merchants were generally honest, ‘becaus [sic] amongst them all 
things are or ought to be transacted bona fide, and without suspicion of fraud’, so they could 
be trusted to uphold their agreements to perform an award without the need for court 
enforcement.116 The Arbitration Act might therefore have been a hollow proposition: whilst 
ostensibly it offered a solution for resolving merchants’ disputes, in practice it might not have 
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If the Arbitration Act had been largely hollow in its effect and, for this reason, had not been 
frequently employed in the years following its enactment, how are we to account for the 
upswing in its use by the 1770s-1780s that Horwitz and Oldham demonstrated to have 
occurred? As to answer this question it is necessary to depart from the study of arbitration in 
the seventeenth century, it will only be possible here to put forward a workable solution for 
their finding, one that draws heavily on secondary scholarship. It will be suggested that the 
rise in recourse to the Act coincided with changes to the contemporary legal system that 
made the establishment of a merchant court similar to what merchants had promoted less 
likely to take place. As the principal substantive issues merchants had criticised were 
gradually ‘incorporated’ into the common law, a process which began in the mid-seventeenth 
century but which reached its zenith under Lord Mansfield’s tenure as chief justice of the 
court of King’s Bench in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Arbitration Act 
became a more attractive option for merchants as it addressed one lingering issue which this 
process of incorporation could not fix: it provided a way to avoid much of the procedural 
delay of a lawsuit.  
 As Alexander Justice’s remarks reveal, the Arbitration Act did not put an end to 
contemporary support for a merchant court. Indeed, as the historian Christian Burset has 
shown, merchants continued to promote the establishment of such a court well into the 
eighteenth century.117 An examination of these proposals, be they from the seventeenth or 
eighteenth century, makes it clear that a merchant court was viewed as a sort of panacea for 
the procedural and substantive issues which merchants faced at law. Procedurally, the court 
would enable merchants to ‘end all businesses speedily amongst themselves without charge 
or delay’ given that its procedure would be summary and unrestricted by the rules and 
formalities of the law.118 Substantively, the court would be able to decide merchants’ 
differences in a more competent manner, for not only would its judges have professional 
experience in the matters in dispute, but there would also be no issue as to whether the matter 
was determinable by the law. Whereas the ‘municipal laws of England’ were not ‘sufficient 
for the ordering and determining the affairs of traffic, and matters relating to commerce’, by 
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allowing these issues to be judged by a merchant court, basing its decision on mercantile 
practice or ‘custom’, the issues could be decided to merchants’ satisfaction.119 
 Whilst the reasons merchants put forward for requiring a merchant court do not 
appear to have changed over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the legal 
context in which these proposals were made did. Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, 
efforts were taken by both lawyers and legislators to make it easier for merchants to have 
their commercial disputes decided within the confines of the common law system. These 
efforts were not pursued out of an altruistic concern for merchants’ affairs, however. For 
lawyers, the ability of the courts to handle the resolution of commercial issues more 
effectively would have resulted in more business and, consequently, fees.120 For legislators, 
the more effectual determination of commercial disputes would have had the potential to 
increase trade and add to the wealth of the kingdom.121 Whatever the reason, the combined 
efforts of these groups gave rise to what legal scholars have called the ‘incorporation’ of 
mercantile custom into the common law.122 As the details of how this process of 
incorporation occurred have been covered in previous studies,123 it is sufficient to summarise 
the process here. Whilst many of the instruments and practices on which merchants had relied 
to conduct their commercial affairs were not recognised by the common law and could not 
therefore be enforced by the courts, the common law position underwent three successive 
stages of change. First, beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, the courts allowed 
merchants to plead in a lawsuit that the matter should be decided according to the ‘custom’ of 
merchants so that a jury formed of merchants could make a verdict on the issue. Second, laws 
were passed by Parliament at the turn of the century authorising the courts to enforce two 
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and bills of exchange in the time of Chief Justice Holt’, JLH 31:2 (2010), pp. 149-75; W. Swain, The 
law of contract, 1670-1870 (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 42-106. 
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types of commercial instruments, inland bills of exchange and promissory notes, on which 
merchants had relied to transfer funds and to raise capital but which the courts had not 
previously accepted for contractual reasons.124 Finally, through a series of judgments made in 
the 1760s-1780s, Lord Mansfield, chief justice of the court of King’s Bench, developed a 
substantive doctrine of commercial law so that the ‘custom’ of merchants was no longer an 
exception but rather a part of the existing legal system. By the second half of the eighteenth 
century, then, the substantive issues which merchants long criticised were largely solved—
perhaps not in the way that merchants would have wanted, but well enough that calls for a 
merchant court based on these complaints would have been counter-productive.  
 Whilst this meant that merchants could now rely on the courts to decide their 
commercial disputes in a more effective manner, the changes resulting from this 
incorporation process did not address the other principal concern that had grounded 
merchants’ proposals for erecting a merchant court: to avoid the delays of the law. In this 
context, the Arbitration Act might therefore have emerged as a more attractive option, for 
whilst it did not preclude the involvement of the courts entirely as Alexander Justice had once 
criticised, it would have allowed merchants to by-pass much of the tedium associated with 
conventional legal proceedings. By having the terms of their submission entered into a 
court’s rule book, in the event that one merchant did not perform the award, the other would 
have only had to motion the court to issue a writ of attachment against him; there would have 
been no need for pleadings or a trial. The Act’s enforcement procedure would therefore have 
been more expeditious than a normal lawsuit, so as merchants began to rely more heavily on 
the common law courts to resolve their disputes, this comparative advantage would have been 
increasingly obvious. Thus, whilst the Act did not change, the context surrounding it did, 
which might in turn explain why there was an upswing in its use by the end of the eighteenth 
century. Nearly one hundred years after the Arbitration Act had first been drafted, perhaps it 
was finally perceived as a method for avoiding the ‘tedious determination of controversies 
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This chapter has provided the most complete account for the drafting and enactment of the 
Arbitration Act. It has followed the Act’s substantive development from its initial proposal by 
the Board of Trade to its passing through Parliament, and it has considered in close detail the 
various drafts of the Act. In so doing, the chapter has argued that the Act in its final form had 
not been the original proposal of the Board; rather, the intention had been to formulate a way 
for references to be ‘decisive without appeal’, and that it was only at John Locke’s instigation 
that the proposal came to involve arbitration more generally. By contextualising this 
development amidst the Board’s position at the time, the chapter has also contended that the 
Board had advanced the Act out of concern for its own survival and not because it was 
necessarily the best or only option available. As explored in the chapter itself, taking this 
view has two important consequences, particularly in relation to previous scholarship. First, it 
supplies an additional explanation for why England did not institute merchant courts during 
the period, an issue which has been examined by previous scholars, most notably Christian 
Burset.126 Second, this view might be able to account for the infrequent recourse to the Act’s 
provisions in the years following enactment, an important finding of the study conducted by 
Henry Horwitz and James Oldham on the Act and its effects in the eighteenth century, but 
one which they admitted was not easily explained.127 But the arguments and findings of this 
chapter are in themselves noteworthy, especially for a study such as this on the practice of 
arbitration in the seventeenth century. The Arbitration Act of 1698, the first statute on 
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1. Principal findings and conclusions 
 
To conclude this study of seventeenth-century arbitration, it is best to begin by summarising 
its principal findings and conclusions. These fall under two heads, reflecting the original aims 
of this dissertation: first, to examine what the process of arbitration entailed and how it was 
practised; second, to explain why the Arbitration Act of 1698 was made. Regarding the first 
aim, this dissertation has revealed that there was a full and developed ‘law’ relating to 
arbitration, a body of rules that affected and prescribed each element of the process. Although 
the rules were varied, it has been shown that they derived from just two principles: first, that 
an award had to comply with the specifications of the parties’ submission; second, that the 
award was tantamount to a judgment, as acceptable as any resulting from the courts. The 
dissertation has also made clear, however, that these rules were neither fixed nor intransigent. 
They were capable of being changed in light of external developments or even practical 
problems, and, in some cases, they could even be circumvented by the parties forming their 
submission using conditional bonds. Whilst the extent to which these rules applied in practice 
may of course be questioned, their existence is, nonetheless, noteworthy. They provide a 
different view of arbitration than that depicted in scholarship, putting arbitration within the 
confines of the law rather than outside it. 
 By examining accounts of arbitration found in diaries and letters, this dissertation has 
also been able to re-create the practice of arbitration during the period, examining not just 
how the process was conducted, but also the reasons and motivations behind it. Whilst this 
study has provided evidence to support the views of scholars that arbitration was often 
intended as an alternative to litigation and could be employed for conciliatory and 
‘neighbourly’ ends, it has equally revealed that there was more to the practice than these 
views. The parties to a dispute might have decided to arbitrate the matter for practical 
purposes of time and expense, or they might even have sought to exploit the process to 
silence an opponent or to hold greater sway over its outcome. Moreover, this dissertation has 
shown that the way in which the steps and stages of arbitration were conducted could itself be 
meaningful. Who the parties nominated to resolve their dispute could be revealing of the 
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nature of their disagreement, and even the form of submission the parties entered into could 
be telling, in various ways, of how committed they were to the process. So whilst it is not 
wrong to conclude that arbitration did often result in the resolution of disputes, the process of 
getting to that resolution is nonetheless worth examining.  
 Regarding the second aim of this dissertation, to explain why the Arbitration Act was 
made, it has been shown that the making of the Act was essentially a two-stage process. 
Whereas the provisions of the Act itself were drafted in the months preceding its enactment, 
its enforcement procedure developed as a result of changes implemented in the 1650s-1670s. 
Whilst this dissertation is not the first to recognise the Act’s longer history of development,1 
it has made clear that the two stages were not pursued for the same reasons. The Act’s 
enforcement procedure had arisen in the context of references, the legal fiction on which it 
would rely having first been used so that a reference initiated at the assizes could be enforced 
by the common law courts. By contrast, the Act itself was drafted to address the issues 
merchants faced at law by providing them with a way to obtain a court-enforced decision 
without the need for a lawsuit. Not only, then, were the two stages of the Act’s making 
distinct in terms of timing, but the grounds for their development were largely unrelated. Far 
from representing any culmination of change over time, the making of the Arbitration Act 
appears to have been a piecemeal and disjointed occurrence. 
 Investigating the two stages of the Arbitration Act has also allowed this dissertation to 
come to some surprising conclusions as to why the Act was made. First, it is unlikely that the 
Act was made to ‘fix’ how arbitration was then enforced by the courts, an assumption that 
might be reached if the Act’s enforcement procedure were considered in isolation. Whilst the 
Act did fill a ‘gap’ in that it provided a way for the courts to enforce the performance of 
awards in a summary manner, by examining the existing methods of enforcement as well as 
the apparent lack of contemporary criticism for them, it has been revealed that the effect or 
‘remedy’ of the Act was not especially needed. Second, it is probable that the Act was made 
to serve as an alternative to erecting merchant courts: although it addressed the principal 
issues facing merchants in litigating their commercial disputes, the Act was not the solution 
that merchants had proposed. Nonetheless, John Locke and the Board of Trade appear to have 
gone against these proposals to advance the Arbitration Act not because they believed it to be 
the better option, but because it had the better chance of becoming a token achievement of 
their early efforts. Combining these two conclusions, it would therefore seem that the making 
 
1 Horwitz and Oldham, ‘Arbitration’, pp. 141-43. 
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of the Arbitration Act had little to do with the actual practice of arbitration, a conclusion that 
finds support in the fact that contemporaries did not resort to the Act’s provisions in the 
decades following its enactment. Whilst the Arbitration Act would later become important, 
both to contemporaries and to the modern day, its impact on seventeenth-century arbitration 
was, by contrast, minimal. 
 
2. Consequences of findings 
 
Having set out the principal findings and conclusions of the dissertation, it is worth taking 
some time to consider their consequences, particularly in relation to previous scholarship. 
Here it is best to return to the two matters that inspired this study. The first was the 
incongruity that whilst scholars have acknowledged the importance of arbitration to the 
period, little has been done to investigate the process further. In the Introduction, this lack of 
scrutiny was attributed to scholarly disinterest, an opinion which appears to be confirmed by 
this dissertation as a whole. Not only has this dissertation made clear that arbitration as a 
subject matter is capable of close study, but it has shown that conclusions can be reached as 
to the composition, practice, and enforcement of the process. Due to the largely, but not 
exclusively, extra-judicial nature of arbitration, it may never be possible to assess the 
incidence of arbitration in a similar way to what Christopher Brooks has done for litigation,2 
but this does not mean that our understanding of the process should therefore be confined to 
viewing it simply as an alternative to litigation or as a community-based method of dispute 
resolution.3 Indeed, there are many facets of arbitration raised by this dissertation that would 
likely be of interest to scholars. For example, doctrinal legal historians might find it curious 
that the common law justices formulated a legal fiction so that a reference ordered at the 
assizes could be enforced at Westminster; or that the court of King’s Bench altered the way in 
which it examined accusations of contempt to accommodate this enforcement practice. 
Moreover, historians of social order and relations might be surprised to learn that there was a 
clear and developed ‘law’ of arbitration, the process was not just prescribed by norms and 
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 C.W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and vipers of the commonwealth: the ‘lower branch’ of the legal 
profession in early modern England (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 48-74; ‘Interpersonal conflict and social 
tension: civil litigation in England, 1640-1830’ in The first modern society: essays in English history 
in honour of Lawrence Stone, eds. A.L. Beier, D. Cannadine, J.M. Rosenheim (Cambridge, 1989). 
3
 James Sharpe, for example, stated of arbitration: ‘It is, perhaps, in the nature of the phenomenon that 
no systematic study of it will ever be possible’. J. Sharpe, ‘“Such disagreement betwyx neighbours: 
litigation and human relations in early modern England’ in Disputes and settlements: law and human 
relations in the west, ed. J. Bossy (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 167-87, at p.183. 
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expectations; or that the decisions contemporaries made in conducting an arbitration could 
impart wider social meaning. Ultimately, this dissertation has only scratched the surface of 
what was arbitration in seventeenth-century England, so it is hoped that by revealing some of 
the ways in which the process might be studied, more research can be and will be undertaken. 
 The second matter to inspire this study was the apparent disparity between, on the one 
hand, the conciliatory and ‘neighbourly’ view of arbitration espoused by social historians 
and, on the other, the fact that the Arbitration Act enabled parties to be imprisoned for 
contempt if they did not comply with an arbitration. In the Introduction, the need to explain 
or reconcile this disparity was presented as a driving force of this dissertation, with two 
related questions being asked. First, in light of the view of arbitration put forward by 
scholars, why was the Act needed? Second, in light of the passing of the Act, what does it say 
about this established scholarly view? Albeit similar, these two questions are not one and the 
same, so unsurprisingly they result in different answers. Regarding the first question, this 
dissertation has revealed that, at least as it concerned the general practice of arbitration at the 
time, the Arbitration Act was not needed. The Act was not passed to address any perceived 
fault with the process, so it should not be seen as some sort of bellwether as to the state of 
arbitration at the time or of how successful the process was at resolving disputes. The ‘why’ 
of the Arbitration Act had little to do with the noted scholarly view. Regarding the second 
question, however, this dissertation has also shown that the substance of the Act, the 
enforcement procedure it enabled, was not new. It built on a practice already in use by the 
common law courts, and it can easily be contextualised within the methods of enforcement at 
the time. The ‘what’ of the Act does have an effect on the view put forward by scholars: it 
shows that legal enforcement was a more entrenched part of the process than previously 
recognised. Of course, this does not mean that contemporaries were unable to conduct 
arbitration without court involvement. But what it cautions against is the assumption, one 
easily made when arbitration is viewed as a conciliatory process, that once a dispute was put 
to arbitration, it was bound to be determined. There was more to the practice of arbitration 
than being an endpoint in the disputing process, and it is hoped that future studies will be 
more receptive to this widened view. 
 Beyond the matters inspiring this study, there are other ways in which the findings of 
the dissertation can be seen to affect previous scholarship. One way would be in relation to 
the ‘legalisation’ of arbitration that legal scholars have claimed to have occurred as a result of 
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the Arbitration Act.4 To summarise the view, it has been argued that as to employ the Act’s 
enforcement procedure required more direct judicial involvement than simply forming a 
submission, with the increase in the Act’s use by the mid-eighteenth century, the practice of 
arbitration as a whole came by extension to resemble a court process: lawyers were often 
chosen for the role of an arbitrator, and the way in which an arbitration was conducted took 
on more of the procedural trappings of a lawsuit. With its focus on arbitration in the 
seventeenth century, this dissertation is not in a position to assess the extent to which this 
transformation took place, but its findings can nevertheless speak to the causality of the 
change. The finding that there were clear legal rules prescribing the practice of arbitration 
may, for example, dampen the claim that it was because of the Act that the practice became 
legalised. How much of this noted transformation should in fact be attributed to the effects of 
the Act? Moreover, even if the Act had brought about such a change, this dissertation’s 
analysis of the Act’s drafting would suggest that this outcome had been unintended. The Act 
was drafted with the express intention of applying to merchants’ disputes, and it was only due 
to an amendment, perhaps made by William Blathwayt, that the scope of the Act’s provisions 
was extended to apply to non-commercial matters. Whilst these findings do not invalidate 
what legal scholars claim to have later occurred, they might help ward off the taking of a 
more teleological view of this transformation. Simply because the Act precipitated a process 
of legalisation does not mean that it had been made or designed for this purpose. 
 Another way in which the findings of this dissertation could relate to previous 
scholarship is in reference to recent arguments of social historians on the ‘decline’ of 
neighbourliness. Having focused previously on the enduring features of English society in the 
seventeenth century,5 recent scholarship on the subject has been more open to questioning 
whether the period witnessed a change in the structuring of social relations so that the 
premium once placed on community and neighbourly interaction mattered less by the end of 
the century.6 Given that the arbitration has been widely depicted in scholarship as a 
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neighbourly process, it is not difficult to see how the Arbitration Act and its enforcement 
procedure might be taken to reflect this change. As neighbourly ties that had once constrained 
parties to adhere to arbitration frayed, a more coercive form of enforcement was needed.7 At 
least regarding the Act, however, the findings of this dissertation would caution against 
taking such a view. The Act was made for reasons other than addressing the state of 
arbitration at the time, so its passing should not be seen as emblematic of any change in social 
relations. Yet one criticism that could be made of this dissertation is that in its examination of 
the practice of arbitration, it has not sufficiently addressed the issue of change over time. 
Priority was instead given to examining how the practice was conducted and the reasons and 
motivations underlying it. Accordingly, it may well be that the practice had undergone some 
form of transformation over the period; simply because the Arbitration Act was not reflective 
of this perceived change does not mean that the more general practice of arbitration had 
remained constant. It would be a worthwhile objective for future study to consider whether 
any changes to the practice of arbitration can be discerned.  
 
3. Areas for further research 
 
As a final matter to discuss, it is worth considering possible areas for further research. As 
noted in the above discussion on the ‘decline’ of neighbourliness, one area for study would be 
to address the issue of change over time in the diaries and letters consulted to examine how 
arbitration was practised in the seventeenth century. It should be mentioned, however, that in 
undertaking research for this analysis, no general impression was given pointing to any 
obvious change. That said, these types of sources were not consulted with the explicit 
intention of looking for a change over time, so this impression might simply be attributable to 
differing research objectives. Equally worthwhile would be to supplement the sources used 
for this examination. Only printed diaries and letters were analysed for the study, and it 
cannot be said that the writers were well-suited to impart a representative view of the more 
general practice of arbitration, being exclusively men and of the ‘middling’ sort or higher. 
 
England’ in Remaking English society: social relations and social change in early modern England, 
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Yet it cannot be assured that examining additional sources would reveal further accounts of 
arbitration, or at least accounts that can offer a markedly different view of contemporary 
practice. With no other way of knowing for certain whether a given source will contain 
descriptions of arbitration than to trawl through its contents, any further advances in this area 
of study will likely be slow-going. 
 Further research could also be undertaken to fill in some of the ‘gaps’ in the account 
of the drafting and enactment of the Arbitration Act. Due to time and financial constraints of 
research, most of this account has been based on the analysis of two sets of sources: the 
Board of Trade’s journals and John Locke’s personal papers and correspondence. It might be 
productive to look into other sources as well, such as the papers of William Blathwayt, one of 
the known ‘drafters’ of the Act,8 or even of John Egerton, the earl of Bridgewater, who not 
only served as the president of the Board of Trade and as a privy councillor, but was also 
responsible for chairing the review committee that revised the draft of the Act submitted to 
the House of Lords.9 There are also certain features of the account that beg clarification. Who 
were the ‘men experienced in our laws’ whom Locke consulted to draft his proposal? Or how 
did the Board of Trade come to instruct Locke to draw up a scheme involving ‘referees’ that 
could be ‘decisive without appeal’? Resolving these issues would not only provide a fuller 
account of the drafting process, but they could put to test the conclusions which this 
dissertation has reached regarding why the Act was made. For example, it has been argued 
that the Act had not been pursued out of a concern for how arbitration was enforced at the 
time, but did the lawyers whom Locke consulted make any comment as to whether the Act’s 
enforcement procedure could provide a more suitable ‘remedy’ in cases where a party did not 
perform an award? Moreover, it has been contended that the Board had advanced the Act out 
of concern for its own survival, but did any of its members discuss their reasons for 
supporting this proposal, particularly in light of the persistent call amongst merchants for a 
merchant court? Due to the nature of the surviving sources, there is the possibility that these 
issues and others like them might never by explained, but it would be comforting to know, 
especially given the conclusions of this dissertation concerning the impact of the Act on the 
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general practice of arbitration at the time, that all practicable avenues for research have been 
exhausted.  
 The findings of this dissertation, particularly those relating to enforcing arbitration in 
its various forms, lend themselves to other areas of research as well. One possibility would be 
to examine how the court of Chancery, the principal court of equity in the realm, dealt with 
arbitration. A preliminary investigation into the court’s enforcement practices has revealed 
some interesting findings. The first is that, throughout the seventeenth century, the court was 
prepared to enforce references using a contempt procedure similar to the one adopted by the 
common law courts, the chief difference being that it was the referee’s award, rather than the 
order of reference, that became a rule or ‘decree’ of the court.10 As the justices of the 
common law courts often attended Chancery proceedings to give advice on points of law,11 
one wonders whether their exposure to this more long-standing procedure informed or 
affected how they came to enforce references in their own courts. The second and more 
surprising finding is that the court of Chancery was prepared to use its contempt procedure 
not just to enforce the performance of referees’ awards, but also to enforce what it called 
‘extrajudicial’ or ‘voluntary’ awards—that is, awards resulting from the private submission 
between parties.12 The immediate significance of this finding is that, prior to the Arbitration 
Act, it was in fact possible to enforce the performance of this type of award, just not in the 
common law courts: only in the court of Chancery was this remedy available. It is also clear 
from this preliminary investigation that the court of Chancery was willing to enforce the 
performance of an ‘extrajudicial’ award even in instances where the aggrieved party could 
have or had sought redress from the common law courts, usually by means of the action of 
debt on an obligation.13 Accordingly, this would suggest that when a party did not perform 
the award, the aggrieved party would have had at his disposal more than one option for 
seeking enforcement, something which might in turn explain the lack of criticism of the ways 
in which the common law courts had enforced arbitration before the passing of the 
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examples of cases where extra-judicial awards were decreed, see Scott v Wray (1634/5), 1 Chan. Rep. 
85; Bishop v Bishop (1639), Tot. 17, 1 Chan. Rep. 142; Church v Roper (1639/40), 1 Chan. Rep. 140; 
Norton v Mascall (1697), 2 Ven. 24. 
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example, Norton v Mascall (1697), 2 Ven. 24. 
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Arbitration Act. Although more research would be needed, it is conceivable that on those 
occasions where an aggrieved party would have preferred for his opponent to perform the 
award than to receive a sum of money by way of legal remedy, he would have turned to the 
court of Chancery for enforcement. 
 Another possible area for research would be in relation to the contempt procedure that 
the common law courts came to use in the 1650s-1670s to enforce references. As John 
Charles Fox, writer of the only comprehensive study on the history of contempt, contended, 
the ability of the common law courts to penalise the offence by means of a summary 
procedure—that is, by granting a writ of attachment to summon and imprison the disobedient 
party—was itself a seventeenth-century development.14 Fox argued that before this time, the 
courts had punished the offence as any other criminal matter, by indictment or by 
information, and that it was the 1641 abolition of the court of Star Chamber, the prerogative 
court which Fox claimed to have had jurisdiction to penalise a contempt committed against 
the common law courts using a summary procedure, that spear-headed the change to the 
enforcement practices of these courts.15 Whilst Fox’s arguments are ripe for review, having 
first been articulated in two articles from 1909, they nonetheless find some support in the 
research conducted for this dissertation. For one thing, only the legal works and dictionaries 
published after the abolition of the court of Star Chamber acknowledge that a writ of 
attachment could be used by the common law courts in the context of contempt.16 For 
another, in a mid-seventeenth-century report on the fees collected by the clerks of the court of 
King’s Bench, one that was used in Chapter 3 to re-create the court’s contempt procedure for 
the purpose of its analysis, it was noted that ‘for examination upon attachments for contempt 
we do not know what hath been anciently taken by reason of the fewness of them’, which 
might suggest that the procedure was relatively new.17 If Fox’s claims were proven correct, 
they might in turn provide an additional explanation for the hesitancy shown by the court of 
King’s Bench in the 1650s-1660s to enforce references by means of its contempt procedure. 
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 J.C. Fox, ‘Summary process to punish contempt. I.’, LQR 25:3 (1909), pp. 238-54; ‘Summary 
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 This report was reprinted in J. Trye, Jus filizarii: of, the filacer’s office in the court of King’s Bench 
(1684), pp. 205-52, the above quotation being at p. 221. 
 165 
It could be that the court’s reluctance was reflective of a larger trend of judicial uncertainty as 
to what issues the court was prepared to apply this new procedure, an area which might be of 
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Appendix I – Timeline of events for the making of the Arbitration Act 
 
 
December 1695 House of Commons introduces proposal to establish a council of trade 
 
28 January 1695/6 House of Commons presents several resolutions for a council of trade, one of 
which is that ‘the said commissioners be empowered to consider the best 
methods for setting a court merchant’ 
  
27 April 1696 Parliament is prorogued 
 
15 May 1696 William III commissions the Board of Trade and Foreign Plantations  
 
25 June 1696 First meeting of Board of Trade 
 
19 August 1696 Board of Trade directs John Locke to ‘draw up a scheme of some method for 
determining differences between merchants by referees that might be decisive 
without appeal’ 
  
31 October 1696 House of Commons requests a report on Board of Trade’s progress 
 
9 November 1696 
 
18 December 1696 
 
18 January 1696/7 
 
Locke delivers draft of arbitration bill to Board of Trade 
 
William Blathwayt submits amended draft of arbitration bill to Board of Trade 
 
Locke sends Board of Trade his revisions of Blathwayt’s draft. Board orders that 
the revisions be included in draft of arbitration bill represented to Privy Council 
  
21 January 1696/7 A representation is drawn up of the arbitration bill and is sent to Privy Council 
 
25 February 1697/8 A bill ‘for determining differences by arbitration’ is read for the first time in 
House of Lords 
 
28 February 1697/8 Second reading of bill; committed to at least five of forty-three named peers 
 
11 March 1697/8 Earl of Bridgewater reports that the bill is fit to pass with ‘some amendments’ 
 
26 March 1698 Third reading of bill; passed by House of Lords 
 
31 March 1698 First reading of bill in House of Commons 
 
2 April 1698 Second reading of bill; committed to thirty-three named MPs 
 
9 April 1698 Commons committee is enlarged to include another seventeen named MPs 
 
27 April 1698 Commons committee is enlarged to include ‘all the members that are merchants, 
and all that serve for the cloathing counties’ 
 
2 May 1698 Edward Clarke reports that the bill is fit to pass, the only amendment being that 
the word ‘unto’ be omitted from first paragraph of bill. Third reading of bill; 
passed by House of Commons 
 










Heading Entry Board members present 
 






Mr Locke was desired to draw up a scheme of some method for 
determining differences between Merchants by Referees, that might be 
decisive without Appeal. 
 
 
Ex officio: Earl of Bridgewater, 
Chancellor of Exchequer 
 
Working: John Pollexfen, John 
Locke, Abraham Hill 
 
 




Mr Lock acquainted the Board that in Order to draw up a scheme of 
some method for determining differences between Merchants by 
Referees, that might be decisive without appeale, as had been desired of 
him by the Board he had enquired into the methods practised in Holland 
for that purpose, but found them too intricate, and too different from our 
methods to be put in practise here; whereupon he had consulted with 
others experienced in our Laws, who had drawn up a draught of an Act 
of Parliament for that purpose, which he delivered into the Board. 
Ordered thereupon that a Representation be drawn up, to lay before his 
Majesty the usefulness of this designe of determining Controversies 




Ex officio: Earl of Bridgewater, 
Sir Philip Meadows 
 
Working: William Blathwayt, 
John Pollexfen, John Locke, 
Abraham Hill 
 





A Representation to his Majesty upon the Draught of an Act of 
Parliament for determining differences between Merchants by 
Arbitration was read and agreed upon. 
 
 
Ex officio: Earl of Bridgewater, 
Sir Philip Meadows 
 
Working: William Blathwayt, 
John Pollexfen, Abraham Hill2 
 
 
1 CO 391/9, pp. 62, 222, 233, 288, 354, 358. 
2 Locke had departed for Oates sometime after 13 November where he would remain for the winter. 
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The Draught of an Act of Parliament for determining of Controversies 
between Merchants by Arbitration, which was intended to have been 
presented to his Majesty the 18th of the last month, but was then upon 
some doubt about the forme of it put into the hands of Mr Blathwayt to 
be advised upon, being now returned with some amendments; Ordered 
that the Secretary send a Copie of this Second Draught to Mr Locke who 
brought in the first. 
 
 
Ex officio: Earl of Bridgewater, 
Sir Philip Meadows 
 
Working: William Blathwayt, 
John Pollexfen, Abraham Hill 
 




Upon reading the remarks sent by Mr Locke upon the Alterations made 
in the Draught of a Bill presented by him to the Board for determining 
Controversies between Traders by Arbitration, Ordered that the said 
Draught be corrected according to these remarks, And a Report prepared 
to lay it in that manner before his Majesty. 
 
 
Ex officio: Earl of Bridgwater, Sir 
Philip Meadows 
 
Working: William Blathwayt, 
John Pollexfen, Abraham Hill 
 





A Representation upon the Draught of a Bill to be proposed in 
Parliament for the terminating of Controversies by Arbitration, 
according to the last Corrections ordered to be made of that Draught; 
Was now3 signed and transmitted to the Council Board. 
 
 
Ex officio: Earl of Bridgewater, 
Sir Philip Meadows 
 
Working: William Blathwayt, 












3 The words ‘both of them’ have been crossed out. 
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Whereas it hath been found by Experience that references 
made by Rule of Court have Contributed much to the ease of the 
subject in the determining of Controversies because the parties be- 
come thereby obliged to submit to the Award of the Arbitrators under 
the penalty of Imprisonment for their Contempt in Case they 
refuse submission Now for promoting Trade and rendring the 
Awards of Arbitrators the more effectual in all Cases for the 
final Determination of Controversies referr’d to them by Mer- 
chants and traders concerning matters of Account or Trade 
Be it Enacted by the Kings most Excellent Majesty and by and with 
the Advise and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporall 
and Commons in Parliament Assembled and by Authority of 
the same That for and after the           day of            
it shall and may be Lawfull for all Merchants and Traders 
desiring to End any Controversie Suit or Quarrell Controversies 
Suites or Quarrells by Arbitration to Agree that their Sub- 
mission of the suite to the Award or Umpirage of any Persons 
or person should be made a Rule of any of his Majesty’s Courts 
of Record which the parties shall chuse and to insert such their 
Agreement in their Submission or into the Condition of the Bond 
or promise whereby they oblige themselves respectively to submit 
to the Award or Umpirage of any Person or Persons which Agree- 
ment being so made and inserted in their Submission or promise 
or Condition of their respective Bonds shall or may upon produ- 
cing an affidavit thereof made by the Witnesses thereunto or 
any one of them in the Court of which the same is agreed to be 




























Whereas it has been found by Experience that Refferences 
made by Rule of Court have contributed much to the Ease of the 
subject in the determining of Controversies for which and Action 
hath been brought Because the Parties become thereby obliged to 
submit to the Award of the Arbitrators, under the penalty of Im- 
prisonment for their Contempt in case they refuse submission. 
Now for promoting Trade, and rendring the Award of Arbitrators 
the more effectuall in all cases, for the finall determination of 
controversies referred to them by Merchants Traders and others con- 
cerning Matters of Accompt, Trade or other matters Bee it Enacted 
by the Kings most Excellent Majesty by and with the Advise and  
consent of the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Commons in 
Parliament Assembled and by Authority of the same, That 
from and after the           day of           it shall and may 
be Lawfull for all Merchants, Traders, and others desiring to 
end any Controversy or Quarrell Controversies or Quarrells (for 
which any Action personal hath been brought) by Arbitration 
to agree that their submission of the matter in suit to the Award 
or Umpirage of any persons or person should be made a Rule of  
his Majesty’s Court of Record in which such suit or Action at the 
time of such submission was or is depending, so as such submission 
be in writing and signed by each party submitting and Witnessed by one 
or more credible persons, and to incert such their Agreement in their 
submission, or into the Condition of the Bond whereby they oblige 
themselves respectively to submit to the Award or Umpirage of 
any person or persons, which Agreement being so made and incerted 
in their submission or Condition of their respective Bonds shall or 
 















Court be Entred of Record in such Court and a Rule shall thereupon 
be made by the said Court that the parties shall submit to and 
finally be Concluded by the Arbitration or Umpirage which  
shall be made Concerning them2 by the Arbitrators or Umpire 
pursuant to such Submission and in Case of Disobedience to such 
Arbitration or Umpirage the parties neglecting or refusing to 
performe and Execute the same or any part thereof shall be 
subject to all the Penalties of Contemning a Rule of Court 
when he is a Suitor or Defendant in such Court and the Court 
on Motion shall Issue process accordingly which process shall 
not be stop’d or delayed in its Execution by any order Rule 















may upon producing an Affidavit thereof made by the Witnesses 
thereunto or any one of them in the Court where such suit or 
Action was or is depending and reading and fileing the said Affida- 
vit in Court, be entred of Record in such Court and a Rule shall there- 
upon be made by the said Court that the parties shall submit to, & 
finally be concluded by the Arbitration or Umpirage which shall 
be made concerning the matters submitted to Arbitration by the 
Arbitrators or Umpire pursuant to such submission. And in case 
of disobedience to such Arbitration or Umpirage, the party neglec- 
ting or refusing to performe and execute the same or any part 
thereof shall be subject to all the penalties of contemning a Rule 
of Court when he is a Suitor or defendant in such Court, and the 
Court on Motion shall issue processe accordingly, which Process 
shall not be stop’d or delayed in its Execution by any Order Rule 




2 ‘the matters submitted to Arbitration’ is included superscript. 
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May it please your Majesty. 
 
          The great obstructions in Trade arising from the Tedious Determination of 
Controversies between Merchants and Traders concerning Matt[er]
s
 of Accompt 
or Trade in Our Ordinary Methods, have obliged us to apply Our selves to finde 
out some remedy for so great an evill, Whereupon Wee humbly beg leave to lay 
before your Majesty the annext Draught of a Bill, which if past in to Law, Wee 
humbly conceive would greatly conduce to that End, and Consequently be of very 
great advantage to the Trade of this Kingdome. 
 







                               J Bridgewater              W
m
 Blathwayt 
                               Tankerville                  John Pollexfen 
                               Ph: Meadows              Abr. Hill 
 
Whereas it hath been found by Experience that References made by Rule of Court 
have contributed much to the ease of the subject in the determining of 
Controversies, because the Parties become thereby obliged to submit to the Award 
of the Arbitrators under the penalty of Imprisonm[en]
t
 for their contempt in case 
they refuse submission. Now for promoting Trade and rendring the Awards of 
Arbitrators the more effectual in all Cases for the final Determination of 
Controversies referr’d to them by Merchants, Traders and others concerning 
Matters of Account Trade or other Matters; Be it Enacted by the Kings most  
Excellent Majesty, by and w[i]
th
 the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and 
Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled and by Authority of the same, 
That from and after the           Day of          it shall and may be lawfull for all 
Merchants, Traders and others desiring to end any controversy suite or Quarrel, 
Controversies, suits or Quarrels, for which there is no other legal remedy but by 
personal Action or suit in Equity by arbitration, to agree that their submission of 
the same to the award or Umpirage of any Persons or Person should be made a 
Rule of any of his Majesty’s Courts of Record, which the Party shall chuse and to 
insert such their agreement in their submission, or into the Condition of the Bond 
or promise whereby they oblige themselves respectively to submit to the award or 
Umpirage of any Person or Persons, which Agreem[en]
t
 being so made and 
inserted in their submission or promise or condition of their respective Bonds 
shall or may upon producing an Affidavit thereof made by the Witnesses 
 














thereunto, or any one of them in Court of which the same is agreed to be made a 
Rule, and reading and filing the said Affidavit in Court, be Entred of Record in 
such Court and a Rule shall there
upon
 be made by the said Court, that the parties 
shall submit to, and finally be concluded by the Arbitration or umpirage which 
shall be made concerning the Matters submitted to Arbitration by the Arbitrators 
or Umpire pursuant to such Submission, and in case of Disobedience to such 
arbitration or Umpirage, the parties neglecting or refusing to performe and  
Execute the same or any part thereof, shall be subject to All the penalties of 
Contemning a Rule of Court, when he is a suiter or Defendant in such Court, and 
the Court on such Motion shall issue Process accordingly, which Process shall not 
be stopt or delayed in its Execution by any Order, Rule, Command or Process by 
any other Court, either or Law or Equity. 
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                    Whereas it has been found by experience that 
References made by Rule of Court have contributed much to the 
case of the subject, in the Determining of Controversies, because the 
Parties become thereby obliged to submit to the Award of the 
Arbitrators, under the Penalty of imprisonment for their contempt 
in case they refuse submission; Now for promoting Trade, and 
rendring the Awards or Arbitrators the more effectual in all Cases, 
for the final Determination of Controversies referred to them by 
Merchants and Traders, or others, concerning Matters of Account 
or Trade, or other Matters; Be it enacted by the King’s most 
Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and consent of the 
Lords spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament 
Assembled, and by authority of the same; That from and after 
the eleaventh day of May w[hich] [^shalbe in [the] yeare of our Lord 1698] it shall and may be lawfull 
for all Merchants and Traders, and others, desiring to end any 
Controversie, Suit, or Quarrell, Controversies, Suits, or Quarrells, 
(for which there is no other remedy but by personal Action or 
suit in Equity) by Arbitration, to agree that their submission of 
the suit, to the Award, or Umpirage of any person or persons, 
should be made a Rule of any of his Majesty’s Courts of 
Record, which the Parties shall chuse, and to insert such their 
Agreement in their submission, or into the condition of the Bond 
or Promise whereby they oblige themselves respectively to submit 
to the Award or Umpirage of any Person or Persons; Which 
Agreement being so made, and inserted in their Submission or  
Promise, or Condition of their respective Bonds, shall or may upon 
producing an Affidavit thereof made by the Witnesses thereunto, 
or any one of them, in the Court of which the same is agreed to be 
made a Rule, and reading and filing the said Affidavit in 
Court, be entred of Record in such Court; And a Rule shall there- 
upon be made by the said Court, that the Parties shall submit to, 
and finally be concluded by the Arbitration or Umpirage 
which shall be made concerning them by the Arbitrators or 
Umpire, pursuant to such submission; And in case of disobe- 
dience to such Arbitration or Umpirage, the Party neglecting 
or refusing to performe and execute the same, or any part 
thereof, shall be subject to all the Penalties of contemning 
a Rule of Court when he is a suitor or Defendant in such Court, 
And the Court on motion shall issue Processe accordingly; Which 
Processe shall not be stopt or delayed in it’s Execution, by any Order, 
 

















Rule, Command, or Processe of any other Court, either of Law or 
Equity, unlesse it shall be made appeare on oath, to such Court, 
that the Arbitrators or Umpire misbehaved themselves, and that 
such Award, Arbitration or Umpirage was procured by Corrup- 
tion or other undue means. 
                    And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, 
that any Arbitration or Umpirage procured by Corruption, or 
undue means, shall be judged and esteemed void, and of 
non effect, and accordingly be set aside by any Court of 
Law or Equity; so as Complaint of such Corruption or undue 
Practice be made in the Court where the Rule is made for 
Submission to such Arbitration or Umpirage within before 
the last day of the [^next terme] after such Arbitration or Umpirage 
made and published to the Parties, any thing in this Act 
contained to the contrary notwithstanding./ 
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Whereas it hath been found by Experience That References made by Rule of Court have 
contributed much to the Ease of the Subject in the determining of Controversies because the Parties 
become thereby obliged to submitt to the Award of the Arbitrators under the Penalty of 
Imprisonment for their Contempt in case they refuse Submission Now for promoting Trade and 
rendring the Awards of Arbitrators to more effectual in all Cases for the final Determination of 
Controversies referred to them by Merchants and Traders or others concerning Matters of Account 
or Trade or other Matters Be it enacted by the Kings most Excellent Majesty by and with the  
Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Co[m]mons in Parliament assembled 
and by Authority of the same That from & after the Eleventh Day of May which shall be in the 
yeare of our Lord One thousand six hundred ninety eight Itt shall and may be lawfull for all 
Merchants and Traders & others desiring to end any Controversie Suit or Quarrel Controversies 
Suits or Quarrels (for which there is no other Remedy but by Personal Action or Suit in Equity) by 
Arbitration to agree that their Submission of their Suit to the Award or Umpirage of any person or 
persons should be made a Rule of any of His Majesties Courts of Record which the Parties shall 
choose and to insert such their Agreement in their Submission or the Condition of the Bond or 
Promise whereby they oblidge themselves respectively to submitt to the Award or Umpirage of any 
Person or Persons which Agreement being so made and inserted in their Submission or Promise or 
Condition of their Respective Bonds shall or may upon producing an Affidavit thereof made by the 
Witnesses thereunto or any one of them in the Court of which the same is agreed to be made a Rule 
& reading and filing the said Affidavitt in Court be entred of Record in such Court and a Rule shall 
thereupon be made by the said Court that the Parties shall submitt to & finally be concluded by the  
Arbitration or Umpirage which shall be made concerning them by the Arbitrators or Umpire 
pursuant to such Submission And in case of Disobedience to such Arbitration or Umpirage the 
Party neglecting or refusing to performe and execute the same or any part thereof shall be subject 
to all the Penalties of contemning a Rule of Court when hee is a Suitor or Defendant in such Court 
and the Court on Motion shall issue Processe accordingly which Processe shall not be stopt or 
delayed in its Execution by any Order Rule Co[m]mand or Porcess of any other Court either of  
Law or Equity unlesse it shall be made appeare on Oath to such Court that the Arbitrators or 
Umpire misbehaved themselves and that such Award Arbitration or Umpirage was procured by  
Corruption or other undue Means. 
 
And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid That any Arbitration or Umpirage procured by 
Corruption or undue Means shall be judged and esteemed void and of none Effect and accordingly 
be sett aside by any Court of Law or Equity so as Complaint of such Corruption or undue Practise 
be made in the Court where the Rule is made for Submission to such Arbitration or Umpirage 
before the last Day of the next Terme after such Arbitration or Umpirage made and published to the 
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